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This thesis examines the regulatory and legislative approach taken in the United 
Kingdom to deal with deaths arising from work related activities and, in 
particular, deaths that can be directly attributed to the behaviour of 
corporations and other organisations.  Workplace health and safety has 
traditionally been seen in the United Kingdom as a regulatory function which can 
be traced to the very earliest days of the Industrial Revolution.  With an 
emphasis on preventing workplace accidents and ill-health through guidance, 
advice and support, the health and safety legislation and enforcement regime 
which had evolved over the best part of two centuries was considered 
inadequate to effectively punish corporations considered responsible for deaths 
caused by their activities following a series of disasters in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries. 
To address this apparent inadequacy, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007 was introduced creating the offence of corporate 
manslaughter and corporate homicide.  Based on a gross breach of a relevant 
duty of care resulting in the death of a person, the Act effectively changed what 
had previously considered a matter of regulation, an approach that had obvious 
weaknesses and shortcomings, to one of crime and criminal law. 
Whether this is the best approach to dealing with deaths caused by an 
organisation is challenged in this thesis and the apparent distinction between 
‘criminal’ and ‘regulatory’ offences is also examined.  It was found that an 
amended Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 to include a specific offence 
of corporate killing, in conjunction with the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 
2008 would almost certainly have resulted in a more effective approach to 
dealing with organisations responsible for causing deaths as consequence of their 
activities.  It was also found that there was no substantive difference between 
‘regulatory’ and ‘criminal’ law other than the stigma associated with the latter, 
and that distinction would almost certainly disappear, at least in the context of 
worker safety, as a consequence of the penalties available following the 
introduction of the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008.  
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That law, hitherto half dormant, is awake, and bent upon the command that 
all these deadly shafts shall no longer mangle or murder, every year, two 
thousand human creatures but that they shall henceforward be securely 
fenced.1 
 
From Sunday the law ensures improved justice for victims of corporate 
failures. The Act provides that companies and organisations can be found 
guilty of corporate manslaughter on the basis of gross corporate failures in 
health and safety. 
We are sending out a very powerful deterrent message to those 
organisations which do not take their health and safety responsibilities 
seriously.  Angela Eagle, Justice Minister2 
The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 was met with 
both support and criticism when it was introduced.3  Intended as a response to 
inadequacies identified in the legal approach to corporate killing, its origins can 
be traced back to the Law Commission Consultation Paper on Involuntary 
Manslaughter published in 1994, although the campaign for a change in the law 
dealing with corporate killing started to gather momentum in the late nineteen-
eighties following a series of accidents that resulted in major loss of life.4  
Whilst the Consultation Paper dealt with most aspects of involuntary 
manslaughter, one section was devoted to corporate manslaughter and the 
problems of holding organisations accountable for deaths arising from their 
                                        
1 'Chips', Deadly Shafts, vol Volume XI (Household Words, 1855) 
2 Ministry of Justice, 'Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act comes into force' (UK 
Government, 2008) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/news/newsrelease040
408a.htm> accessed 18 August 2014 
3 For some typical responses, see Frank B. Wright, 'Criminal liability of directors and senior 
managers for deaths at work' (2007) Criminal Law Review 949, David  Ormerod and Richard 
Taylor, 'The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007' (2008) Criminal Law 
Review 589,  
4 The Law Commission, Law Commission Consultation Paper No 135, Involuntary Manslaughter 
(LCCP 135) (HMSO 1994); Rosemary Craig, 'Thou shall do no murder: a discussion paper on the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007' (2008) 30 Company Lawyer 17 19 
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activities.5  When the Consultation Document was published, the Law 
Commission was basing its views on one failed corporate manslaughter 
prosecution taken against P&O Ferries Ltd following the capsize of the Herald of 
Free Enterprise in 1987 with the loss of one-hundred and eighty-four lives.6  The 
Herald of Free Enterprise was not the first accident with a major loss of life 
attributed, at least in part, to the behaviour of an organisation and it was 
certainly not the last in the years leading towards the end of the twentieth and 
the start of the twenty-first century.  The King’s Cross Fire in 1987, Piper Alpha 
and the Clapham Rail Crash in 1988, the Southall Rail Crash in 1997, the Larkhall 
gas explosion in 1998 and the Hatfield Rail Crash in 2000 are just a few of the 
accidents that occurred during this period, each with a significant loss of life and 
attributed to the activities of large national and international organisations.  
There were few prosecutions for manslaughter following these accidents which 
were mainly unsuccessful resulting in some commentators suggesting that 
corporations were getting away with murder.7  The few successful corporate 
manslaughter prosecutions were in respect of the very smallest companies where 
the actions of the senior management and the actions of the company were 
deemed to be one and the same.  Discussing the crime of manslaughter, former 
Home Secretary Jack Straw commented on the ineffectiveness of the then-
existing approach to dealing with deaths arising from corporate activities, where 
the criminal law was unable to secure a conviction against either corporations or 
individuals “whose acts or failures have contributed to the deaths”.8   
The accusation of companies getting away with murder was a minority view, but 
more typically it was thought that large corporations were not being adequately 
punished for causing deaths as a consequence of their activities.  Although large 
fines were imposed in a few cases, these tended to be the exception rather than 
the rule and in general fines were low, even where death had occurred as a 
consequence of the offence.  Tombs and Whyte pointed out that what they 
                                        
5 The Law Commission, Law Commission Consultation Paper No 135, Involuntary Manslaughter 
(LCCP 135) op. cit. n.4, p.17 
6 R. v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd. (1990) 93 CrAppR 72 (Central Criminal Court) 
7Rob Jones, 'Safety Crime: a case study of Transco' 1999) 19 
<https://www.ljmu.ac.uk/LSA/LSA_Docs/RJ_Transco.pdf> accessed 24 September 2014; Maurice 
Punch, 'Suite violence: Why managers murder and corporations kill' (2000) 33 Crime, Law and 
Social Change 243;  
8 The Home Office, Reforming the Law on Involuntary Manslaughter: The Government's Proposals  
(HMSO 2000) 3 
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described as “safety crimes” did not attract the same level of punishment as 
other forms of crime including corporate crime, an observation made by many 
other commentators.9  Perhaps more importantly, there was a perception that 
the stigma normally associated with murder or manslaughter was not attached 
to these offences, which were viewed as regulatory rather than criminal in 
nature.  In only a very few cases were individuals found liable for manslaughter 
as a consequence of deaths arising from work activities.  The close of the 
twentieth century and start of the twenty-first saw a demand for something to 
be done to address this apparent gap in the law; what was to be done was much 
less clear other than the punishment of corporations for the specific offence of 
causing death through their activities. 
The clamour for something to be done was based on the assumption that the 
existing law protecting workers and others was in some way inadequate and at 
least some of this perceived inadequacy could be attributed to the regulatory 
nature of health and safety legislation intended to protect workers (and others).  
The origins of health and safety legislation in the United Kingdom can be found 
in the Factories Act 1802 which, as discussed in more detail in the next Chapter, 
was generally ineffective although it did establish a regulatory, rather than 
criminal approach to workplace safety.  The nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
saw a gradual extension of the legislation in both range of workplaces covered 
and the requirements imposed on employers, culminating in the consolidating 
Factories Act 1961.  The next significant piece of legislation dealing with worker 
safety was the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, a major departure from 
the previous approach to workplace safety in so far as it ended the industry 
and/or activity specific approach where laws were written for specific types of 
activity (the Factories Acts, Mines and Quarries Acts, Agriculture Acts, Offices, 
Shops and Railway Premises Act and so on) and focussed on all work activities.  It 
also moved away from the previous emphasis placed on absolute requirements to 
a risk-based approach requiring the protection of workers’ safety so far as is 
reasonably practicable.  A very significant development in the 1974 Act was the 
                                        
9 For example, Andrew Hopkins, 'Compliance with What?: The Fundamental Regulatory Question' 
(1994) 34 British Journal of Criminology 431 435; Gary Slapper, 'Corporate Manslaughter: an 
Examination of the Determinants of Prosecutorial Policy' (1993) 2 Social Legal Studies 423 
424;Gary Slapper and Steve Tombs, Corporate Crime (Pearson Longman 1999) 196;Steve Tombs 




inclusion of persons, other than employees, who could be affected by an 
employer’s activities.  
The 1974 Act was generally welcomed when it was introduced but it had two 
important characteristics that perhaps led to it being considered inadequate for 
dealing with the major accidents described previously.10  It focussed on 
contraventions rather than outcomes and it was still perceived as a regulatory 
rather than criminal piece of legislation.  This distinction between ‘regulatory’ 
and ‘criminal’ law, with health and safety legislation falling under the former 
category, is seen by some commentators as one of the main reasons for 
organisations not being properly punished when their activities result in loss of 
life.11  The United Kingdom legal system has no formal distinction between 
regulatory and criminal law; legislation identified as regulatory is subject to 
exactly the same processes as that considered criminal in nature, so any 
difference can only be attributed to perception or modes of enforcement and 
penalties, rather than its intrinsic form or structure.12  Why this is significant is 
as a consequence of the differing responses to a guilty verdict; unlike being 
found guilty of what would be considered a criminal offence, there is little or no 
perceived stigma attached to regulatory offences resulting in indifference being 
demonstrated towards them by individuals and organisations.  This response will 
be discussed in detail in this thesis.  Health and safety offences can attract very 
large fines but unlike a guilty verdict of manslaughter, for example, there is very 
little stigma attached to them – “the only significant difference in terms of 
                                        
10 For example, see Norman Lewis, 'Health and Safety at Work Act 1974' (1975) 38 The Modern 
Law Review 442 443 and Phil James, 'Reforming British Health and Safety Law: a framework for 
discussion' (1992) 21 Industrial Law Journal 83 83 
11 Tombs and Whyte, Safety Crimes op. cit. n.9, p.168; C. Wells, Corporations and Criminal 
Responsibility (Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law and Justice, 2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
1993) 25 
12 The 1707 Act of Union maintained the independence of the Scottish legal system resulting in 
two different approaches to the law in the United Kingdom. England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
share what is generally referred to as the ‘English’ legal system, although special conditions 
apply to Northern Ireland.  This has resulted in a rather unique set of circumstances, best 
described by Farmer (L Farmer, Criminal law, tradition, and legal order: crime and the genius of 
Scots law : 1747 to the present (Cambridge University Press 1997) 21)  “…the Scottish legal 
system exists without its own legislative body and the British Parliament passes laws that may be 
administered differently within the same country.”  Since Farmer wrote that, the Scottish 
Parliament has been established and given some law making powers but the situation remains 
the same for health and safety legislation which has not been devolved. 
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deterrence between civil and criminal fines is the potential stigma associated 
with the criminal label”.13   
As will be discussed in Chapter Three, the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 
1974 was never intended as a tool to punish employers and certainly was never 
intended as a response to workplace deaths.  The ethos of the 1974 Act was the 
reduction of accidents and ill-health caused by work activities and the continual 
improvement of working conditions.  There was no explicit offence of causing 
death, injury or ill-health, instead offences focussed on contraventions of the 
relevant statutory provisions, although the consequences of such offences might 
be taken into account during sentencing.  At the time of the introduction of the 
2007 Act, the 1974 Act had been in force for more than 30 years and had been 
considered successful in reducing deaths, injuries and ill-health in the workplace 
but its limitations in punishing corporations and individuals responsible for 
workplace deaths were becoming increasingly apparent. 
In many respects, this inability to deal specifically with deaths arising from work 
activities is not surprising. Multi-fatality accidents are not a peculiarly late 
twentieth/early twenty-first century phenomena; they have occurred on a 
relatively regular basis since the earliest days of the industrial revolution (and 
probably before), but what did change in this period was the idea that 
organisations could be held responsible for the deaths, not just their causes 
which was the emphasis of the existing health and safety legislation.  The Health 
and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 came into force well before this change in 
attitude, where organisations could be considered criminally liable for deaths 
arising from their activities. Prior to the end of the twentieth century, there was 
little public demand for corporations to be punished explicitly for causing death, 
even in major disasters such as Aberfan in 1966 where one hundred and sixty-six 
people died, mainly children, after being buried under colliery spoil.  The cause 
of the accident was attributed entirely to a failure in the way the National Coal 
Board managed the tip but no prosecution was taken against it, and there is no 
indication that a case for corporate manslaughter was ever considered.  In 1974, 
an explosion at a chemical plant in Flixborough resulted in the deaths of twenty-
                                        




eight people with a further thirty-six seriously injured.  Once again, the 
responsibility for the explosion was attributed to the plant operators but 
although the accident did result in a change in regulatory control of this type of 
installation, there was no prosecution for corporate manslaughter, nor any 
suggestion that there should be. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider the changes in society and 
societal attitudes that took place between the Aberfan and Flixborough 
disasters, and the Herald of Free Enterprise but there was a significant shift in 
the public attitude towards organisations considered responsible for deaths and 
in particular, multiple deaths.  The concept of corporate criminal liability had 
been established for a number of decades before the Herald of Free Enterprise 
disaster and from that concept, it was held that a company could be charged 
with corporate manslaughter. This was confirmed by case law in the second part 
of the twentieth century although the case against P & O Ferries Ltd was the 
first corporate manslaughter prosecution recorded in England and Wales 
(European Ferries Ltd, the original operator of the Herald of Free Enterprise, 
was acquired by the P & O group shortly after the accident).  The case against P 
& O failed, mainly as a consequence of the application of the identification 
doctrine which requires the identification of an individual who could be 
considered as representing the corporation (the “controlling” or “directing 
mind”) and whose direct actions were responsible for the actions leading to the 
deaths before a corporation could be successfully prosecuted for manslaughter.  
In large organisations, it was almost impossible to satisfy the identification 
doctrine, there were too many layers of management between the direct cause 
of the accident and any person who could be considered senior enough to be the 
“controlling mind”.  The concept of “controlling mind” and the identification 
doctrine will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter but it made the few 
subsequent prosecutions for corporate manslaughter against large organisations 
certain to fail.  That is not to say that all corporate manslaughter prosecutions 
were unsuccessful but the few that did succeed were in respect of very small 
companies where the prosecution was able to establish the “controlling mind”.  
This created a two tier approach to justice; because of their complexity, large 
organisations were effectively immune from prosecution for corporate 
manslaughter and most senior managers from prosecution for manslaughter but 
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small organisations could be prosecuted for the offence and their senior 
managers for manslaughter.  This was clearly unfair and unjust and by itself 
would have justified a change in the law. 
The attempts to use corporate and individual manslaughter prosecutions as a 
means of punishing organisations and senior managers for deaths arising from 
work activities could be considered an extension of the criminal law into what 
was previously the domain of regulation.  In the cases described above and 
discussed in more detail elsewhere in this thesis, prosecution for manslaughter 
was an attempt to punish the organisations involved, perhaps attaching the 
stigma apparently lacking in the regulatory approach to health and safety 
offences.  It could also be argued that the degree of harm to the victim was 
more properly recognised by the manslaughter charge than through the more 
typical health and safety offences that focussed on the causes, rather than the 
consequences. The stigma of a guilty verdict for a criminal offence would appear 
to be more important than the unlimited fines that could be imposed through 
the regulatory routes.14  There is some debate about the real impact of ‘stigma’ 
on an organisation, with a note in the Harvard Law Review suggesting that it is 
“questionable”, whilst Fisse argues that prosecution for a criminal offence 
“…imposes a stigma that, unlike monetary loss, cannot simply be written off as a 
business cost or passed on to others.”15  Associating stigma with bad publicity, 
Cahill and Cahill suggest that by itself it could be sufficient punishment for some 
organisations.16  What is generally agreed, however, is that stigma is much more 
likely to be attached to a criminal rather than regulatory conviction. 
Before considering the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
in more detail, it is worth briefly considering the range of penalties available for 
health and safety offences, in addition to an unlimited fine (for indictable 
offences).  The focus so far in this introduction has been on organisations, the 
offences they can commit and the fines that can be levelled against them, but 
                                        
14 For example, £15 million in the case of  R v Transco plc [2006] EWCA Crim 838; £10 million 
later reduced to £7.5 million in R. v Balfour Beatty Rail Infrastructure Services Ltd [2006] EWCA 
Crim 1586; [2007] Bus LR 77; [2007] 1 Cr App R (S) 65; [2007] ICR 354; (2006) 150 SJLB 922; 
(Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) 
15, 'Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior through Criminal Sanctions' op. cit. n.13, 
p.1230; Brent Fisse, 'Sentencing options against corporations' (1990) 1 Crim Law Forum 211 229 
16 Sandra Cahill and Philip Cahill, 'Scarlet Letters: Punishing the Corporate Citizen' (1999) 27 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 153 159 
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individuals at all levels of a company can also be prosecuted for a range of 
offences and, very importantly, prison sentences can be imposed in some 
circumstances.  The Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 greatly extended and 
increased the penalties available to the courts in respect of both organisations 
and individuals found guilty of health and safety offences including 
imprisonment for a wider range of contraventions.  The potential for the 2008 
Act to be more significant than the 2007 Act to effectively address corporate 
killing will be an important part of this research and will be considered in depth 
in the final chapter of this thesis. 
The introduction of a corporate manslaughter offence would prove to be neither 
an easy nor straightforward process, as indicated by the fact that it would be 
thirteen years between the initial proposals in 1994 and the introduction of the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.  The Act, which 
introduced a range of penalties for organisations found guilty of causing death as 
a consequence of “a gross breach of a relevant duty of care” owed by the 
organisation to the victim will be discussed in depth in Chapter Five.17  
Importantly, the 2007 Act applies only to organisations, there is no liability 
imposed upon individuals although they could still be separately prosecuted for 
gross negligence manslaughter.  The main penalty is a fine but remedial and 
publicity orders can also be made.  The 2007 Act theoretically extends beyond 
what would be considered workplace health and safety issues and could include 
deaths arising in circumstances that would be excluded from the normal 
application of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 although it is difficult 
to imagine any circumstances where the former would apply but not the latter, 
and it is fair to say that any such case would very much be the exception rather 
than the rule.   
Perhaps one of the most significant differences between the 1974 and 2007 Acts 
is enforcement.  The enforcement of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 
1974 and the relevant statutory provisions (including the 2008 Act) is carried out 
by a number of different agencies but mainly the Health and Safety Executive 
for high risk activities including manufacturing and local authorities for low risk 
activities and the service sector, whereas the police will be mainly responsible 
                                        
17 The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (c.19) 
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for initiating proceedings under the 2007 Act.  Unlike health and safety 
legislation where prosecutions in England and Wales can be initiated by the 
various inspectorates (the situation is different in Scotland), proceedings for the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 must have the consent 
of the Director of Public Prosecutions in England and Wales and the Director of 
Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland in Northern Ireland.  In Scotland, all 
prosecutions for indictable offences are instigated by the Lord Advocate so there 
is no specific provision in the Act for proceedings in that part of the United 
Kingdom.  As stated previously, it is expected that investigations for corporate 
manslaughter will be led by the police but the Health and Safety Executive or 
other enforcing agency would also be involved where the death arose from a 
work activity.18 
On the basis that the main penalty available in the 2007 Act is a fine, on the 
face of it health and safety legislation would seem to have a wider range of 
penalties, including imprisonment.  The penalties available through the health 
and safety legislation can be imposed even where there has been no personal 
injury or ill-health, there only needs to a contravention of one or more of the 
relevant statutory provisions.  It could be argued that the stigma of being guilty 
of a ‘criminal’ rather than ‘regulatory’ offence is sufficient justification in itself 
for the 2007 Act, or perhaps the explicit crime of corporate manslaughter is 
reason enough.  Alternatively it could be argued that it is mainly symbolic; the 
cry for something to be done was heard and that something ended up being a 
piece of legislation that brought very little new to the suite of enforcement 
options, and had almost nothing to offer in preventing accidents in the 
workplace.  Unlike the provisions contained in the health and safety legislation, 
which can require improvement or prohibit dangerous activities before an 
accident occurs, the 2007 Act is entirely reactive, death must have occurred 
before its provisions come into effect.  This may serve as a deterrent but it is 
much more likely that its main function will be to punish those few organisations 
found guilty of corporate manslaughter.  The senior managers of the largest 
organisations will be no more likely to be personally liable for gross negligence 
                                        
18 Ministry of Justice, A guide to the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (The 
Stationary Office 2007) 18 
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manslaughter than before whereas the senior managers of the smallest 
companies will be just as vulnerable. 
The relevance of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
must also be considered in the context of the subsequent Health and Safety 
(Offences) Act 2008.  As stated previously, unlimited fines have always been 
available for certain contraventions of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 
1974 but the range of offences subject to imprisonment has been greatly 
increased, perhaps making the 2008 Act a more significant piece of legislation 
for the improvement of worker safety than the 2007 Act, and possibly a more 
effective means of punishing corporate killing.  The 2008 Act was never intended 
to address the shortcomings of the 2007 Act, but it does allow senior managers 
to be prosecuted for workplace deaths, irrespective of the size of the 
organisation although in the largest companies it will always be a challenge to 
prove liability.  Unlike the 2007 Act, the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 
could be used in circumstances where deaths or serious injuries could have 
occurred but did not, the ‘near-misses’.  Addressing these ‘near-misses’ has 
always been an important part of improving the safety of workers and other 
people who may be affected by work activities. 
This thesis will examine the relationship between the Corporate Manslaughter 
and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 and the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 
focussing on their very different approaches to addressing work-related deaths. 
It is fair to say that the 2007 Act has got off to a slow start, with few 
prosecutions in England and Wales and none in Scotland, so its actual impact on 
corporate behaviour is still a matter for conjecture.  As discussed, unlimited 
fines for certain offences have always been available for contraventions of the 
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and its relevant statutory provisions, 
but the introduction by the 2008 Act of the possibility of a custodial sentence for 
a much wider range of offences could make it a more effective deterrence to 
those individuals who may be responsible for the circumstances that could lead 
to a workplace fatality, rather than the 2007 Act which can only punish the 
organisation itself.  In essence, it is a question of whether it is more of a 
deterrence to imprison an individual who carries some personal responsibility for 
the death (and such a penalty would almost always be associated with a fine for 
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their company) or to only fine the organisation (“corporation”) but with a stigma 
associated with “true” crime, that might not be associated with regulatory 
penalties.   
The aim of this research can be condensed into a number of research questions 
which will be answered in the final chapter:-  
1. Why has the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and its 
predecessors been perceived to have failed to effectively address the 
criminal behaviour of organisations resulting work related deaths? 
2. Why were the high profile corporate manslaughter cases arising from 
work related fatal accidents in the latter half of the twentieth century 
and the early part of the twenty-first century unable to result in a 
successful prosecution? 
3. Will the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act address 
the apparent or perceived shortcomings in the current approach to 
prosecution for corporate manslaughter following work related deaths? 
4. Is the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act ‘symbolic’ 
rather than ‘instrumental’  and if so, is it an appropriate approach to 
dealing with workplace safety? 
5. With the introduction of the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008, 
has the “regulatory” approach finally been given the means necessary 
to properly address its previous perceived shortcomings and made the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act irrelevant? 
To properly understand and appreciate the current approach to work-related 
deaths, it is necessary to analyse the origins and nature of health and safety 
legislation in the United Kingdom.  Chapter Two investigates the historical 
context of legislation intended for worker protection with Chapter Three 
examining the current state of safety regulation in the context of its ability to 
effectively address the most serious workplace accidents.  Chapter Four 
introduces and examines the concept of corporations and corporate killing with 
Chapter Five going on to analyse and assess the background and nature of the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 and its impact since 
its introduction.   
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Chapter Six examines the actual and apparent distinction between “true” 
criminal law and regulatory law.  This apparent distinction is a very important 
part of this research since the 2007 Act would be categorised as “criminal” in 
nature, whereas the 2008 Act would generally be described as “regulatory”.  
Some of the implications for this distinction have already been touched upon in 
this Chapter and they will be discussed in much more detail in Chapter Six.  
Chapter Seven will consider the arguments presented throughout this thesis and 
draw conclusions, focussing on the implementation, impact and effectiveness in 
reducing workplace deaths of both the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 




2.0 Regulation of Workplace Safety in the UK 
2.1 Introduction 
The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 and Health and 
Safety (Offences) Act 2008 can only be properly considered in the context of the 
history of health and safety legislation in the UK.  Whilst the 2007 Act covers 
fatalities arising from corporate activities other than work, it is inevitable that 
work-related deaths will form the vast majority of cases, a fact recognised by 
the Act itself, which makes specific reference to breaches of health and safety 
legislation.19  Accordingly, this Chapter will examine the development of health 
and safety legislation in the United Kingdom from the earliest days of the 
industrial revolution through to the Robens Report of the nineteen-seventies, 
which resulted in the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, the most 
significant change to health and safety regulation in almost two centuries of 
legislative worker protection.20  An analysis of the evolution of worker safety 
legislation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will help to explain the 
perceived inadequacies of health and safety regulation in the late twentieth 
century and the assumed need for a more robust approach to deaths arising from 
work activities which ultimately resulted in the 2007 Act. 
Industrialisation of the United Kingdom in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries brought many benefits but also many challenges which the 
societal structures of the time were unable to meet.  Mass migration from the 
countryside to the industrial towns and cities resulted in overcrowded and 
disease-ridden slums where workers lived a short, and in many cases, brutal 
life.21  Conditions in the workplace were, more often than not, just as bad if not 
worse than those at home but with the additional hazards of occupational illness 
and accidents which often resulted in serious injury or death.22  The only 
recourse available to workers and their families in these circumstances was an 
action in common law or the law of master and servant, which will be discussed 
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20 Robens, Safety and Health at Work.  Report of the Committee 1970-72, 1972) 
21 Frederick Engels, The Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844 With a Preface 




later in this section.  This Chapter will discuss how the development of 
legislation to improve working conditions was both piecemeal and haphazard, 
and perhaps not, or not only, as the result of “Tory Philanthropy” as suggested 
by Dicey.23  The theory that safety legislation was of greater benefit to 
employers rather than the people it was intended to protect will be introduced 
in this Chapter and expanded upon in Chapter Six where the theories of crime 
and regulation are discussed in more depth and their apparent distinction 
addressed.   
The introduction of the first Factories Act in 1802 and the subsequent 
appointment of factory inspectors in 1833 heralded state intervention for the 
protection of worker safety by means of legislation as the norm in the United 
Kingdom.  This Chapter will consider the effectiveness of this approach with 
subsequent chapters examining whether or not deaths directly attributable to 
the actions of employers could, or should, be described as murder, or at the 
very least, manslaughter or culpable homicide, as proposed by various 
commentators over the past two centuries.24  As this Chapter will illustrate, the 
perceived failure of the law to properly hold employers to account for workplace 
deaths has been a feature since the very earliest days of the industrial 
revolution, a failure that was never properly addressed during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.  From the very first Factories Act of 1802 through to 
the Robens Report of 1972, there has been a distinct lack of accountability 
attached to employers in respect of deaths arising from their activities.  The 
reasons for this situation can only be properly understood by examining the 
development of workplace safety laws from the very earliest days of 
industrialisation in the context of the social and industrial norms of the time.  
This Chapter will examine the background to the first Factories Acts and their 
subsequent evolution through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
                                        
23 A.V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the 
Nineteenth Century (Liberty Fund 2008) 
24 John Mitchell, Treatise on the Falsifications of Food, and the Chemical Means to Detect Them  
(Hippolyte Bailliere 1848) 122  Mitchell was referring to food adulteration rather than workplace 
safety but what he was referring to would certainly fall under the category of corporate killing; 
'Chips', Deadly Shafts op. cit. n.1, p.494; Andrew Hopkins, 'Social Values in Occupational Safety 
Law' (1989) 13 Legal Studies Forum 135 140; Jones, 'Safety Crime: a case study of Transco' op. 
cit. n.7, p.19; Punch, 'Suite violence: Why managers murder and corporations kill' op. cit. n.7, 
p.273; Steven Bittle and Laureen Snider, 'From Manslaughter to Preventable Accident: Shaping 
Corporate Criminal Liability' (2006) 28 Law & Policy 470 489 
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culminating in the Robens Report which led, in turn, to the Health and Safety at 
Work etc. Act 1974.  Best described as a series of responses by the establishment 
to changing circumstances arising from industrialisation, much of the resulting 
legislation benefitted employers more than employees. 
 
2.2 Before the Factories Acts 
Whilst there can be no doubt that pre-industrial revolution workers and others 
died as a result of work activities, there is very little information available about 
how and why.  Relatively large scale manufacturing had been established in 
various parts of the United Kingdom by the end of the eighteenth century but 
few details of workplace deaths exist.25  Prior to the nineteenth century there 
was no mechanism for distinguishing between deaths occurring as a result of 
workplace activities and those arising from non-work related accidents but it 
must be assumed that many workers died as a result of their employment 
whether through accident or ill-health.26  Agricultural workers would have been 
exposed to a range of work related diseases, extremes of weather and injuries 
from working with livestock; miners from fire, explosion, roof collapse, etc., 
builders from falls from height, being struck by falling objects, etc., watermen 
from drowning, and so on.  Whilst some of these deaths would have been 
recorded in newspapers, the vast majority would have been significant only to 
their families, fellow workers and employers. 
That is not to say that workplace hazards were completely ignored.  One 
example of an invariably fatal work related disease from the eighteenth century 
was the occurrence of scrotal cancer amongst chimney sweeps and their 
apprentices.  The disease was observed by Pott towards the end of the 
eighteenth century when he made the association between occupation and 
illness. 27  This is not the only example of such an association being made 
                                        
25 Jamie L. Bronstein, Caught in the Machinery.  Workplace Accidents and Injured Workers in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain. (Stanford University Press 2008) 7 
26 P.W.J. Bartrip and S.B. Burman, The Wounded Soldiers of Industry.  Industrial Compensation 
Policy 1833 - 1897 (Clarendon Press 1983) 8 
27 Percival Pott and James (Sir) Earle, The chirurgical works of Percival Pott. to which are added 
a short account of the life of the author, a method of curing the hydrocele by injection and 
occasional notes and observations by Sir James Earle, vol III (Wood and Innes 1808) 
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between disease and work, or even the first, but it is one of the best known. The 
first piece of legislation in the UK dealing specifically with poor working 
conditions was the 1788 Act for the better Regulation of Chimney Sweepers, and 
their Apprentices.28  It was not introduced in response to Pott’s work but as a 
result of the general outcry against the working conditions of what were 
referred to as climbing boys, or chimney sweepers’ apprentices.  Children (girls 
as well as boys) as young as five were taken on by chimney sweepers to assist in 
the cleaning of chimneys.29  The smaller the child the better, since they were 
expected to climb into the confined spaces of chimneys and flues to clean 
accumulations of soot.  The work was dirty and dangerous, with many of the 
children dying from asphyxiation, burns or falls. 
The 1788 Act was relatively straightforward in that it contained two main 
provisions; no apprentice to be employed under the age of eight, and chimney 
sweepers to have no more than six apprentices at one time.  Although penalties 
were included in the Act, there was no enforcement provision other than for 
Justices to hear complaints.  The Act contained no requirement to improve 
working conditions or for the welfare of the apprentices.  As could be expected 
from a piece of legislation containing no enforcement provision, the Act was 
unsuccessful.  In 1834, Roberts reported:-  
“Climbing boys being forced up chimnies by goads and flames - of them 
being scarified, bruised, flogged and crippled - having their nails torn off - 
their eyes inflamed-their growth stinted, and their limbs distorted - of 
their sufferings and death from the cureless cancers - of their being 
suffocated, baked, burnt, and scalded to death - of their being dashed to 
pieces in pots falling from the tops of the highest chimnies - and dying 
from disease and want and misery by the highway side,…”. 30 
                                        
28 An Act for the better Regulation of Chimney Sweepers, and their Apprentices 1788 (28 Geo 3 
c48) 
29 George L. Phillips, 'The Abolition of Climbing Boys' (1950) 9 American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 445 447 
30 Samuel Roberts, An address to British females of every rank and station, on the employment 
of climbing boys in sweeping chimnies  (Whitaker & Co. 1834) 13 
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It would be the latter half of the nineteenth century before the employment of 
children in this industry was finally ended.31 
In England and Wales in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the employer’s 
responsibility to his employees in the event of an accident at work extended 
only so far as his benevolence or the common law allowed.  If an employer’s 
personal negligence was the cause of an accident resulting in injury (but not 
death), the victim or the victim’s personal representative could sue for damages 
at common law, although there is no recorded case of an employer being sued 
for injuries to employees prior to 1837, either successfully or unsuccessfully.32  
The situation for the families of workers killed at work due to negligence by 
their employer was even worse since they were unable to sue for damages.  In 
Baker v. Bolton33 it was held that the death of a person could not be considered 
an injury and consequently the right of action was unavailable where that death 
arose as the result of a tort.  Holdsworth suggested that this decision was, at 
best, illogical, but it was not until the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 that personal 
representatives (wife, husband, parent, grandparents, children, grandchildren, 
step-parents and step-children) of the deceased were given the right to take 
legal action for the loss arising from the death of a person caused by “…wrongful 
act, neglect, or default…” where the victim would have been able to take action 
for damages if they had been injured, rather than killed.34  Although not 
specifically referred to in the 1846 Act, the doctrine of common employment 
(discussed later in this section) was successfully used by defendants, 
significantly reducing the effectiveness of the Act in providing compensation for 
the dependants of the victims of fatal workplace accidents.  The position in 
Scotland was quite different, where both patrimonial loss and solatium could 
provide an award to the victim’s family following a death arising from the 
negligence of employers.  Patrimonial loss referred to the economic loss arising 
from dependency, and solatium recognised the grief and suffering arising from 
the loss.35 Unlike the doctrine of common employment mentioned previously and 
discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs, this distinction between 
                                        
31 Phillips, 'The Abolition of Climbing Boys' op. cit. n.29, p.462 
32 Priestley v. Fowler (1837) 150 Eng Rep 1030 1220- 1865 1032 
33 Baker v Bolton & Ors [1808] EWHC KB J92  
34 W. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol III (3rd edn, Methuen 1922) 334; Fatal 
Accidents Act 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c.93) 
35 Hector Burn  Murdoch, 'English Law in Scots Practice III' (1909) 21 Jurid Rev 148 150;  
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Scots law and that of England and Wales was retained well into the twentieth 
century. 
The traditional master-servant relationship based on status, continued to be the 
norm well into the eighteenth century, with the master being expected to take 
on responsibility for servants injured as a result of work activities.36 As the 
eighteenth century drew to a close, this relationship was increasingly being seen 
in terms of contract rather than status.37  Maine described the move from status, 
where the rights and duties of an individual are determined by their class or 
position in society, to contract as an indication of a progressive society.38  
Although Graveson disagreed with Maine’s theory of progress being measured by 
the move from status to contract, suggesting instead that an element of 
contract had always existed in feudalism, the development of the Factories Acts 
in the nineteenth century could at least partly be explained by the change of 
emphasis “…from one of reason to one of individual liberty”. 39 
The emphasis of the early Factories Acts on the protection of women and 
children almost to the complete exclusion of male workers can be explained by 
contractual relationship, or lack of it, between employers and the employed. 
Male workers, in accepting a contract of employment, were deemed to accept 
all the risks and hazards associated with the work, volenti non fit injuria.  This 
had the consequence that employers could not be held liable for injury arising 
from activities associated with the work, at least so far as a male workers were 
concerned.  As a consequence of society and the law assuming them unable to 
form a judgement of their own interests and/or having inferior bargaining power 
which could lead to them being exploited by others, women and children were 
not considered capable of entering the same type of contractual arrangement as 
men.40  As stated previously, this distinction between male workers and females 
and children was significant in the evolution of factories legislation in the 
nineteenth century.  It should be noted that both Graveson and Kahn-Freund 
                                        
36 Bronstein, Caught in the Machinery.  Workplace Accidents and Injured Workers in Nineteenth-
Century Britain. op. cit. n.25, p.27 
37 R. H. Graveson, 'The Movement From Status To Contract' (1941) 4 The Modern Law Review 261 
264 
38 Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law (4th edn, John Murray 1870) 170 
39 Graveson, 'The Movement From Status To Contract' op. cit. n.37, p.263, 265 
40 O. Kahn-Freund, 'A Note on Status and Contract in British Labour Law' (1967) 30 The Modern 
Law Review 635 641 
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suggested that what actually transpired was a reversal of Maine’s theory, with 
the movement from contract to status particularly in certain aspects of 
employment including worker safety.41   
In the early part of the industrial revolution, the extent of an employer’s 
responsibility for his employee’s safety was established in the case of Priestley 
v. Fowler which was brought in respect of injuries incurred by an employee 
when the cart he was driving collapsed.  The injured party, Priestley, sued his 
employer, Fowler, for damages arising as a consequence of the accident.  The 
case, first heard at the Lincolnshire Summer Assizes in 1837, found in Priestley’s 
favour and he was awarded £100 in damages.  On appeal by Fowler, the original 
judgement was overturned on the basis that he was not liable for the injuries 
incurred by Priestley.  In finding in favour of the appellant, Abinger, C.B. 
declared that there was no duty imposed on a master to look out for the safety 
of his servant, or for any injury arising from circumstances that he had no 
knowledge of including injury caused by a fellow employee.42  In addition, he 
held that a servant can decline any service where he may suffer injury and 
conversely, the servant or employee is deemed to have accepted any inherent 
risks as part of the contract of employment with remuneration made 
accordingly. In effect, the duty of the master or employer extended only so far 
as “…to provide for the safety of his servant in the course of his employment, to 
the best of the judgement, information and belief” although even this limited 
responsibility seems to have been lost in the interpretation of his comments 
elsewhere in this judgement.43 
Abinger, C.B.’s judgement established the principle that the employer would 
only be liable for injuries arising from his own direct actions and would have no 
liability for the actions of any of his employees so long as he was not negligent in 
their selection.  This became known as the doctrine of Common Employment 
(also known as the Fellow-Servant rule in the US). The principles established in 
Priestley v. Fowler had very long-term consequences for employees injured 
whilst at work and subsequent cases reinforced and extended this rule.  The 
common employment doctrine was applied in the US as well as the UK and by 
                                        
41 Ibid; Graveson, 'The Movement From Status To Contract' op. cit. n.37, p.263 et seq 




1888, Hobbs described it as being “bitterly opposed” (although he failed to say 
by whom) and based upon circumstances that had ceased to exist.44 Described by 
Glazebrook as a “monstrous doctrine”, common employment was considered by 
Graveson as the “…judicial response to the demand of employers for a reduction 
of the vastly increased Common Law liabilities imposed upon them by the 
employment of hundreds upon machines…”.45  With the enormous changes in 
working practices brought about by the Industrial Revolution, employers were 
clearly fearful that they would be liable to pay compensation for injuries and 
deaths occurring in their factories where workers would be exposed to a wide 
range of hazards from moving machinery and other dangerous activities.  This 
view was supported by Cornish and Clark who suggested that the common 
employment doctrine was a judgement that the costs of accidents were 
something that could not and should not be met by a developing industry which 
perhaps is a reflection on the priorities of both industry and state.46 
In Scotland, at least for the first half of the nineteenth century, the Common 
Employment doctrine was not applied if the accident was caused by the 
negligence of an employee to whom the employer had delegated at least part of 
his authority.47  This continued until 1858 when the doctrine of common 
employment was imposed on Scotland by the judgement reached by Lord 
Cranworth in the case of Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid.48  Contrary to the clear 
wishes of the Scottish Courts explicitly stated in the judgement in Dixon v. 
Rankin49 and in other cases, Lord Cranworth held that there was “…no clear 
settled course of decision in Scotland,…” preventing a similar approach to 
common employment being taken in both countries.  This imposition was still 
worthy of comment almost 40 years later when Williamson observed “…the Scots 
                                        
44 Marland C.  Hobbs, 'Statutory Changes in Employers' Liability' (1888) 2 Harvard Law Review 212 
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45 P.R. Glazebrook, 'A Better Way of Convicting Businesses of Avoidable Deaths and Injuries?' 
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47 J.G. Pease, 'An English Workman's Remedies for Injuries Received in the Course of His 
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Courts did not accept the English law of ‘Common Employment’ till it was thrust 
upon them by the House of Lords.”50  Priestley v. Fowler and subsequent cases 
made it almost impossible for employees to sue their employers for injuries 
arising from work unless they could show that they were caused by the personal 
negligence of their employer.51  Howells suggested that by linking the doctrines 
of common employment and volenti non fit injuria, there was an “acceptance of 
all risks in consideration of wages.”52 
The defence of common employment was not available to employers where the 
injury resulted from the breach of a statutory duty; in such cases the injured 
party could sue his or her employer for damages.53 Although the common 
employment defence gradually diminished as additional statutory duties were 
introduced throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, it, along 
with assumed risk and contributory negligence, made it virtually impossible for 
an injured worker to sue his or her employer.54  The common employment 
defence was only slightly diminished through the introduction of the Employers 
Liability Act of 1880 and it would be almost a further seventy years before it was 
entirely eliminated by the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1948.55  
The development of common employment, assumed risk and contributory 
negligence in the nineteenth century is evidence that workers could not rely 
upon the common law to offer any protection or compensation against 
workplace accidents and disease and most employers showed very little sign of 
addressing these issues voluntarily.  It would be many years before workers 
achieved any real entitlement or expectation of a safe place of work, something 
eventually achieved through legislation, as will be discussed in the next section. 
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2.3 The Factories Acts 
The “Factories Acts” is the collective term used for a series of acts implemented 
from the start of the nineteenth century through to the middle of the twentieth 
century that were intended to improve the conditions of those working in 
factories and similar manufacturing premises.  As this Chapter will show, the 
development of the Factories Acts was more evolutionary than revolutionary 
with each iteration consolidating previous additions and amendments, but also 
reacting to changes in working practices, the introduction of new hazards and 
changes in society’s attitudes towards poor working conditions. 
In the twenty-first century, it would generally be considered that legislation to 
improve workplace health and safety was introduced for the benefit of workers. 
Equally, it would be fair to assume that its introduction was not in the interests 
of employers and would have been resisted by them, particularly in the 
nineteenth and early parts of the twentieth century. In a series of influential 
articles published from the nineteen-seventies onwards, Carson proposed a 
contrary viewpoint, suggesting that early factory legislation in the UK was 
supported and encouraged by some of the larger manufacturers of the time.56 
The reasons for this would include altruism but as argued by Baines, it would 
also be profitable to the employer to have “…a moral, sober, well-informed, 
healthy and comfortable body of workers.”57  As will be discussed later in this 
Chapter, there was also an element of anti-competitiveness in the behaviour of 
some of the mill owners supporting this legislation; what was proposed would be 
more difficult for the smaller mills and factories located in rural areas to comply 
with than the larger ones located in towns and cities.  The view that 
governments did not always have the best interests of those they governed in 
mind when creating laws and institutions was commented upon by Bentham who 
stated that “Government has, accordingly, under every form comprehending 
laws and institutions, had for its object the greatest happiness, not of those over 
whom, but of those by whom, it has been exercised; the interest not of the 
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many, but of the few, or even of the one, has been the prevalent interest; and 
to that interest all others have been, at all times, sacrificed”.58  This would 
support the view that the regulation of working conditions was achieved with the 
consent of factory owners with their profits in mind, instead of (or as well as) 
the altruism of social reformers being the primary motivating factor.  The 
concept of regulation being for the benefit of the regulated rather than those it 
was purported to protect has evolved over the years into the private theory of 
regulation which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. 
The first efforts to improve working conditions for factory workers were a by-
product of the efforts to control the hours of work of children and other young 
people and prevent the outbreak of disease amongst factory workers.  What was 
subsequently referred to as the first Factories Act was introduced in 1802 
although concern over working conditions, particularly for children and young 
people had been expressed a number of years previously.  Concern about the 
conditions in factories in England was first recorded by the Manchester Board of 
Health in 1795 which was established following an outbreak of typhoid fever.  In 
the Resolutions for the consideration of the Manchester Board of Health 
(reproduced in Peel’s Report of 1816), Percival identified a number of concerns, 
some of them directly related to the outbreak of disease, some dealing with 
other conditions.59  In particular, Percival expressed concern that overcrowding 
in cotton factories and the workers’ housing was a significant cause of the 
spread of infectious disease amongst children and others working in the factories 
and the general working conditions within the factories were injurious to health. 
The long working hours during daytime and night working were considered 
harmful to children’s health (Percival also commented on how their children’s 
earnings encouraged parents to “…idleness, extravagance and profligacy…”) and 
there was little, if any, education or religious instruction provided to children 
working in the cotton factories.  Percival did point out that there was good 
practice in some cotton factories where most of the issues raised in his report 
were avoided or minimised. 
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Sir Robert Peel (also the owner of a mill where children were employed including 
at night and which had particularly bad working conditions), partly as a 
consequence of Percival’s report, his own experiences and other examples of 
poor working conditions, introduced a bill in 1802 for the Better Protection of 
the Health and Morals of Apprentices. 60, 61  The Health and Morals of 
Apprentices Act 1802 was subsequently passed without any significant 
opposition.62  The 1802 Act applied to mills and factories (but only textile and 
woollen mills and factories) in Great Britain and Ireland where three or more 
apprentices or twenty or more other persons were employed at one time.63  The 
requirements of the Act were not particularly onerous and included that walls 
and ceilings be washed twice each year with quicklime and water; that windows 
sufficient for adequate ventilation be provided; that apprentices be supplied 
with two complete suits of clothing, with one new suit provided at least once 
each year; that no apprentice work for more than twelve hours a day, exclusive 
of time for meals, and the hours of work must be between 6.00am and 9.00pm; 
separate sleeping compartments for males and females and no more than two in 
a bed; that arrangements be made in specified circumstances for education and 
religious instruction; and that visitors were empowered to call in a physician in 
the event of becoming aware of any infectious disease occurring in a factory.  
Many of the concerns raised by Percival were, in theory, addressed by this Act 
although as will be discussed below, in reality it had little impact on the 
conditions in mills and factories.  Enforcement was to be carried out by two 
visitors appointed by a Justice of the Peace.  One of the visitors was to be a 
Justice of the Peace and the other a clergyman of the established Churches of 
England or Scotland.  The penalty for committing an offence was a fine not less 
than 40 shillings and not exceeding £5.64 
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The 1802 Act was not a success, “…fore-doomed to failure, and it was in fact, 
totally ineffective”.65   The system of ‘visitors’ was ineffective, with little 
incentive for them to do much more than a cursory visit.  The nature of the local 
community would have put the visitors in the same social circles as the mill and 
factory owners, an obvious disincentive to robust enforcement.66  McDonagh was 
even more critical of the system of visits by local justices of the peace, 
suggesting that they “…might be ignorant, lazy, cowardly or self-interested…”.67  
Many of the mills and factories were in fairly isolated areas and in “…many parts 
of the country, it seems, the very existence of the Act was unknown”      .68  As 
Brebner put it, “…the first Factory Act achieved little to protect ‘the health and 
morals of apprentices’ in textile factories”.69  Hutchins and Harrison  suggested 
that the 1802 Act had more in common with Elizabethan Poor Law as it related 
to parish apprentices rather than “…the conscious assumption of control over 
industry”.      70  They argued that the Government had taken on the responsibility 
for raising and placing out children into factories and consequently was 
compelled to try to regulate their working conditions, which had a striking 
similarity to the consequences of the Poor Relief Act 160171 where orphan and 
pauper children could be apprenticed to various trades.  The focus on the morals 
and welfare of the apprentices, rather than safety, gave the 1802 Act a very 
different emphasis from later Factories Acts and did very little to improve the 
conditions for workers in factories and mills. 
The next attempt to improve conditions for factory workers, particularly in 
respect of children, was once again led by Sir Robert Peel who introduced a Bill 
in 1815 to extend the protection afforded by the 1802 Act to the so-called ‘free 
children’ who lived locally and did not fall under the category of ‘apprentices’.72  
This Bill encountered much more resistance from mill-owners and it was referred 
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for further consideration to a select committee which reported in 1816.73  One 
of the provisions in the Bill that did not survive was the appointment of ‘duly’ 
qualified and independent visitors to ensure enforcement with payment being 
made to the visitors from the public purse to cover their trouble and expenses.74 
Although this provision was removed during the journey of the Bill through 
Parliament, it did anticipate the eventual introduction of factory inspectors. The 
Bill was enacted in 1819, although according to Henriques it was substantially 
emasculated during its passage through Parliament.75  It did extend a lesser 
degree of protection to ‘free children’, at least so far as hours of work were 
concerned but its application was limited to cotton mills.   
The subsequent Factories Acts of 1825 and 1831 were both intended to control 
the working hours of young people but a lack of effective enforcement provision 
meant they were no more effective than previous Acts. The movement for a ten-
hour working day for children and young people which started in Yorkshire in 
1825, gained momentum in 1830 with the establishment of the Short Time or 
Ten-Hour movement.76  The two issues of child employment and workplace 
regulation were inexorably linked in the early days of factory legislation and 
would continue to be so for decades to come.  The Act of 1831 was no more 
successful in reducing the hours of work for most children and young people than 
earlier legislation, mainly due to the lack of enforcement provisions and it did 
not satisfy the demands of the Short Time Movement.  Controversy over the 
actual conditions of child workers continued to grow and a Select Committee, 
which reported in 1832, was set up to investigate the extent of child labour in 
mills and factories.77  At least some of the evidence collected by the Committee 
was read by Lord Ashley who offered his services to lobby for the ten-hour day 
for children and young people and he introduced a Bill in 1833 to limit the 
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number of hours that young people could work in factories.78  Once again, the 
emphasis was on hours of work but Ashley’s Bill contained a number of other, 
more controversial, measures including a proposal to prosecute for manslaughter 
the occupier of a mill where a death of a child or young person had occurred as 
a consequence of the culpable negligence of the occupier in failing to guard 
machinery.  This would appear to be the first attempt to create a mechanism 
that would allow for the prosecution of employers for manslaughter following a 
workplace death, albeit in limited circumstances.  Although Ashley’s Bill 
proposed severe penalties, there was still no effective enforcement mechanism 
included amongst its measures.79 
Althorp, Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, declared the intention of the 
Government to bring its own measures to deal with child labour causing Ashley 
to abandon his Bill.80  Prior to any Government Bill being introduced, however, a 
new Royal Commission was established to examine the employment of children 
in factories.81  Three commissioners were appointed, including Edwin Chadwick, 
and they were supported by local assistant commissioners who collected 
information in the manufacturing districts of Great Britain and Ireland.  The 
timescale for reporting was very short but after gathering evidence the Royal 
Commission published its report on 1st August 1833.82  The report focussed on 
the employment of children and young people but it also included 
recommendations in respect of guarding dangerous parts of machinery and 
providing compensation for workers injured through no fault of their own.  
Importantly, the Commission proposed the establishment of an inspectorate to 
undertake the enforcement of any subsequent legislation. The Commission made 
reference to fatal injuries arising through wilful negligence but declined to make 
any recommendations in their respect. 
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Chadwick subsequently produced a Government bill in 1833 incorporating most 
of the recommendations of the Commission.83   That Bill was amended in the 
Lords, removing the power of the inspectors to establish schools, and it was 
enacted in 1833 as the Act to regulate the Labour of Children and young Persons 
in the Mills and Factories of the United Kingdom.  Once again, the legislation 
only applied to textile factories and mills (and even then, some types were 
excluded, including lace factories) and the emphasis was on the hours of work of 
children and young people.  All of Ashley’s more controversial measures 
contained in his Bill of the same year, including any possibility of mill owners or 
occupiers being prosecuted for manslaughter for deaths arising from work, were 
omitted from the 1833 Act which was a shadow of Chadwick’s first Bill, and bore 
almost no resemblance to Ashley’s earlier effort.  Even the aim of improving 
children’s working hours was only partly achieved and there was certainly no 
requirement in respect of compensation in the event of a workplace injury or 
guarding of dangerous machinery.  As MacDonagh suggested, it was “…in many 
respects a failure” continuing the tradition established by the previous three 
attempts at legislation to improve working conditions.84 
There was a strong movement to improve working conditions, particularly of 
children, but Marvel suggested a different interpretation of the events leading to 
the 1833 Act.85 He proposed that it “was drafted at the behest of the leading 
textile manufacturers” with the intention of increasing the cost of production of 
smaller mills and factories, reducing their output and as a consequence 
increasing the costs of textiles and increasing profits.  The 1833 Act would have 
serious consequences for rural water driven mills which were more reliant on 
children than the large urban steam-powered mills.  Marvel’s argument supports 
Carson, discussed previously, who suggested that early factories legislation was 
generally supported by factory and mill owners for their own benefits rather 
than any consideration of their workers. 
The 1833 Act heralded a new era of State involvement in areas never before the 
subject of regulation.  Its main provisions still related to children and young 
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people including the prohibition of night work between the hours of 8.30pm and 
5.30am for all under the age of eighteen employed in cotton, woollen, worsted, 
hemp, flax, tow, linen or silk mills; no person under eighteen years of age to be 
employed for more than twelve hours/day or sixty-nine hours in a week; no child 
younger than nine to be employed except in silk mills; no person younger than 
thirteen to be employed for more than nine hours in one day or more than forty-
eight hours a week; persons restricted to a twelve hour day to be allowed one 
and a half hours per day for meals which must be elsewhere than the machinery 
room or mill.86 Provision was to be made for the education of children who were 
restricted to forty-eight hours work per week but as discussed previously, the 
removal of the power of inspectors to establish schools still meant that many 
children were excluded from education due the absence of suitable facilities.  
Where education was provided by the employer and authorised by the Inspector, 
a penny in the shilling could be deducted from the child’s weekly wages to go 
towards its provision.  
Without question, the most significant aspect of the 1833 Act was the 
introduction of four Inspectors for its enforcement.  The failure of the 
enforcement regime introduced by the 1802 Act was widely recognised and the 
appointment of Government Inspectors was felt to be the only way to ensure at 
least some level of enforcement (although their subsequent performance was 
somewhat inconsistent and there has been some debate about their 
effectiveness).87  Effective or not, the appointment of the inspectors marked a 
fundamental change in the relationship between state and industry.  Although it 
would take a further century and a half for all sectors of  employment to be fully 
regulated by the state, at least so far as health and safety was concerned, the 
impact of the 1833 Act was to change not just the relationship between the 
state and industry but also between employers and employees. 
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Worker protection afforded by the 1833 Act was mainly restricted to controlling 
hours of work of children and apprentices with only a marginal impact on the 
work environment and working conditions.  Although the Commission 
recommended a system of compensation for children and operatives injured 
whilst at work (for the latter it had to be shown that the injury arose through no 
fault of their own) it was not included in the Act.88  If the requirement for 
compensation had been included in the 1833 Act, Thomas suggests that it would 
have removed the need for legislation to deal with machinery guarding and other 
safety issues.  His argument is based on the assumption that if employers were 
responsible for paying compensation in the event of worker being injured by 
dangerous machinery, there would have been a financial incentive to remove the 
hazard which could have eliminated the need for the legislative approach that 
developed in the following decades. This would almost certainly have resulted in 
a completely different approach to the provision of safety in the workplace in 
the United Kingdom.  It is also interesting to note that the few requirements in 
the 1802 Act relating to safety or welfare were omitted entirely from the 1833 
Act or greatly reduced in scope.  Unlike the 1802 Act, there was no specific 
requirement for ventilation and the requirement for twice-yearly lime-washing 
was reduced to annually, and even then the Inspector could give written 
permission removing the need for it. 
Although perhaps more notable for what it did not include rather than what it 
did, the regulatory approach for the protection of workers’ health and safety 
could be considered to have its origins in the 1833 Act.  The introduction of a 
government enforcement agency put in place all of the machinery necessary for 
state regulation of workplace health and safety although the inadequacies of 
both the 1833 Act and the Inspectorate quickly became apparent.89 Although the 
role of the factory inspector was focused on hours of work by children, in his 
report of 1835 one of the newly appointed Inspectors, Robert Saunders, 
commented on workplace accidents, noting that there was no provision for their 
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notification to the Inspectorate.90  Perhaps more importantly, he made specific 
mention of the dangerous state of unguarded machinery, a matter also 
mentioned by his fellow inspector, T. Jones Howell.91  
The general dissatisfaction with the 1833 Act resulted in pressure on the 
government to review both the scope of the Act and the role of inspectors and 
their superintendents.  A Select Committee chaired by Lord Ashley was 
established in 1840 to examine the implementation of the 1833 Act, reporting in 
February, 1841.92  The intention of the Committee was not to recommend new 
legislation but to make recommendations for the improved operation of the 
existing.  On that basis, the Committee focussed on the hours of work by 
children and young persons, the age of child workers, their education provision, 
and so on, but it also made recommendations in respect of workplace safety.  
Evidence given to the Committee by superintendents told a story of serious 
injuries and deaths of workers, particularly children, as a result of coming into 
contact with moving parts of machinery.  According to evidence given by one of 
the superintendents, the verdict of accidental death was invariably the outcome 
of Coroners’ Inquests held in respect of fatalities arising from workplace 
accidents, implying that there was no blame attached to employers for these 
deaths, irrespective of their cause.      93   
The Committee made four recommendations in respect of worker safety 
including a prohibition of the cleaning of moving machinery, guarding (or 
“boxing-off”) dangerous parts of machinery and the payment of compensation 
where the injury had occurred through contact with dangerous parts of 
machinery left exposed through negligence.  Should an inspector see a 
dangerous part of a machine, they could give written notice to the mill owner 
and should a worker subsequently be injured as a consequence of coming into 
contact with it, the mill owner would be subject to a fine in addition to any 
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compensation paid out.  There were other recommendations that fell outside 
the scope of the 1833 Act, for example extending the legislation to deal with silk 
mills and the prohibition of tampering with factory clocks, but the main 
recommendations represented a radical departure from the previous regulation 
of factories.  It should be noted that although the Committee recommended 
extending the legislation to cover silk mills, this was still part of the textile 
industry; all other industries plus a significant part of the textile industry 
remained outside the scope of the legislation. 
A series of bills based on the recommendations of the Committee were 
presented to Parliament, culminating in the final bill in February 1844.94  The 
Bill of 1844 contained most of the recommendations made by the Committee 
including a prohibition on the cleaning of moving machinery, guarding of certain 
machinery parts, notice of dangerous machinery to be given by Inspectors to mill 
owners and the notification of accidents resulting in the injured person being 
absent from work.95   The Act came into force in June 1844 and its most 
significant impact was the requirement to guard certain types of moving 
machinery and the prohibition on children and young people cleaning machinery 
which was in motion or working between moving and fixed parts of a self-acting 
machine when it was mechanically propelled.96 The penalty for non-compliance 
was a fine not less than £5 and not more than £20, and if an Inspector was 
satisfied that machinery was not properly guarded he was required to give 
written notice to the factory occupier to that effect, set out in the form of a 
schedule.  Giving fourteen days’ notice, the occupier could have the matter 
referred to two arbitrators, one appointed by himself and the other appointed 
by the Inspector who would determine whether or not there was a failure to 
comply.  Should the two arbitrators disagree, a third arbitrator would be 
appointed.  If it was agreed that guarding was unnecessary or impossible, the 
notice was to be cancelled. 
The requirement for the guarding of dangerous parts of machines was not 
universally welcomed and the idea that accidents could be caused by anything 
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other than the carelessness of workers was dismissed by certain parts of society.  
The 1844 Act was seen as ‘meddling and mischievous’ by many factory owners 
and there was an effort made to reduce the level of protection afforded by it, if 
not remove it altogether.97 The fight to water-down the guarding provisions of 
the 1844 Act continued and in 1856, a further Act was introduced to clarify 
where “…Doubts have arisen as to the true Construction of the said several 
Sections:”, namely the general requirement to guard certain parts of 
machinery.98  The 1856 Act restricted the need to guard mill-gearing to those 
parts that children, young persons and women could come into contact with, 
thus reducing the level of protection afforded to others who used machinery.   
The 1844 Act was much more extensive than the previous acts and included 
requirements for more serious accidents to be investigated by the certifying 
surgeon and a report sent to the sub-Inspector of Factories for the area.  
Certifying surgeons were employed to certify the age of the children employed 
in the factory and confirm their fitness for the work they were expected to carry 
out.  Fees were paid by the factory occupiers but could be recovered from the 
wages of the workers examined.  An interesting inclusion in the 1844 Act was the 
ability of the courts to increase the penalty for failing to guard specified 
machinery where a person had suffered injury as a consequence of that failure.99  
Section 60 of the Act allowed all or part of the increased penalty of between £10 
and £100 to be given to the victim at the discretion of the Secretary of State.  
Any award made tended towards the lower end of the spectrum, with £10 being 
a typical award with no record of the maximum award of £100 having ever been 
made.100 Although Section 60 made reference to “…any bodily injury…”, Bartrip 
and Burman found that payment was made to the personal representatives of 
the victims who had been killed as a result of coming into contact with the parts 
of machinery referred to previously.101  This seems to contradict Howells who 
suggested that the lack of any provision for compensation in the event of a fatal 
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accident was a weakness of the 1844 Act.102  Peacock was even more adamant in 
stating that compensation could not be awarded in the event of death.103 
The power to make an award for injury caused by unguarded machinery 
remained in statute until the Employers’ Liability Act of 1880 but after 1862, 
there seems to be only one such case, where an award was made to the 
grandmother of a deceased child.104  Bartrip and Burnam suggested a number of 
reasons for the failure by the factory inspectors to use Section 60 more 
extensively including employers volunteering to pay suitable compensation 
leading to proceedings being abandoned. Howells also pointed out that that 
some magistrates would abandon any hearing under this section of the Act if 
notified that compensation had already been paid to the victim.105  Howells 
went on to suggest that penal compensation schemes of the type established by 
1844 Act were unsuccessful since the sums imposed on employers were 
insufficient to be any kind of deterrent resulting in neglect being “…the 
cheapest policy for the entrepreneur to pursue…”.106  A further provision of the 
1844 Act worthy of comment is the requirement for notice to be sent to the 
certifying surgeon within twenty-four hours of any accident which caused bodily 
harm resulting in the victim being unable to return to work before 9.00am the 
following morning.  The certifying surgeon was then required to visit the factory 
as quickly as possible to make a full investigation of the nature and causes of the 
injury.  A report was then to be sent to the district inspector within twenty-four 
hours.   
The 1844 Act was a significant and substantial piece of legislation containing 
many provisions not discussed here and although it was still only applied to 
textile mills and factories, worker protection was being extended in other areas 
of industry. 1842 saw the introduction of an Act to prohibit  the employment  of 
Women and Girls in Mines  and Collieries;  to  regulate  the employment  of 
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Boys, and  to make  other provisions  relating  to persons  working  therein.107   
This Act prohibited the employment of women, girls and boys under the age of 
10 in mines and restricted the employment of boys under the age of thirteen.  It 
also allowed for the appointment of Inspectors of Mines and Collieries by the 
Secretary of State.  For all its faults, the 1844 Act was an important piece of 
legislation, not least because it established the pattern of consolidation rather 
than innovation which characterised the development of the Factories Acts over 
the following half-century.  Legislation was extended to other parts of the 
textile industry such as print and dye works, lace and rope making but it was not 
until the 1864 Act for the Extension of the Factory Acts that industries other 
than textiles came under legislative control.108  The Act of 1864 extended some 
legal protection to workers in a further six specified industries including 
earthenware (excluding brick and tile manufacture), lucifer matchmaking, 
percussion cap manufacturing, cartridge manufacturing, paper staining and 
fustian cutting.109 All of these industries were associated with particular hazards 
to health and safety or were notorious for long hours and the employment of 
children. 
A wider range of industries was brought under legislative control in 1867 but a 
distinction was drawn between factories and workshops with the introduction of 
two new Acts.110  The Factory Acts Extension Act 1867 extended the scope of the 
earlier acts to include a range of industries including blast furnaces, copper 
mills, certain types of mills and forges and factories where power was used for 
the manufacture of machinery, metal articles and gutta percha, paper, glass or 
tobacco manufacture, letter-press printing, bookbinding.111 It also included any 
premises where fifty or more persons were employed in any manufacturing 
process.112  There were further specific requirements included in the Act dealing 
with a range of specified dangerous processes.  It is worth noting that this Act 
did not introduce any additional measures, it only extended those already in 
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existence to a wider range of industries and activities.113  The Workshop 
Regulation Act of 1867 applied to manufacturing premises where fewer than fifty 
persons were employed (unless already subject to the requirements of the 
earlier Factory Acts).114  Workshops included all other premises where the 
activities associated with manufacturing were undertaken but without the use of 
mechanical power. There was little difference in the requirements for textile 
and non-textile factories but the requirements for workshops, particularly in 
respect of hours of work tended to be much more flexible and this did give rise 
subsequently to the problems of sweated labour in these types of premises.115 
 Although similar to the Factory Acts, the requirements of the Workshop Act 
tended to be less onerous.116  One significant difference was the involvement of 
local authorities in its enforcement, first proposed by the Children’s 
Employment Commission in their third report in 1864 as a means of reducing the 
expense of employing additional factory inspectors to cope with the large 
increase in numbers of premises covered by the legislation.117  When introducing 
the Hours of Labour Regulation Bill to the House of Commons in 1867, Walpole, 
commenting that it would be impossible to appoint enough factory inspectors to 
cope with the increased number of premises covered by the legislation, 
proposed that local authorities would be responsible for its enforcement. 118  The 
Workshop Regulation Act, 1867 came into force on 21 August 1867 and included 
the requirement for local authorities to enforce it.119  Although the proposal to 
use local authorities originated from the Commission, it was far from 
enthusiastic about this option stating that it “…would only be with reluctance 
and as an alternative we should recommend this course to be pursued.”120 A 
similar debate about the role of local authorities in the enforcement of safety 
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legislation would take place just over 100 years later when Robens was taking 
evidence for his report which led to the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 
1974.121 
It was not until the 1878 Factory Act that workshops and factories ceased being 
subject to separate legislation although the distinction between them remained 
in place for some time after that.122  The 1878 Act was another consolidating 
provision, bringing together the previous factory and workshop legislation as well 
as introducing new requirements.  The 1878 Act introduced a new way of 
classifying factories; textile factories and non-textile factories.    Although 
workshops were included in the same Act, they were further separated into 
three classes, workshops, workshops where neither children nor young persons 
were employed and domestic workshops. The definition of “factory” was rather 
complicated which Redgrave interpreted as “…a place in which machinery is 
moved by the aid of steam, water, or other mechanical power.”123  This is 
slightly different from the interpretation by Hutchins and Harrison who define 
“factory” as “…premises where any articles are made, altered, repaired, 
ornamented, finished or adapted for sale by means of manual labour exercised 
for gain, if mechanical power is used on the premises”.124  They go on to point 
out that some of the provisions of the 1878 Act extended to a few specific non-
textile factories whether power was used or not.  The definition of “factory” 
contained in the final Factory Act which became law in 1961 was almost 
identical to that used by Hutchins and Harrison.125 
Section 82 of the Act expanded on the explicit offence established in the 1844 
Act of causing death or bodily injury through the use of unguarded or 
inadequately guarded machinery in contravention of the Act, including the 
concept of penal compensation.126  A fine not exceeding £100 could be imposed 
upon the factory occupier, some or all of which could be applied “for the benefit 
of the injured person or his family”      .127 This system of “penal compensation” 
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was only ended with the introduction of the Factories Act 1959 although it 
seemed to fall out of use by the turn of the twentieth century.128  Howells put 
this down to the increased success of civil action taken by victims and their 
families towards the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth 
centuries. 
The following years saw a number of supplementary Factory Acts, most notably 
those of 1891 and 1895, which amended the 1878 Act or repealed sections of it.  
It is fair to say that these acts continued the well-established approach of 
evolution and consolidation rather than innovation, and whilst they may have 
had a noticeable impact on specific aspects of work, in themselves they were 
not significant steps forward in worker protection. Reflecting the well-
established approach discussed previously in this Chapter, this period could best 
be described as one of evolution, rather than revolution, but the system of 
regulation enforced by a central inspectorate had been well established. 
1901 saw a further Factory and Workshop Act which consolidated and repealed 
the 1878, 1891 and 1895 Acts along with a range of amending instruments 
introduced over that period.129  Once again, the 1901 Act did not contain any 
significant changes to the existing requirements.  Protection for women, young 
persons and children was further enhanced, including the prohibition of the 
employment of children under the age of 12.  Sanitary and health and safety 
arrangements were enhanced, as were the accident recording and reporting 
requirements.  The distinction between workshops and factories was retained 
but some additional classes were established including textile factories, non-
textile factories, tenement factories and domestic factories.  There were even 
more classes of workshops, namely Workshops, Tenement Workshops, Men’s 
Workshops, Women’s Workshops and Domestic Workshops.130 
Perhaps one of the most significant aspects of the 1901 Act was the increased 
involvement of local authorities and the Medical Officer of Health in the 
application of the Public Health Act 1875 to factories.  As previously discussed, 
the 1878 Act made local authorities responsible for enforcing parts of the 
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legislation dealing with sanitary arrangements and means of escape in the event 
of fire in workshops but the 1901 Act extended some of these responsibilities to 
include factories.   The Public Health Act of 1875 which dealt with sanitary 
arrangements and removal of nuisances applied to workshops but not factories 
and the factory inspectorate had no powers to rectify any nuisances in premises 
that would fall under its jurisdiction.  Instead, where an inspector encountered 
nuisances in factories, a report had to be made to the local authority who would 
then take the appropriate action.131  The 1901 Act included provision for the 
factory inspector to take over these responsibilities from the local authority if 
they were not being properly undertaken; moreover, the factory inspector could 
recover any costs incurred whilst doing so.132  This power continued in the 
twentieth century in Section 46 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 
which allows the Secretary of State to transfer the enforcement function from a 
local authority to the Health and Safety Executive if satisfied that the former 
has failed to carry it out to a satisfactory standard.133 
Although an improvement in many respects, the 1901 Act still allowed young 
people to work long hours in difficult conditions.134  There was some limited 
protection for agricultural workers and those employed in mines and quarries 
but the legislation excluded large sections of the working population.  As a 
consolidating Act, the 1901 Act introduced little that was new, which continued 
to be the case for the next sixty years even with two major Factories Acts being 
introduced during that time, both of which were consolidating in nature.  In 
addition to the two major acts, there was a large number of statutory 
instruments in the form of regulations and orders issued mainly to deal with 
specific industries or activities. 
The next major Factories Act was in 1937 which, once again was a consolidating 
Act.135  The 1937 Act made no reference to “workshops” but there was still a 
distinction drawn between factories where mechanical power is used and where 
it is not.  There were no major new developments in the 1937 Act, but the 
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requirements for guarding were strengthened.136  A new minimum working 
temperature to be achieved within the first hour of work of 600F was introduced 
by section 3(2) of the 1937 Act.  Although no longer included in legislation, this 
temperature (converted to 160C) has been reproduced in the most recent 
Approved Code of Practice for the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) 
Regulations 1992 as a minimum acceptable working temperature.137 
The role of local authorities continued in the 1937 Act, with responsibility for 
the enforcement of sanitary accommodation requirements in all factories.  For 
factories where no mechanical power was used, local authorities also enforced 
the provisions relating to cleanliness, overcrowding, ventilation, temperature 
and drainage.  The provision of means of escape in case of fire from certain 
factories also remained with local authorities. 
The next major (and final) Factories Act was introduced in 1961 and again was a 
consolidating Act.138  Unlike the previous acts, there doesn’t appear to be any 
comment or discussion on its content or implementation.  A guide was published 
by the Ministry of Labour to support the legislation but very little else.139 The 
1961 Act was very similar in most respects to the 1937 Act, including the role of 
local authorities in the enforcement of certain parts where no mechanical power 
was used in the factory.  Certain sections of the Factories Act 1961 remained in 
force into the twenty-first century although the main requirements were 
repealed by the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. 
The history of the Factories Acts shows a sequence of legislative provision 
focussed on improving working conditions rather than addressing workplace 
accidents and culpability.  As will be discussed in later chapters, this emphasis 
on improvement rather than punishment certainly contributed to the perceived 
need for some mechanism to address corporate killing, something that was not 
catered for in the Factories Acts, nor the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 
1974.  The 1974 Act will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. 
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2.4 Other Sectors of Employment 
The conditions in mines were at least as bad as those in the very worst factories 
and mills, and probably worse in most cases.  It was not just the working 
conditions and hours that were desperate, Scottish miners were only released 
from serfdom in 1799, something that Duckham traces back to the Scottish Poor 
Laws of 1579 and 1597 which allowed vagrants to bind themselves for life to 
colliery owners.140  The plight of miners was made worse by the Anent Coalyiers 
and Salters Act of 1606, which made it an offence to hire coal miners or salters 
without proper testimonial from their previous masters.141 It also allowed 
masters and owners of coal mines and salt pans to “…to apprehend all 
vagabounds and sturdie beggers to be put to labour”      .  As stated previously, 
serfdom in coal mining continued in Scotland until 1799, and according to 
Devine, its eventual prohibition by the Colliers and Salters (Scotland) Act 1775 
and the Colliers (Scotland) Act 1799 was not through altruism but to address a 
shortage of miners and colliers and increase the number of workers in that 
industry.142   Although miners in other parts of the United Kingdom were not 
subject to the serfdom imposed upon Scots miners, working conditions were 
little better and employment of young children was the norm. 
Legislation dealing with mines and collieries was first introduced in the United 
Kingdom in 1842.143  Similar to the early factories legislation, the focus of the 
first mines and collieries acts was on the restriction of children (under 10 for 
boys), and women from working in mines but it did not extend to work on the 
surface of pits. The other main provisions were the prohibition on persons 
younger than 15 operating steam or other powered hoists intended for raising 
persons up the mine shaft and the authorisation of the Secretary of State to 
appoint inspectors.  It was not until the Act of 1850 that legislation was enacted 
appointing inspectors but their role was limited to the inspection of mines.144 
The 1850 Act was repealed in 1855 by a more robust piece of legislation that 
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introduced a range of “General Rules” for all mines and “Special Rules” for 
individual mines.145  There were seven General Rules which were entirely 
focussed on safety.146  Where the inspector was satisfied that dangerous 
conditions existed, his report could be exhibited at the mine until the dangerous 
conditions were rectified and any person could discontinue his service without 
any penalty.  The following decades saw continual repeals and modifications of 
the legislation but as with the Factories Acts, the process was more evolutionary 
than revolutionary.  The final Mines and Quarries Acts was enacted in 1969 and 
mainly focussed on extending the 1954 Act to include tips following the Aberfan 
disaster (discussed later in this Chapter).   
There were two other sectors which had explicit health, safety and welfare 
legislation prior to the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974; offices, shops 
and railway premises and agriculture.  The Shop Hours Regulations Act of 1886 
set a maximum number of hours that a person under the age of 18 could work to 
seventy-four per week, inclusive of breaks for meals and district councils had 
the power to appoint inspectors for the enforcement of the Act.147  The Shops 
Act, as it became in later versions, was amended and updated throughout the 
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, culminating with the Shops Act 1950.  
During that time, the focus remained on hours of work, prohibition of Sunday 
trading (with some exemptions) and compulsory half-day holiday each week.  By 
1950, there was some limited reference to health and welfare but it was 
restricted to requiring seats for female workers and the provision of sanitary 
facilities.  Its enforcement remained with local authorities, many of whom 
appointed Shops Inspectors to carry it out.  Although the limited health and 
safety requirements were subsequently replaced by the Offices, Shops and 
Railway Premises Act 1963 and then the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 
1974, the Shops Act was not entirely repealed until 1994 when Sunday trading 
restrictions in England and Wales were relaxed.148 The 1950 Act became more 
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controversial in the nineteen-eighties and nineteen-nineties than it had been 
when first enacted mainly due to the Sunday trading debate. 
The Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963 was similar to the Factories 
Acts in its scope and intent and extended the legislative provision dealing with 
worker safety and health to a further eight million people.149  It reflected many 
of the requirements of the Factories Acts such as provision for heating, 
ventilation, cleanliness, overcrowding, sanitary accommodation, guarding 
dangerous machinery, and so on.150  Enforcement of the 1963 Act rested mainly 
with local authorities but there were exemptions including premises occupied by 
them, railway premises (but even then local authorities were responsible for the 
enforcement of kiosks, shops, etc. within a railway station), and so on.  One 
contentious exemption was premises where only a self-employed person or their 
close family worked, or where twenty-one hours a week or fewer was worked.151  
In such cases, the 1963 Act did not apply and this was perceived as a significant 
failing.152  Samuels argued that although the self-employed person might be 
expected to take care of their own safety and that of their close family, there 
was no protection for part-time workers or visitors who may have reason to 
frequent the premises.  Other requirements of the 1963 Act included the need 
for premises to be registered and the posting of an abstract of the Act in a 
prominent place in the premises or employees to be otherwise made aware of its 
contents.  Certain accidents were to be notified to the enforcing authority but 
this duty did not extend to illness or disease, whereas the Factories Act 1961 did 
require specific diseases to be notified. 
One of the most significant differences between the Factories Act and the 1963 
Act arose where a body corporate was found guilty of an offence which had 
occurred as the result of the “…consent, connivance of, or is attributable to any 
neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary…”, then that person 
was also liable for prosecution.153  This offence did not appear in the Factories 
Act 1961 but was reproduced, almost verbatim, in the Health and Safety at Work 
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etc. Act 1974.154 This offence will be discussed in more detail in subsequent 
chapters.   
The final sector with legislative control of health and safety prior to 1974 was 
agriculture.  The Agricultural Children Act 1873, which came into force on 1st 
January 1875, prohibited the employment of children under the age of eight in 
any agricultural work unless employed by their parents on their own land.  
Children between the ages of eight and twelve could only be employed if they 
had certificates showing they had achieved a specified level of attendance at 
school.155 
Although further legislation was introduced dealing with working hours of 
children, young persons and women, health and safety was not subject to legal 
controls until 1956, with the introduction of the Agriculture (Safety, Health and 
Welfare Provisions) Act.  A much shorter Act than the Factories Act or the 
Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act, the 1956 Act still afforded agricultural 
workers some degree of protection in respect of health and safety including 
guarding dangerous machinery, general safety, lifting excessive weights and the 
provision of sanitary facilities.  The 1956 Act also had requirements for the 
recording and notification of accidents and first aid provision similar to those 
laid down in the Factories Act. 
There was other safety-related legislation, much narrower in scope, dealing with 
specific types of premises or specific hazards, for example, the Nuclear 
Installations Act 1965 and the Radioactive Substances Act 1960.  These and 
similar Acts were important but limited to a very few premises and/or activities 
although they did add to the plethora of legislation associated with worker 
safety and welfare. 
It seemed clear to most people that the state of health and safety legislation by 
the 1960’s was unsatisfactory, with too many people dying or suffering injury or 
ill-health as a result of work activities.156  In 1967, the Ministry of Labour 
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published a First Consultative Document on the comprehensive reform of health 
and safety legislation and its enforcement in response to the general 
dissatisfaction.157  Although three-hundred organisations commented on the 
proposals to merge the Factories Act and Offices, Shops and Railway Premises 
Act and extend the scope of the legislation to as many workers as possible, 
according to Robens “doubts grew” as to whether the approach developing from 
the consultation would have the desired effects or would just be more of the 
same.158  In her speech introducing the Employed Persons (Health and Safety) 
Bill in March 1970, Barbara Castle made reference to the First Consultative 
Document and concluded “…that we need to get away from the conventional 
approach; that the mere consolidation and revision of existing legislation is not 
enough. I have, therefore, decided to set up a small, high-powered body to 
conduct a general inquiry across the whole field—not merely the Factories Act 
and O.S.R.P. Act.”159   This resulted in the establishment of the Robens 
Committee in 1970 to address some of the concerns raised over the outcome of 
the 1967 consultation and the state of workplace health and safety in general.  
As a consequence of the Government’s eventual decision to adopt a different 
approach, Castle’s Bill did not progress beyond its second reading.160    
There was a general consensus that the number of deaths, injuries and illnesses 
arising from work activities was unacceptable although there had been a 
significant fall in the fatal accident rate since the first decade of the twentieth 
century, from 17.5 to an average of 4.5 per 100 000 people employed in the 
decade 1961 – 1970.161  The safety record of the UK was better than most of its 
competitors although perhaps not as good as suggested by Selwyn  who held that 
“…it was generally acknowledged that we had in this country the finest 
regulatory system of legal controls anywhere in the world,…”        .162  Selwyn 
then qualified this statement by describing a number of fundamental 
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shortcomings of the UK system, some of which will be discussed in more detail 
below.  It is possible that Selwyn was conflating “finest” with oldest, which 
would certainly be true.  Robens was particularly concerned that there appeared 
to be no discernible improvement in the fatal accident rate during the preceding  
ten years which suggested that the country  had “…reached some sort of plateau 
in occupational safety and health performance.”163 
As discussed previously, the then-existing legislation tended to focus on specific 
industries or employment sectors, leaving large groups of the working population 
outside its scope with estimates of such numbers varying from five million to 
eight million.164  Drake and Wright and Selwyn were writing after the Act came 
into force so it is likely that their estimates of “new entrants” were more 
reliable than Robens.   As well as large groups of workers having no legal 
protection, people other than employees who may be affected by work activities 
generally fell outside the scope of the law.  This exclusion included members of 
the public, as illustrated by the Brent Cross crane disaster in 1964 where a crane 
collapsed with its load falling on a coach killing seven passengers and injuring a 
further thirty-two.165 The report into the accident suggested that there was a 
case to be made for extending the legislative protection afforded by the 
Factories Act and related legislation to members of the public although when 
giving evidence on behalf of the Government, counsel for the Attorney General 
stated that  “the Ministry of  Transport take the view that the existing 
Regulations, which  cover  the  use of  cranes  and other  building operations, 
although in fact designed primarily  for  the protection  of  workmen,  do,  if  
strictly observed,  give protection  to the public”.166  This view was repeated by 
the Minister of Labour, Raymond Gunter, who in a written response to a question 
about the Report stated that “The protection afforded to the worker by the 
Factories Act and Regulations does, however, provide incidental protection to 
members of the public and we do not think this would be effectively increased 
by an extension of the Act's scope or of the powers of Factory Inspectors.”167  It 
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would be less than a decade before this approach to public protection was 
completely overturned.    
In 1966 the mining village of Aberfan was engulfed in an avalanche of mine spoil 
from a tip that had been established over the previous fifty years.  One of the 
worst affected buildings was the primary school, where most of the 144 deaths 
occurred; 116 children aged between seven and ten and 28 adults died in the 
disaster.168  The Government appointed a Tribunal to investigate the causes of 
the disaster and make recommendations.  The Tribunal, chaired by Lord Justice 
Sir Herbert Edmund Davies, reported its findings on 3rd August 1967.169  Although 
the main focus of the Tribunal was on establishing what happened, how it 
happened, who was responsible and what lessons could be learned to prevent it 
happening again, it also considered the legal issues associated with the accident.  
One of the recommendations made in the Report was for legislation (in this case 
The Mines and Quarries Act 1954) to be extended to include “…provision for the 
safety of the general public…”.170  It is notable that although the Tribunal found 
the National Coal Board entirely responsible for the disaster (it eventually 
admitted liability), there were no criminal proceedings taken against it or any of 
its employees.171  Its liability extended only to the payment of compensation and 
a partial share of the costs to remove the tip.  The disaster fund raised by public 
subscription was required to pay a significant portion of the cost of the removal. 
Unlike the recommendations made following the Brent Cross crane collapse, the 
recommendations made by the Tribunal to extend the legislation to cover public 
safety were eventually included in the Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act 1969.  In 
addition to requiring tips to “…be made and kept secure…”, it allowed local 
authorities to serve notice on owners of disused tips requiring remedial works to 
be carried out where the tip was considered unstable and that instability could 
give rise to danger to members of the public.172  Owners had the right of appeal 
and local authorities could carry out work in default and recover the costs.  The 
                                        
168 Celia Wells, Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters  (Sweet and Maxwell 1995) 21 
169 Lord Justice Sir H. Edmund Davies, Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the 
Disaster at Aberfan on October 21st 1966, 1967) 
170 Ibid 
171 Iain McLean, 'On Moles and the Habits of Birds: The Unpolitics of Aberfan' (1997) 8 Twentieth 
Century British History 285 287 
172 Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act 1969 (c.10) Section 14 
48 
 
duties included in this Act were further extended by the Mines and Quarries 
(Tips) Regulations 1971. 
The unacceptable level of fatalities arising from work activities, large sectors of 
industry falling outside legislative control of health and safety and the lack of 
legal protection for members of the public were the main drivers for the most 
significant change to health and safety legislation in more than a century.  This 
change started with the publication of the Robens Report which will be discussed 
in the next section. 
 
2.5 The Robens Report 
The Committee on Safety and Health at Work, chaired by Lord Robens, was 
appointed by the Secretary of State for Employment and its terms of reference 
were:- 
“To review the provision made for the safety and health of persons in the 
course of their employment (other than transport workers while directly 
engaged on transport provisions and who are covered by other provisions) 
and to consider whether any changes are need in: 
(1) the scope or nature of the major relevant enactments, or 
(2) the nature and extent of voluntary action concerned with these 
matters, and 
to consider whether any further steps are required to safeguard members 
of the public from hazards, other than general environmental pollution, 
arising in connection with activities in industrial and commercial premises 
and construction sites, and to make recommendations”.173 
The appointment of Alfred Robens as chairman of the committee was perhaps an 
unusual choice, given the fact that he was chairman of the National Coal Board 
at the time of Aberfan disaster.  That in itself was not reason to question his 
appointment but his approach to the disaster was perhaps less sympathetic than 
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might have been expected and he was personally criticised by the Tribunal.174  
Given Robens’ experience as Chairman of the National Coal Board immediately 
after Aberfan, it is perhaps unsurprising that the recommendations of the Report 
of the Committee include a general antipathy towards criminal prosecution 
following accidents at work.  This particular view of the committee will be 
discussed in more detail later in this Chapter.  The Committee collected a wide 
range of evidence, including one-hundred and eighty three written submissions 
from organisations and individuals, meetings with various government 
departments, field visits with inspectors from many of the inspectorates and 
overseas visits to the US, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden and 
a number of research reviews. 
The Report was submitted to the Secretary of State for Employment on 9th June, 
1972 and seemed to have strong government support as demonstrated in a 
speech to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Employment, the Right 
Honourable Maurice McMillan “The recommendations are far-reaching and the 
report will obviously require careful study by all concerned, both inside and 
outside Government. Nevertheless, the Government are convinced that reform is 
now a matter of considerable urgency in an area of such great importance to all 
employees, and it is their intention to take early action towards achieving the 
broad objectives of the report.”175  The reaction to its publication was generally 
positive although there were some dissenting voices with the Labour Research 
Department  describing it as “...a naive and timid mouse...”. 176,177   
Robens found a system of statutory health and safety control that, whilst not 
broken, was certainly dysfunctional.  The shortcomings of the system at that 
time were well known and many of the problems have already been discussed, 
but to build a proper picture of the situation that Robens was presented with, 
they need to be revisited.  The problems identified by Robens can be loosely 
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categorised into two main groups, legislation and enforcement.  The 
shortcomings of the legislation were well known.  Robens was of the opinion that 
there was too much (nine main groups of statute and five-hundred statutory 
instruments), too much of it was “unsatisfactory” – unintelligible, complex, 
prescriptive, obsolescent, too focussed on physical aspects of work rather than 
working practices, it tended to focus on specific industries or activities meaning 
that a large part of the working population fell outside statutory control of 
workplace health and safety.178 Members of the public and other groups of 
persons who were not employees were not afforded any protection by the 
legislation (other than by the Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act 1969 discussed 
above). Enforcement was piecemeal at best, with seven separate inspectorates 
(plus local authorities) answering to five different government departments, it 
was inevitable that a coordinated, coherent response to health and safety issues 
would be difficult, if not impossible in certain circumstances.  Some premises 
could be visited by a range of different inspectorates, each focussing on 
different aspects of the work activity whereas some premises would fall 
completely outside all statutory control.   This problem affected every level of 
enforcement, from the inspectorates all the way through to government 
departments.  Major initiatives were not possible without the support of other 
departments which meant that the rate of progress was determined by the 
slowest.179   
Perhaps surprisingly, given the presence of these serious shortcomings affecting 
just about every aspect of health and safety regulation, Robens identified one 
main cause of accidents in the workplace, “…the most important reason for 
accidents at work is apathy.”180  Although the problem of “apathy” is referred to 
a number of times in the report, no evidence is put forward to support the view 
that it was the main cause of accidents in the workplace.  The phrase in Chapter 
Two of the Report “If, as we believe, the greatest obstacles to better standards 
of safety and health at work are indifference and apathy…”181 (author’s italics) 
would suggest that there was no evidence to support the allegation of apathy as 
the main cause of accidents, or at least to support the emphasis given to it by 
                                        






Robens.  This view was supported by Simpson who suggested that the conclusion 
drawn in the report that most accidents were caused by apathy is “…presented 
as axiomatic rather than a reasoned conclusion”.182 
Nichols and Armstrong, partly blaming Robens’ “homespun psychology” for this 
approach, questioned the basis for his view of apathy as being the main cause 
for accidents at work, “Not only does it look suspect theoretically; it is markedly 
lacking in evidence to back it up”.183  They went further in proposing that 
accidents were, in the main, caused by production rather than apathy, although 
this view was partly based on the analysis of only 5 accidents in a single 
workshop.184  Broadhurst suggested that ignorance was the underlying cause of 
“much so-called apathy”.185 In a speech to the House of Commons, Neil Kinnock 
took a different, although equally critical view of Robens’ emphasis on 
apathy.186  He agreed with Robens that apathy was the major cause of accidents 
in the workplace but he described the Report’s reasons for that apathy as a 
“facile axiom” and went on to say that “...to suggest that the law is the main 
cause of apathy is a distortion of reality.  It is like saying that the crutch has 
made the cripple”.  In the same debate, Paul Rose also questioned the 
conclusion drawn by Robens that apathy arising from inadequate law was the 
main cause of accidents in the workplace, instead proposing that inadequate 
enforcement was the main issue to address.187  Kinnock supported this view with 
the statement “There is a definite link between the existence of apathy and the 
absence of stringent, effective and punitive laws”. 
Most of the recommendations made by Robens and subsequently implemented by 
the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 were predicated on the theory that 
apathy was the root cause of accidents and ill health in the workplace and that 
apathy arose as a consequence of too much bad legislation.  As previously 
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discussed, this theory did not meet with unanimous support, but its importance 
in what followed cannot be exaggerated. 
The focus of the recommendations contained in the Report was very much on a 
shift from the enforcement of legislation by a central inspectorate to self-
regulation, with those giving rise to the risks being responsible for their control 
and management requiring the imposition of new duties on employers and 
employees.   The Report made it clear that “…any idea that standards generally 
should be rigorously enforced through the extensive use of legal sanctions is one 
that runs counter to our general philosophy”; Simpson suggested that the then 
existing inspectorates had never had a rigorous policy of prosecution.188,189 It is 
perhaps surprising that Robens was so explicit in his view that standards should 
not be rigorously enforced by the use of “legal sanctions”, but it does clearly 
establish the views of the Committee with regards to the shift towards self-
regulation.  Having said that, Robens’ enthusiasm for voluntarism was 
demonstrated in 1951 when as Minister of Labour, he introduced the Industrial 
Disputes (New Order) to the House of Commons. During that debate, he stated 
“Our industrial relations system rests on the voluntary principle and it is my 
hope that the principle and that system will be strengthened…”, clearly 
demonstrating his preference for voluntarism over regulation.  Although Robens 
did not expand upon the meaning of “…the voluntary principle…” in the context 
of industrial relations, Kahn-Freund proposed that it meant the end of the use of 
criminal law to achieve “industrial peace” and an emphasis on “…the 
autonomous organs of negotiation and arbitration…”.190   
This understanding of the effectiveness of self-regulation did not go 
unchallenged.  Woolf questioned Robens’ “general philosophy” and suggested 
that it led to the assumption that “…industry can be no more safe and healthy 
than voluntary methods of self-regulation will make it”.191  Woolf proposed that 
voluntary methods, which had always been available to employers, had proved 
no more successful in the past than legal regulation.   In particular, he was 
dismissive of the statement made by Robens that “infringements” arise 
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“…through carelessness, oversight, lack of knowledge or means, inadequate 
supervision or sheer inefficiency.  In such circumstances the process of 
prosecution and punishment by the criminal courts is largely an irrelevancy”        
.192 Woolf disagreed with this view, arguing that “Proof of a guilty mind is not 
required against motorists for careless or dangerous driving; why should a 
different standard apply to careless or dangerous employing?”.193  
Woolf argued that the hope that voluntary methods would prove more effective 
was based on two assumptions made by Robens; that culpability has little to do 
with the creation and existence of workplace hazards and that there is less 
natural conflict between employers and employees in relation to health and 
safety than any other matter.194    Both of these assumptions were, according to 
Woolf, false and he called for a re-examination of Robens’ whole approach to 
improving health and safety at work which, needless to say, never happened. 
The TUC also expressed some concern about the shift towards self-regulation, 
suggesting that while action from within industry could reduce accidents, it was 
not an alternative to “strong safety legislation, strictly enforced”.195  Unlike 
other areas of employment law and industrial relations, health and safety has 
never been subject to collective bargaining.  When considering health and safety 
laws and the social security system in the context of “collective laissez-faire”, 
Davies and Freedland asked the question “How was one to explain the regulation 
of these matters by law rather than by collective agreements?”196  They 
suggested that the explanation may be historical, with the legislation dealing 
with health and safety preceding collective bargaining but they then went on to 
quote Kahn-Freund who proposed that “Standards of health, safety and welfare, 
or of hours of work of women and juveniles, do not, on the whole, lend 
themselves well to collective bargaining, and – exceptions apart – they are much 
better enforced by inspectors than by union representatives.”197  The exclusion 
of health and safety from collective bargaining continued to generally be the 
case until the introduction of various nationalisation acts immediately following 
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the Second World War, and even though the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 
1974 created a wider role for unions and union representatives than before, it 
was still limited in scope.198  Even Robens, with all his enthusiasm for 
voluntarism, made it clear that there “...is no legitimate scope for ‘bargaining’ 
on safety and health issues...” although the report did emphasis the usefulness 
of “...constructive discussion, joint inspection and participation in working out 
solutions.”199   The role of the unions in health and safety will be discussed in 
more detail later in this Chapter and in Chapter Three, where the 1974 Act will 
be examined.   
Finally, Robens’ preference for voluntary codes over statutory regulation was 
criticised by Simpson who cast doubt on the suggestion that voluntary codes are 
easier to understand and more flexible and consequently more likely to be 
effective.200  Simpson also pointed out that the move away from statutory duties 
could have a deleterious effect on civil claims for damages taken by injured 
workers following their breach.   
It is much easier to find criticism of the Report’s conclusions and 
recommendations but there was also some limited support for its general 
approach to regulation.  Howells suggested that setting out basic statutory 
duties supported by voluntary codes “…could not fail to be creative of better 
attitudes…”201 although in his summary he does go on to suggest that while 
Robens’ identification of the weaknesses of the system in place at that time was 
excellent, its remedies were “less persuasive”.202  Hutter supported Robens’ 
emphasis on business being responsible for health and safety but she was less 
enthusiastic about the subsequent suggestion that the “occasional spot check” 
would be sufficient to ensure it properly met this responsibility.203 
As discussed earlier in this Chapter, legislation without effective enforcement 
provision is doomed to fail and one of the areas considered to be failing was the 
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inspectorates. Robens was concerned about the fragmentation of the 
enforcement provision with seven different inspectorates (plus local 
authorities), each responsible for specific industries or specific activities across 
industries.  The inspectorates found themselves in five different government 
departments which, according to Robens, meant that “...obsolescence and 
inadequacies of many of the existing statutory provisions are in no small part 
due to the fact that where overlapping responsibilities are involved ‘the need to 
have wide consultation may mean that all can move forward only at the pace of 
the slowest’”.204 
Robens’ answer to this was the establishment of a new body which would be 
responsible for the administration of the new unified Act.205  It would be 
separate, self-contained and have autonomy in its day to day operations.  The 
new body would satisfy all the requirements for responsible and accountable 
management and have a clear identity, with the person at the top being able to 
“pronounce authoritatively” on all matters relating to health and safety at work.  
Organisations associated in any way with health and safety in the workplace 
would be actively involved in the management of the new body which would 
reflect the principles of self-regulation and self-inspection.  Robens went on to 
strongly recommend that the body should be an executive, not an advisory 
board, with active involvement in both technical and management at a policy 
level.206   
Importantly, the new Authority, as Robens referred to it, was to be separate 
from any government department with its own budget and staff but performing 
its duties under the general policy directive of a government minister (the 
Secretary of State for Employment was suggested).207 To all intents and 
purposes, Robens was proposing the establishment of the new Authority as a 
QUANGO (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation).  In response to its 
concern about the large number of separate inspectorates, the Robens 
Committee recommended the establishment of a unified inspectorate within the 
new Authority.208 This, according to Robens would make better use of support 
                                        







and administration services as well as encouraging the exchange of knowledge 
and experience between inspectors from the different inspectorates.  In 
accordance with its general philosophy of not rigorously enforcing standards (as 
discussed previously), Robens stated that the focus of the new inspectorate 
should explicitly be the provision of advice and assistance.209 It also 
recommended more contact between inspectors and workers and their 
representatives.  Finally, Robens did not make any recommendations about the 
size of the new inspectorate, instead only considering the resources available at 
that time as being sufficient for its future role.210 
Unsurprisingly, the proposal for a new inspectorate was subject to much 
discussion.  Once again, Woolf was very critical of Robens’ views of the nature 
and scope of the proposed new inspectorate suggesting that this was a missed 
opportunity.211 He was of the opinion that the Factory Inspectorate had always 
been far too small to effectively enforce the legislation and felt that Robens 
could have made a case for a much larger inspectorate.  This view was reflected 
by Neil Kinnock who suggested that the number of inspectors would have to be 
multiplied by fourfold or fivefold if they were to do the job of issuing 
improvement and prohibition notices effectively.212  Nichols and Armstrong 
expressed serious concern about the apparent under-manning of the 
inspectorates, concerns that were obviously not addressed by the Report.213  It 
should be noted that the recommendation to create a unified inspectorate did 
not meet with unanimous support.  Skeet expressed concern about the 
amalgamation of some of the inspectorates and he recommended that at least 
the Mines and Quarries Inspectorate, Nuclear Installation Inspectorate and the 
Alkali and Clean Air Inspectorate should remain independent.214  The proposal 
for the expansion of inspectors’ powers also met with some criticism.  
Broadhurst described wider powers for inspectors as “...unnecessary as they are 
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obnoxious”.215  In particular, she objected to the proposed powers for inspectors 
to take any person into premises and especially into private residences. 
The continuing role of local authorities as enforcement agencies was considered 
at some length by Robens.216 The Committee identified two main criticisms of 
local authority involvement in health and safety enforcement, poorly qualified 
or experienced staff in some authorities and inconsistencies in interpretation of 
the law.  Robens concluded that local authorities should continue with their 
enforcement role but with much more cooperation, support and coordination 
with the new unified authority.  Local authorities would very much be the junior 
partners in the new system of enforcement, taking their instruction and 
guidance from the new unified authority.  A clear delineation between the 
activities enforced by the new inspectorate and local authorities was perceived 
as essential for efficient enforcement but the final decision on any particular 
premises would rest with the area officer of the new inspectorate.  The role of 
local authorities in the enforcement of health and safety legislation does not 
seem to have been a significant source of debate amongst contemporary 
commentators who tended to focus on the existing and proposed inspectorates. 
As previously discussed, Robens was not supportive of rigorous enforcement of 
standards.  The report referred to a “...considerable body of opinion...” 
supporting the view that criminal law sanctions had a very limited role to play in 
improving health and safety in the workplace.  From previous discussion, it can 
be seen that this view was far from unanimous but it did provide a justification 
for Robens’ recommendations in respect of the future of sanctions and 
enforcement.   Robens clearly stated that criminal proceedings were 
inappropriate for the “generality” of health and safety offences and 
recommended that it be reserved only for offences where an exemplary 
punishment would be expected and supported by the public.217  This would mean 
that criminal proceedings would be instituted only for offences of a flagrant, 
wilful or reckless nature that either have, or could have, resulted in serious 
injury.  The Report did recommend that penalties in such cases be much higher 
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than had previously been the case.  Woolf, one of the most vehement critics of 
Robens’, proposed that “...a prosecution should normally follow the discovery of 
every breach of the safety and health legislation which involves danger to any 
person...”, a very different approach from that recommended by Robens.218 
As an alternative to criminal proceedings for health and safety offences, Robens 
proposed a system of administrative sanctions, namely Improvement and 
Prohibition Notices.219  These could be served by an inspector without the need 
to go to the courts.  Improvement Notices would be the main sanction available 
to inspectors and would require the recipient to remedy contraventions within a 
reasonable period of time.  Prohibition Notices would only be served in more 
serious circumstances and would require the activity, equipment or process to 
be discontinued.  In the case of prohibition notices, there would be the option to 
come into immediate effect but Robens suggested that this would be the 
exception rather than the rule and that recipients would have a reasonable 
period of time to take remedial action.  In both cases, the recipient of a notice 
would have the opportunity to appeal against it but not in the criminal courts.  
Instead, the already existing Industrial Tribunals could be used to hear appeals 
against notices. 
Once again, Woolf expressed concern in respect of the impact improvement 
notices would have on the number of prosecutions.220  He suggested that 
improvement notices would replace rather than supplement the deterrent 
procedures as inspectors focussed on maintaining good relationships with 
employers.  Simpson also expressed some concern about the emphasis on 
administrative sanctions since their effectiveness ultimately relied upon threat 
of criminal proceedings.221  Howells questioned the effectiveness of prohibition 
notices and commented on what he perceived as the “complexity” of the 
different proposed classifications.222  He also suggested that the notices should 
remain in force unless complied with or annulled by the tribunal. 
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Robens considered requests from various bodies for the extension of the 
licensing systems that already existed.223  The Committee rejected these 
requests on the grounds of effectiveness, cost and the potential for transference 
of responsibility from those who create the risks to the licensing agency.  
Instead, Robens recommended that licensing should be used “very selectively” 
and retained mainly for the control of high risk installations and activities.  The 
rejection of a wider use of licensing met with some criticism from Howells who 
commented on the “inadequate grounds” for this recommendation.224  Other 
than Howells, the use or otherwise of licensing does not appear to have been 
subject to much comment. 
Robens held the view that worker participation in health and safety matters was 
essential if self-inspection and self-regulation by individual organisations was to 
be successful.225  Robens also believed the best answer was a statutory duty 
setting out arrangements for participation by employees.  Robens pointed out 
that the concept of worker participation was not new, legislation requiring 
consultation with workers or their representatives already existed.  The Coal 
Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 was the first of the major nationalisation acts 
following the second world war and required the National Coal Board to enter 
into negotiations with organisations representing substantial numbers of workers 
employed by the Board with respect to a range of issues, including safety, health 
and welfare.  The emphasis placed on organisations representing workers would 
suggest that the intention was for trade unions to represent workers in these 
negotiations.  The 1946 Act contains no mention of safety committees or safety 
representatives. 
Subsequent nationalisation acts (Electricity Act 1947, Gas Act 1948, Iron and 
Steel Act 1949) contained similar provisions requiring relevant boards, councils 
or corporations to consult with organisations representing a substantial number 
of employees with respect to health, safety and welfare matters, amongst other 
things.  The duties to consult imposed by the nationalised industries acts suggest 
an extension of collective bargaining rather than an explicit move to improving 
health, safety and welfare in these industries.   Although the nationalised 
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industries had a duty to consult on issues related to health, safety and welfare 
as described above, this obviously only applied to workers in those industries and 
as Kinnock said, “The trade union interest at shop floor level is regrettably often 
based as the Policy Holder Journal puts it ‘on obtaining good settlements of 
injury claims for their members rather than tackling the source of the 
injuries”.226 
The recommendation contained in the Report was for a statutory duty on “every 
employer” to consult with employees or their representatives in respect of 
health and safety in the workplace.227  Robens was keen for flexibility in 
approach to be encouraged and did not feel that any particular approach 
involving safety representatives or safety committees should be specified but 
that guidance, in the form of a code of practice, should be produced.  The 
guidance would offer model arrangements including advice on safety committees 
and safety representatives.  Broadhurst applauded Robens preference of safety 
representatives over safety committees, the latter being the preference of the 
Department of Employment at the time.228  In support of that viewpoint, 
Broadhurst made reference to her previous research which suggested that safety 
committees were ineffective in many situations. 
Although Robens suggested that Improvement Notices could be served where the 
statutory duty to consult was not carried out effectively, it was felt that it was 
not a duty that could in “any strict sense” be capable of enforcement.229  
Simpson found it difficult to accept that the approach recommended by Robens 
would be more effective than that proposed in the abandoned Employed Persons 
(Health and Safety) Bill 1970 which would have required the appointment of 
safety representatives by recognised trade unions where more than 10 people 
were employed.230  Safety committees would also be able to be requested where 
more than a hundred people were employed.   
The recommendation for a statutory duty for employers to consult with 
employees or their representatives was broadly welcomed but Howells suggested 
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that it did not go far enough.231  He expressed surprise that the inspectorate was 
not obliged to inform and involve safety representatives during inspections and 
enforcement.  He did acknowledge that Robens’ emphasis on self-regulation 
could explain this omission. 
The findings and recommendations of the Robens Committee were mainly 
implemented in the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and this very 
important piece of legislation will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
From its very earliest days, health and safety legislation has been regulatory 
rather than criminal in nature and, perhaps as a consequence, never attracted 
the same level of interest as other types of legislation even though many 
thousands of lives have been lost and innumerable people injured or made ill as 
a result of work activities.  The regulatory approach to legislating worker safety 
has continued into the twentieth and twenty-first century and it seems almost 
certain to continue into the future.  Over the past two-hundred years or so the 
emphasis of legislation dealing with worker safety and its enforcing authorities 
has been advice, guidance and support for employers, rather than a punitive 
criminal law response.  Arguments can be made in support of such an approach 
but it will nearly always be to the benefit of employers when compared to the 
alternative of criminal prosecution in the event of deaths or injuries arising from 
work.  Whether or not workers and other people affected by work activities 
benefit from the regulatory approach must be called into question but there is 
little evidence to conclude one way or the other. 
There were a number of milestones in the nineteenth century such as the 
establishment of an inspectorate (emphasising the regulatory nature of the 
legislation), the requirement for guarding certain parts of machinery and the 
application to a wider range of industries and activities but it would be latter 
part of the twentieth century before all workers in all workplaces would be 
afforded the protection of the law in respect of their health, safety and welfare. 
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It could have been expected that promotion of the regulation of workplace 
safety was primarily an altruistic affair, with safety and welfare being the 
priority.  Many of the key figures in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
discussed in this Chapter were indeed driven by the desire to improve the lot of 
the workers, but there is a strong argument to be made in support of the private 
interest theory of regulation where the narrow interests of the regulated are 
served rather than the public benefit.  The private interest theory of regulation, 
which will be discussed in more detail in a later Chapter, could certainly be 
applied to the regulation of worker safety and welfare, certainly into the 
twentieth century. 
It is interesting to note that during the period covered in this Chapter, there 
seems to have been very little debate in respect of an employer’s statutory 
responsibilities to persons other than employees.  This was illustrated by both 
the Brent Cross Crane collapse in 1964 and the Aberfan disaster in 1966.  In 
these cases, and others, the liability of the employers was restricted to the 
payment of compensation for those killed and injured.  There was no question of 
prosecution for corporate or gross negligence manslaughter of those considered 
responsible.  Robens’ recommendations included imposing a statutory duty on 
employers to protect the health and safety of persons other than employees who 
might be affected by their undertaking. 
The next Chapter will consider how the recommendations of the Robens Report 
were implemented as the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and its 
implications for workers and others who could be affected by work activities.  
The subsequent development of health and safety regulation will be discussed 
focussing on its application to deaths associated with work activities and its 




3.0 Health and Safety Regulation Post-Robens 
3.1 Introduction 
The outcome of the Report of the Robens Committee was the Health and Safety 
at Work etc. Act 1974, which came into force on 1 April 1975.232  Most of the 
recommendations contained in the Robens Report were implemented in the 1974 
Act but there were some significant omissions, additions and modifications.  At 
the time, the Act was generally welcomed and, according to Lewis “arguably the 
most important safety statute ever introduced”.233  This welcome was not 
universal, however, Selwyn described it as “…turgid, soporific, and, in parts, 
about as meaningful as medieval metaphysics”.234 He was also concerned about 
the failure of the Act to allow a claim for compensation in the event of a 
workplace accident or ill-health.  He referred to the Act as “…basically a 
criminal statute…” and went on to suggest that the law of health and safety is in 
fact an amalgam of “criminal law, civil law and preventative measures”.  The 
nature of health and safety legalisation will be discussed later in this and other 
Chapters but Selwyn identified what could be described as its schizophrenic 
character, neither criminal nor regulatory, but a bit of both.  
The Act has remained largely intact over the years and although there have been 
some amendments, the provisions dealing with health and safety in the 
workplace are mostly unchanged.  This does not mean that there haven’t been 
other major changes to health and safety regulation in the United Kingdom.  The 
increasing influence of Europe in respect of health and safety at work has had a 
significant impact on the original intentions of Robens and the role of the 1974 
Act.  Perhaps one of the most important changes over recent years has been the 
introduction of the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 which could be 
considered more significant in the field of workplace safety than the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 and will be discussed later in this 
Chapter. 
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The importance of the Report of the Robens Committee cannot be over-stated. 
Hutter described it as “…a watershed in thinking about the legal regulation of 
safety and health”235.  It changed how safety in the workplace was controlled by 
legislation, the extent of the legislative control and how the legislation was 
enforced, but it also perpetuated the perception that laws dealing with 
workplace safety were “regulatory”, rather than “criminal”.  The distinction 
between regulation and crime will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six but 
it has been fundamental in determining how health and safety contraventions 
and, in particular, deaths arising from work activities have been perceived by 
the legal profession and the courts.  As will be shown in this Chapter, the Health 
and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 focusses on contraventions, rather than the 
consequences of the contraventions (although they would certainly be taken into 
account during sentencing).  The 1974 Act does not make reference to the 
severity of the outcome of contraventions, only the contraventions themselves, 
for example, there is no offence in the Act of causing death or serious injury. 
A significant innovation introduced by the 1974 Act was its application to all 
people at work and those affected by work activities, with the only exemption 
being domestic servants, who were considered ‘part of the family’.  The 
traditional approach of absolute requirements being imposed on employers was 
replaced with a range of “General Duties” which were based on outcomes rather 
than inputs, for example, instead of being required to guard dangerous 
machinery, employers would be required to ensure the health, safety and 
welfare of employees, so far as is reasonably practicable.236  Employers would be 
required to identify the risks and then identify and implement the most 
appropriate control measures, taking all the relevant factors into account.  This 
was a significant change of emphasis from what had gone before and an 
important component of the self-regulation approach mentioned previously.   
As discussed in Chapter Two, health and safety legislation in the UK, from its 
earliest days, was piecemeal, inconsistent and excluded large sectors of 
industry, commerce and the general public, from the scope of its protection. 
Enforcement was through a number of different agencies with varying priorities 
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with each being responsible to a different government department.  Robens 
identified these and other failings but came to the conclusion that the biggest 
barrier to the improvement of the safety and health of workers and others who 
may be affected by work activities was apathy, from both employers and 
employees.237  This conclusion did not receive universal support but it formed 
the basis for a different approach to health and safety legislation, where the 
employer and employee were to take on much more responsibility to ensure a 
safer place of work for both workers and anyone else who may be affected by 
work activities.   
That different approach forms the basis for self-regulation, one of the keystones 
of the 1974 Act. In the UK, self-regulation in various guises has been used to 
control a wide range of activities, including advertising, the media, financial 
services and a large number of organisations representing the professions.238 The 
term ‘self-regulation’ has caused confusion and there are a number of different 
approaches to it.239  Baggott, describing self-regulation as “…a rather vague and 
elusive concept…” went on to define it as “… as an institutional arrangement 
whereby an organization regulates the standards of behaviour of its 
members”.240  In the narrower field of self-regulation in the public interest, he 
subsequently defined it as “…a range of public interest-oriented regulatory 
systems which allow the regulated to manage the regulatory process”.241 Ogus 
identified three conditions to be satisfied in the justification of self-regulation, 
namely market failure, inadequacy or inappropriateness of private laws and 
where it is a better approach than “conventional public regulation”.   
In some respects, the term “self-regulation” in the context of the 1974 Act could 
be considered misleading, employers and other duty holders are still subject to 
statutory regulation enforced by various central and local government agencies.  
What the 1974 Act introduced was a different emphasis for compliance, moving 
from external agencies ensuring duty holders complied with statutory 
requirements, to the duty holders themselves being responsible for ensuring 
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compliance.  It is this responsibility imposed upon duty holders that is referred 
to as “self-regulation” in this context, and it is this that most closely fits the 
model of “enforced self-regulation” described by Braithwaite, where an 
organisation is responsible for developing a set of rules dealing with its own 
specific issues and requirements.242  The regulator can then accept or require 
revision to these rules by the organisation.  This has resulted in what Levi-Faur 
described as a “hybrid” system, where organisations are required to identify, 
assess and manage their risks but this self-regulatory approach is enforced 
alongside more traditional rule-based requirements by the same regulator using 
the same enforcement mechanisms.243,244  For health and safety in the UK, the 
health and safety policy statement, which is a requirement for most employers 
in terms Section 2(3) of the 1974 Act, would be equivalent of the rules to be 
produced by organisations, as proposed by Braithwaite.  Since the 1974 Act, 
further health and safety legislation has required employers to produce written 
risk assessments for a range of different activities and these could also be 
considered as forms of rules, which could be accepted or rejected by the 
regulator.  If they are inadequate, non-existent or not complied with by the 
organisation, the regulator can use all of the enforcement mechanisms available 
to it to ensure compliance. 
In effect, what self-regulation did not mean for health and safety was 
voluntarism. There was no choice over compliance with the legislation, nor was 
it self-enforcement; the enforcement function was reserved for the new unified 
agency.245  In the case of health and safety in the UK, self-regulation described 
the requirement for employers and employees to take a proactive approach to 
compliance with the legislation on the basis of the prevailing conditions and 
circumstances of the time and in the context of their activities, but with the 
Health and Safety Executive being responsible for enforcement, effectively 
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enforced self-regulation246.  If self-regulation for the purposes of workplace 
health and safety is considered in the context of Baggott’s definition in the 
previous paragraph, it clearly falls under the category of “public interest-
oriented regulatory systems” but the actual level of management of the 
regulatory process by the regulated is limited to ensuring its own compliance 
with the statutory requirements.  For self-regulation to be effective, there 
would have to be “…acceptance and exercise of appropriate responsibilities at 
all levels within industry and commerce, accompanied by more management 
initiative and greater involvement of work people”.247  Levinson identified three 
forms of self-regulation in the context of workplace safety: by employers and 
employees (the form envisaged by Robens), by employers and trade unions 
(which developed in the UK as a consequence of the Employment Protection Act 
1975 which restricted the role of safety representative to “…those appointed by 
a recognised trade union…”) and by management alone.248  Until the 
introduction of the Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 
in 1996249, this last form of self-regulation would be the norm for organisations 
which were non-unionised and where no alternative consultation arrangements 
were made.  The legal basis for worker involvement in workplace health and 
safety will be discussed later in this Chapter.   
Given the number of major accidents with a significant loss of life that occurred 
since the 1974 Act, it could be argued that the concept of self-regulation has 
been a failure.  In particular, the Herald of Free Enterprise, Clapham Train Crash 
and Piper Alpha (all of which will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter) 
occurred as the result of significant management failures. This might lead to the 
conclusion that while the concept of self-regulation may be attractive to 
industry and government, its effectiveness in improving workplace health and 
safety and reducing accidents has not been demonstrated, indeed exactly the 
opposite would appear to be the case.  Hutter pointed out that self-regulation is 
based on a “…corporate philosophy which regards health and safety as the 
everyday concern of everyone at work so it involves everyone in regulation and 
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emphasises individual responsibility…”.250  This could be considered an ideal but 
the accidents referred to previously in this paragraph would indicate that health 
and safety is not “…the everyday concern of everyone…” and thus casts doubt on 
the whole edifice of self-regulation.  Hutter examined the approach taken by 
British Railways in the late nineteen-eighties/early nineteen-nineties to self-
regulation and although she considered it to be “…one of the better motivated 
and able companies…”, it still struggled to manage it effectively.251  As she 
pointed out, if a company like British Rail which had a clear commitment to 
health and safety had serious difficulties in self-regulation, hundreds of other 
companies, particularly small and medium enterprises with far fewer resources 
at their command, would find it at least as difficult if not more so.  The 
difficulty for small companies to effectively implement self-regulation was borne 
out in a (rather limited) survey of welding companies in New Zealand carried out 
by Walls and Dryson who concluded that “…self-regulation of small New Zealand 
enterprises has not been a success”.252  As Baggott pointed out, self-regulation is 
rarely introduced as the result of public pressure, indeed the opposite is 
frequently the case with a demand for tighter state regulation.253 
This Chapter will examine the 1974 Act in more detail, and in particular its 
scope, the enforcement regime it established, offences and penalties, the 
changes introduced by the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008, arguably the 
most significant piece of specific health and safety legislation since the 1974 
Act, and its consequences.  The role of the European Union on workplace 
legislation and its constraints on UK Government policy will be also be 
considered.  The perceived inadequacy of the 1974 Act to effectively punish 
major corporations following a number of major accidents will be discussed in 
Chapter Five. 
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3.2 The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 
The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (“the 1974 Act”) was given Royal 
Assent on 31 July 1974 with a commencement date of 1 October 1974 and is still 
in force today.  It applies entirely or in part to England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, although Northern Ireland has specific arrangements.  It 
implemented most of the recommendations of the Robens Committees and 
added others.  It was published in 4 parts; part 1 dealt with health, safety and 
welfare arrangements and is of most relevance here, Part 2 established the 
Employment Medical Advisory Service (EMAS), Part 3 dealt with Building 
Regulations (now repealed) and Part 4 covered miscellaneous and general 
matters.  Dawson et al described the Act as both a piece of enabling legislation 
and “In Khan-Freund’s (1972) terms…” a “…species of regulatory legislation” 
although their interpretation of “enabling” is somewhat different from its 
general interpretation.254  In the case of the Health and Safety at Work, etc. 
Act, 1974 Section 15 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations “…for any 
of the general purposes of this Part…”.  This power has been used extensively to 
implement various EU directives, as will be discussed later in this Chapter.  
Section 16 also allows the Health and Safety Commission (now combined with 
the Health and Safety Executive) to approve codes of practice which gives them 
a quasi-judicial status; failure to comply with an approved code of practice is 
not in itself an offence but will be deemed proof that an offence in terms of a 
related statutory provision has occurred unless the defendant can show that the 
steps taken to comply with the provision are at least as good as those laid down 
in the approved code of practice. 
The premise of Dawson et al, that the 1974 Act is a form of “regulatory 
legislation”, is out of step with the statement by Selwyn that it is “…basically a 
criminal statute with appropriate penalties for breaches…”.255  There is not 
necessarily a contradiction between these two statements but they do suggest a 
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difference in perception of the nature of the 1974 Act in particular and of health 
and safety legislation more generally.  Taking an historical perspective, it was 
perhaps inevitable that the 1974 Act would be seen by the courts and 
enforcement authorities as regulatory rather than criminal.  It replaced a 
number of acts and other statutory instruments that were considered regulatory 
that view continued with the introduction of the 1974 Act.  This very important 
distinction between regulation and criminal law will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Six. 
As stated previously, Part 1 of the 1974 Act contains most of the requirements 
relevant to health and safety in the workplace and establishes the Health and 
Safety Commission and Health and Safety Executive, as well as introducing the 
‘General Duties’ and making provision for enforcement.  The 1974 Act applies to 
all work and work activities with the exception of domestic servants.256  There 
have been some grey areas, for example, its application to police officers, but 
these have generally been resolved and domestic servants are now the only 
exempted class of employees of any significance.257  
The main requirements for employers, the self-employed, employees and others 
having control over premises are contained in the General Duties which are laid 
down in Sections 2 to 9 of the Act.  Two important concepts form the basis of 
these general duties, namely “so far as is reasonably practicable” and “risk”.  
Both terms were relatively unfamiliar when the Act was introduced, certainly so 
far as health and safety regulation was concerned, but they have gone on to 
form the basis of the United Kingdom’s legislative approach to workplace safety. 
The first appearance of the phrase “reasonably practicable” in United Kingdom 
legislation would appear to have been in The Coal Mines Act 1911258 and since 
then case law has been relied upon to establish its the meaning with the leading 
definition of the term being found in Edwards v. National Coal Board where 
Asquith, L.J.  stated "’Reasonably practicable’ is a narrower term than 
‘physically possible’ and seems to me to imply that a computation must be made 
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by the owner, in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the 
sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in 
money, time or trouble) is placed in the other; and that if it be shown that there 
is a gross disproportion between them - the risk being insignificant in relation to 
the sacrifice - the defendants discharge the onus on them. Moreover, this 
computation falls to be made by the owner at a point of time anterior to the 
accident.”259          
This definition established a number of important concepts in respect of the 
term “reasonably practicable”, including making it an explicit requirement for 
the person on whom the duty is placed to carry out the assessment prior to any 
accident taking place.  It also clearly places the responsibility for determining 
what is or is not reasonably practicable on that person.  There have been a 
number of cases since Edwards where the concept of reasonably practicable has 
been considered but it is still seen as the leading definition of the term.260  The 
principle of the duty holder being responsible for determining what is 
practicable or reasonably practicable has been carried forward to the 1974 Act.  
Section 40 of the 1974 Act requires the defendant to prove that “...it was not 
practicable or not reasonably practicable to do more than was in fact done to 
satisfy the duty or requirement, or that there was no better practicable means 
than was in fact used…”.261  Drake and Wright  made it clear that the 
prosecution must still prove to “…a high degree of probability…” that a 
contravention has occurred or an offence committed.262  It is then for the 
accused to show that everything reasonably practicable had been done to 
prevent the contravention or offence occurring, taking into account all of the 
circumstances.  This is an example of a “reverse burden of proof” where the 
defendant must prove that she has taken all reasonably practicable steps, rather 
than the prosecution proving that she has not.263 The question of reverse burden 
of proof has arisen from time to time since the commencement of the 1974 Act.  
In the case of Davies v. Health and Safety Executive the defendant was found 
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guilty of contravening Section 3 of the 1974 Act following the death of a self-
employed subcontractor, in that he had not taken all reasonably practicable 
steps to protect the health and safety of persons other than employees.264  
Davies appealed against the conviction on the grounds that the reverse burden 
of proof contained in Section 40 of the 1974 Act was incompatible with the 
presumption of innocence enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998.  The appeal 
was dismissed on the grounds that the infringement of the presumption of 
innocence contained in Section 40 of the Act was justified and compatible with 
the Human Rights Act 1988.   
“So far as is reasonably practicable” was for many years considered a “…limited 
defence…” for some health and safety offences, a view confirmed by Lord 
Nimmo Smith in Williams v Farne Salmon and Trout Ltd.265  This view was 
brought into question by Latham LJ in R. v. HTM where he stated that “…the 
phrase ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ is not a defence” going on to 
describe it as a qualification of the duty to “ensure” the health and safety of 
employees.266  The concept of “so far as is reasonably practicable” as a defence 
is one that is well established and was referred to as such by Hoffman LJ 
throughout the judgement in R. v Associated Octel267, and by others including 
Tuckey LJ in Davies v Health and Safety Executive268.  In his judgement, Latham 
LJ made reference to Davies v Health and Safety Executive, in which Tuckey LJ 
suggested that the phrase “so far as is reasonably practicable” qualifies the duty 
imposed upon employers (and by implication others with similar duties imposed 
upon them by the 1974 Act) and the offence is caused by breach of the qualified 
duty.269  From that, Latham LJ concluded, that “so far as is reasonably 
practicable” is not a defence but has the purpose “…to absolve employers where 
their conduct is blameless.”270  Irrespective of whether or not “reasonably 
practicable” is a defence or a qualification of the duty, concern has been 
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expressed about its fairness to the defendant, for example, Hopkins asked how 
an employer (or employee) could decide what is reasonable practicable.271  It is 
unlikely that Latham LJ’s judgement will have any real practical implications 
and most employers will continue to view it as a defence rather than a 
qualification of their statutory duty. 
Although United Kingdom relies upon case law for its interpretation of 
“reasonably practicable”, an attempt has been made in the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, 2004 (enacted by the Australian Victoria Parliament), to 
describe its characteristics as follows:- 
 “To avoid doubt, for the purposes of this Part and the regulations, regard must 
be had to the following matters in determining what is (or was at a particular 
time) reasonably practicable in relation to ensuring health and safety—  
(a) the likelihood of the hazard or risk concerned eventuating;   
 (b) the degree of harm that would result if the hazard or risk eventuated;   
 (c) what the person concerned knows, or ought reasonably to know, 
about the hazard or risk and any ways of eliminating or reducing the 
hazard or risk;   
 (d) the availability and suitability of ways to eliminate or reduce the 
hazard or risk;   
 (e) the cost of eliminating or reducing the hazard or risk.”272 
Although not a definition as such, the guidance provided in this piece of 
legislation on the determination of reasonably practicable makes explicit the 
factors that would be expected to be taken into account, including 
foreseeability. 
The other significant concept introduced by the 1974 Act was “risk” although its 
significance was almost certainly not appreciated at the time.  The Act does not 
define risk and it is fair to say that it did not take centre stage as it does in 
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subsequent statutory provisions dealing with workplace safety.  There are many 
definitions of health and safety risk, perhaps one of the most common is “…the 
likelihood that a hazard will actually cause its adverse effects, together with a 
measure of the effect” and hazard is considered as anything that could cause an 
adverse effect, normally some kind of loss including harm to human health, 
damage to property or loss of reputation.273  There are various forms of risk 
including project, financial, corporate, innovation as well as health and safety 
risk.  All other forms of risk can have a positive or negative outcome, for 
example, investing in the stock market, fixed price tender for a major project, 
embarking upon a major corporate restructuring, and for all of these forms or 
risk, there can be gain or loss.  Health and safety risk is the exception because 
there can be no gain.  Employers and other duty holders may benefit financially 
from not managing the risk, but the activity giving rise to the risk can only result 
in loss.  To give some indication of the attitude to risk in the early days of the 
1974 Act, three textbooks written specifically to analyse and assess its impact 
barely mention the concept of risk or its importance in establishing reasonable 
practicability.274  From the mid-nineteen-eighties, risk and risk assessment 
became the main focus for all aspects of workplace health and safety and this 
change in emphasis has been reflected in legislation implemented since that 
time. 
The general duties contained in Sections 2 – 9 of the 1974 Act were intended to 
replace the large number of existing statutory requirements with general 
statements defining the responsibilities of employers, employees and others, 
irrespective of the industry sector they may be in.  Since the commencement of 
the Act, Section 5 which deals with certain types of emissions into the 
atmosphere has been repealed with the offence being transferred to 
environmental protection legislation. Section 2, which could be considered the 
most important when it comes to worker safety,  places a general duty on 
employers to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and 
welfare of employees.275  This basic duty is extended to ensure work practices 
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that are safe and without risks, including the provision and use of plant and 
machinery, the handling storage and transportation of articles and substances, 
the provision of information, instruction, training and supervision, the 
maintenance of safe places of work and access thereto, and the provision of 
welfare facilities for people at work.   
The risk-based approach to safety was a very important feature of the 1974 Act 
and caused some concern at the time although it was far from a new approach 
to workplace safety.276  The argument in favour of a risk-based approach was 
that it would be flexible in comparison with the more traditional approach of 
“absolute requirements” taken by the then existing legislation, and adaptable to 
changes in both technology and society’s expectations.  In effect, it provided a 
system that would not need to be changed in response to changing 
circumstances since it was based on outcome, i.e., providing worker safety, 
rather than input, and could accommodate changes in attitudes and perceptions 
to safety as well as advances in technology and manufacturing.   
In many respects, the traditional prescriptive approach was more 
straightforward for employers to achieve compliance, with the workplace either 
satisfying the statutory requirements or not and there was little scope for 
interpretation.  As Drake and Wright put it, “The British on the whole prefer 
statutes which are proof against the imbecile who required detailed guidance 
and the charlatan bent upon misunderstanding the law”.277   The prescriptive 
nature of the requirements contained in the Factories Acts tended towards 
minimum standards since every employer was required to comply with them as 
laid down, resulting in judgements which were not necessarily conducive to 
worker safety.  For example in Nicholls v. Austin (Leyton) Ltd, it was held that 
guarding of dangerous parts of machinery did not extend to material ejected 
from it as a consequence of its operation, subsequently causing injury to the 
operator.278  This case illustrated the problems of the prescriptive approach that 
could result in the legislation not affording full protection against injury as a 
result of the circumstances falling outside the prescribed offence.  In some 
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circumstances, employers were presented with a requirement to carry out 
measures that might not improve worker safety or perhaps even be contrary to 
providing a safe place of work. 
The risk-based approach contained in the 1974 Act focussed on outcome, that is, 
what is expected to be achieved by the employer (with the qualifying “so far as 
is reasonably practicable” discussed earlier in this Chapter).  By requiring 
employers to ensure the health and safety of employees (so far as is reasonably 
practicable), the 1974 Act implies an assessment of the risk and appropriate 
measures taken to eliminate or reduce it to acceptable levels (safety can be 
defined as acceptable risk which means danger can be considered the presence 
of unacceptable risk).  Instead of relying upon explicit requirements laid down in 
statute, employers had to proactively identify all the hazards arising from their 
activities, assess and analyse the risks associated with these hazards and 
implement control measures where appropriate.  This approach was not 
universally welcomed; James described the offences under Section 2 of the 1974 
as “…vague to the point of opacity”.279  He goes on to criticise the test of 
reasonably practicable as “…something of a moving beast given the cost-benefit 
calculation it incorporates”, a characteristic which has been considered an 
advantage by other commentators. 
 
3.3 Employee Representation 
Section 2 also requires the preparation and maintenance of a written health and 
safety policy statement (in prescribed circumstances280), and the appointment of 
safety representatives and safety committees, the latter provisions being 
described by Broadhurst as “…the only sensitive issue…” in the Bill and one that 
took more than its fair share of Committee time.281  As originally enacted, 
Section 2(4) of the Act gave the Secretary of State the power to make 
regulations for the appointment by recognised trades unions of safety 
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representatives to represent the employees. Sub-section 5 extended this power 
to include regulations for the election of safety representatives by employees to 
represent them in any consultation carried out in terms of the Act.  This went 
some way to meet the recommendation by Robens for statutory consultation 
with employees as discussed in Chapter Two.  However the Employment 
Protection Act 1975 subsequently repealed Section 2(5) meaning that the 
statutory duty to consult with employees was limited to safety representatives 
and safety committees appointed by recognised trades unions.  This change was 
the subject of much debate in both Houses of Parliament as the Bill progressed 
and reflected “…an environment of relatively strong trade union movement, a 
highly regulated labour market, relatively low unemployment levels...”282  In 
introducing his amendment to delete the repeal of Section 2(5) of the 1974 Act, 
Gowrie stated that amongst all of the contentious issues in the Bill, there was 
nothing “…which has caused more furious disagreement, resentment or anger on 
this side”.283   
In responding to the amendment to repeal the deletion, Melchett (Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary in the Department of Industry) identified a number of reasons 
why the Government was determined for the repeal of Section 2(5) to go 
ahead.284  One of the reasons given was that trade unions were expected to take 
more responsibility for workplace safety, as proposed by Robens, and this 
change would reinforce this expectation.  Melchett also argued that trade unions 
were best organised to take on the responsibilities for worker participation and 
to “…give statutory rights and responsibilities to those who cannot make full use 
of them…” meaning non-unionised workers, would seriously weaken the 
provisions.  The justifications for the repeal of the Section 2(5) continued with 
the avoidance of serious industrial relations difficulties if employers were 
required to undertake consultations other than through ‘normal’ channels.  
There would be a lack of democratic legitimacy in respect of safety 
representatives who do not have an organisation to “assist” them in exercising 
these responsibilities. In any case, there was nothing to prevent existing 
voluntary arrangements between employers and non-unionised employees 
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continuing.  Perhaps the most telling part of Melchett’s contribution to the 
debate was the statement that improving workplace health and safety could 
best be achieved by placing the responsibility ‘firmly’ on trade unions.  Even 
after Melchett’s defence of the Government’s proposed repeal of Section 2(5), 
Gowrie’s amendment was passed but it was a pyrrhic victory since its repeal was 
subsequently included in the Employment Protection Act 1975 and the 
Government quickly achieved its aims.   
Regulations were made by the Secretary of State in terms of Section 2(4) of the 
1974 Act, The Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 1977 
which allowed for the appointment of safety representatives by recognised 
trades unions and outlined their functions. It would be 1996 and the introduction 
of the Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations before 
Robens’ recommendations in respect of worker participation were fully 
implemented in statute and only then in response to the EC Council 
Directive 89/391/EEC which required worker participation.  
The effectiveness of worker consultation can be measured in two ways; its 
impact on accidents and ill-health in the workplace, and the extent of 
participation by the workforce in consultation, either through safety 
representatives or safety committees.  Unfortunately, there is conflicting 
evidence for both measures.  Reilly et al found that organisations with joint 
consultative committees for health and safety had a lower accident rate than 
those without any form of worker consultation.285  Furthermore, they found that 
organisations with union appointed safety representatives had slightly fewer 
accidents than those with non-union safety representatives.  In research carried 
out on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive, Walters et al proposed that 
“the presence of joint arrangements for worker consultation makes a positive 
contribution to health and safety performance”.286  Fenn and Ashby found the 
opposite when analysing the data collected as part of the 1998 Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey.287  Their findings indicated that where there was a 
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higher level of union membership accompanied by safety committees, there was 
a corresponding increase in accident and illness reported.  They put forward a 
number of possible explanations for this, including employees being more likely 
to report injury or illness, or higher risk establishments being more likely to be 
unionised but in any case, it would certainly contradict the findings of Walters 
et al, and the statements repeated on a regular basis by the Health and Safety 
Executive.   
The DTI analysed the 2004 Workplace Employee Relations Survey to determine 
the extent of worker representation and the facilities and facility time (the time 
negotiated with the employer for the union representative to carry out their 
activities) provided to them.288  An attempt was made to quantify the benefit of 
worker representation in the reduction of accidents and ill health in the 
workplace.  The DTI estimated that the presence of safety representatives 
reduced the number of accidents each year by between 8000 and 13000, 
equivalent to a saving for society of between £136 million and £371million each 
year.289   A different conclusion is drawn in respect of illness in the workplace 
and the DTI analysis did not suggest anything like the same savings, a reduction 
of between 3000 and 8000 cases of illness each year with a corresponding saving 
of between £45million and £207million.  Many assumptions were made by the 
DTI in drawing these conclusions and there would seem to be no firm evidence 
one way or the other that employee representation has any significant impact on 
safety, positive or negative, in the workplace. 
The extent of safety representatives and safety committees in the workplace is 
another question that is difficult to answer definitively since there is no 
regulatory mechanism for recording the presence of safety representatives or 
safety committees in organisations.  Worker involvement in workplace safety is 
far from ubiquitous with the Health and Safety Executive estimating that six out 
of ten workers are not consulted either directly or indirectly on health and 
safety matters.290  This is despite the fact that consultation is a statutory duty 
imposed upon employers in terms of the Safety Representatives and Safety 
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Committees Regulations 1977 and the Health and Safety (Consultation with 
Employees) Regulations 1996.  Most surveys undertaken since the introduction of 
the 1977 Regulations would indicate that worker consultation in health and 
safety matters has steadily diminished.  This reduction can be traced back 
almost to the introduction of the 1977 Regulations.  Walters and Gourley found 
that 17% of workplaces had safety representatives in 1979 compared to 9% in 
1987 with penetration being over 90% in large employers but in single figures for 
the smallest employers.291  Although a small number of workplaces had safety 
representatives, most of these were large organisations which meant that in 
1987, 75% of employees had access to safety representatives. It is worth noting 
that the figure of 75% in 1987 is a reduction on the equivalent 1979 figure of 
79%.  The reduction of both the number of workplaces with safety 
representatives and the number of workers with access to safety representatives 
can be at least partly attributed to the decline in manufacturing in the UK with 
the consequent reduction in the number of union members.  Both of these 
factors continued to influence worker consultation in the nineteen-nineties and 
beyond. 
The Second European Survey on Working Conditions published in 1997 found that 
60% of workers in the UK had been consulted during the previous 12 months 
about changes in their work or working conditions.  This does not include 
workers with access to a safety representative but had not been subject to any 
consultation during that time and it must be noted that consultation is not 
limited to workplace health and safety issues, but it does give some indication of 
the extent of consultation.292  In 2005, the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions published the findings of its 
Fourth Survey showing that in the UK, the number of workers who had been 
consulted in the previous 12 months about work and working conditions had 
reduced to just over 52% although it is worth noting that almost 90% of the 
respondents in the UK considered themselves to be well-informed about work-
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based risks.293  When specifically looking at workplace health and safety 
consultation by employers with their workforce, the TUC identify a similar 
pattern with a reduction from 68% in 2006 to 44% in 2008.294   
There are many reasons for the reduction in consultation in respect of health 
and safety but there seems little doubt that only around half of the workforce in 
the UK is currently consulted by their employer.  Whilst the effectiveness of 
employee health and safety consultation in reducing accidents and ill-health in 
the workplace is open to question, it is now a statutory duty for all employers 
although one that seems to be ignored by most.  The Health and Safety 
Executive points out “…the limited effectiveness of enforcing consultation where 
the development of trust and co-operation are essential” but it does discuss the 
circumstances where prosecution for failure to consult may be appropriate.295  
Previous guidance to inspectors was much more ambivalent in respect of the role 
of enforcement in ensuring compliance with the two main statutory instruments 
requiring consultation.  The 2007 Worker Consultation and Involvement advice 
published by the Health and Safety Executive suggested that “There is no 
requirement to measure worker involvement, or to record findings on Inspection 
Report Forms”, which while true, does indicate a lack of commitment to 
achieving effective consultation and involvement.296  This attitude was perhaps 
reinforced by the statement that both sets of Regulations were “…principally 
administrative, as they do not directly involve risk”.  Again, this statement is 
generally correct but it does indicate a lack of enthusiasm on behalf of the 
Executive to the possible prosecution of employers who fail to consult.  Whilst 
the very low involvement of workers in health and safety consultation cannot 
entirely be blamed on the Health and Safety Executive attitude towards 
enforcement, it cannot have helped. 
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Marking a completely new departure in health and safety regulation in this 
country and throughout the world297, Section 3 of the 1974 Act required 
employers and self-employed persons to conduct their undertaking in such a way 
that they did not put the health and safety of persons not in their employment 
at risk (so far as is reasonably practicable).298  The term “undertaking” has been 
interpreted quite widely and includes providing information and instruction to 
another employer’s employees.299  Self-employed persons also have a duty not to 
put their own health and safety at risk although it should be noted that the 
Löfstedt Review of health and safety regulation recommended exempting self-
employed persons where their activities would have no impact on other 
people.300  This recommendation was made on the basis that EU legislation does 
not generally apply to the self-employed and they were exempted from health 
and safety legislation in some other countries.  Although recognising that the 
burden imposed by health and safety regulation on self-employed was not 
particularly significant, Löfstedt suggested that it would reduce the perception 
that health and safety legislation was being inappropriately applied.  If his 
recommendations are ever implemented, it would mean that the 1974 Act would 
no longer apply to all people at work or affected by work activities.  This would 
be a major departure in how the legislative control of health and safety in the 
United Kingdom. 
 Health and safety legislation was extended to include members of the public, 
visitors, contractors and sub-contractors who may be affected by the work 
activities of an employer and, as will be discussed later in this Chapter, this 
section has been frequently used to prosecute large organisations when 
individual or corporate manslaughter charges have proved unsuccessful.  It is 
worth noting that in the early days of the Act, the extent that it applied to non-
employees was not entirely clear and there was some suggestion that persons 
other than employees were “…people who were actually engaged in the process, 
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but were not themselves employees”, a much narrower interpretation than was 
eventually accepted.301  The current interpretation was quickly established and 
the true extent of this Section of the Act was soon fully appreciated.302  There 
are very few employers, if any, that do not have an association with persons 
other than employees, and there have been a number of interesting cases arising 
from its enforcement including one of the leading cases dealing with the 
interpretation of risk, R v Board of Trustees of the Science Museum.303  In this 
case, the duty owed to persons other than employees was discussed at length, 
and perhaps more importantly, the concept of risk was subject to scrutiny.  The 
Science Museum was prosecuted by the Health and Safety Executive following 
the discovery of Legionella Pneumophila in the air-conditioning system.  
Legionella Pneumophila is the bacterium responsible for causing Legionnaire’s 
Disease when inhaled, and poses a particular risk to individuals susceptible to 
respiratory illness.  The Health and Safety Executive’s case was based on the 
possibility that persons other than employees were exposed to risk as a 
consequence of the presence of Legionella Pneumophila in the air-conditioning 
cooling water.  It should be noted that there were no known cases of illness 
arising out of the presence of the bacterium in the cooling water of the air-
conditioning system prior to the Health and Safety Executive inspection.  The 
defence argued (unsuccessfully) that there was no case to answer; no actual risk 
to the public was proved by the prosecution. The judge in the original case held 
that the prosecution did not have to prove that any member of the public had 
inhaled the bacterium or even that it was in the air; it was sufficient to prove 
that it could have been in the air for a risk to the public to exist.  He ascribed 
the meaning to the word risk of “…a possible source of danger” which is much 
broader than actual danger, a definition which was supported by the appeal 
court on dismissing the appeal against conviction.  This interpretation of risk has 
been a point of reference in a number of cases since then, for example, R v. 
Chargot Ltd which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.304 
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Controllers of premises have a duty under Section 4 to protect the health and 
safety of persons who are not their employees but who use non-domestic 
premises as a place of work or as a place where they may use plant or 
substances provided for their use there, including ingress and egress.305 This 
Section has been used in respect of common parts or properties where there are 
no employees but are used a place of work.  Section 4 would normally be used 
where Sections 2 or 3 would not be applicable and it extends the scope of the 
Act beyond the relationships which form the basis for the other general 
duties.306  It is frequently referred to as the ‘Landlord’s’ general duties since it 
mainly applies to situations where a landlord, property management company or 
property owner is the duty holder.  It is fair to say that this section is much less 
commonly used than Sections 2 and 3, a search of the Health and Safety 
Executive Prosecutions Database revealed only one conviction relating to Section 
4 between 1 April 1999 and 14 February 2013.307   
In addition to imposing duties on employers, self-employed persons and persons 
having control of premises, the 1974 Act also imposes duties on employees.  
Section 7 requires employees to take ‘reasonable’ care of their own health and 
safety and that of other persons who may be affected by their acts or omissions 
while at work.  Employees are also required to co-operate with their employers 
or any other persons so far as it is necessary for them to comply w ith the duties 
imposed by this Act or other relevant statutory provisions.  The concept of 
employees having duties imposed upon them by safety legislation is nothing new; 
the Factories Act of 1864 allowed employers to make special rules and 
regulations governing the behaviour of the workforce in certain areas.308  The 
special rules and regulations were required to be approved by the Secretary of 
State and the maximum penalty was one pound.  Subsequent Factories Acts had 
more explicit requirements, for example, the 1937 Factories Act prohibited 
employees from interfering with anything provided for furtherance of health and 
safety and from doing anything that would endanger their own safety or the 
safety of others.309  They were also required to use anything provided for their 
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safety or the safety of others which, like the prohibitions referred to previously, 
was carried over to the 1974 Act but ‘omission’ was included to extend the 
duties previously imposed upon employees.  This means that employees can be 
prosecuted or otherwise subjected to enforcement action for what they haven’t 
done as well as what they have done if that omission subsequently put their own 
health and safety or the health and safety of others at risk. 
Whilst enforcement action in terms of the Section 7 is normally associated with 
the acts or omissions in respect of health and safety of shop-floor or other non-
managerial workers in the workplace, it applies to all employees, all the way up 
to boardroom level.310  The prosecution of managers and supervisors in terms of 
Section 7 of the 1974 Act, other than directors and managers subject to Section 
37, is described in the Health and Safety Executive guidance on prosecuting 
individuals.311  In general, the HSE would only expect a prosecution to be taken 
under this section where employees “…have shown reckless disregard for health 
and safety, and such disregard has resulted in serious risk”.  Directors and 
managers subject to Section 37 may also be employees, and in such cases, the 
inspector is required to make a judgement about the most appropriate course of 
action to take given the circumstances.  Section 37 will be discussed in more 
detail later in this Chapter. 
Section 7 of the 1974 Act has not been frequently used.  A Freedom of 
Information request by Hughes revealed that from 2000/2001 to 2011/2012, 
there was total of 239 prosecutions, resulting in 181 convictions.312 Prior to the 
enactment of the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008, the penalty for an 
offence in terms of Section 7 was a fine not exceeding Level 5 of the Standard 
Scale although an individual employee could be imprisoned for a small number of 
other offences, for example, failing to comply with a prohibition notice.313  As 
will be discussed later in this Chapter, the 2008 Act has extended the option of 
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imprisonment on conviction to a wider range of offences, including failure to 
comply with Section 7 and the other general duties contained in the 1974 Act.   
 
3.5  Enforcement 
As discussed in Chapter Two, one of the problems identified by Robens was the 
number of different enforcement agencies with some responsibility for 
workplace health and safety.  In “…England alone responsibilities for 
administration and enforcement are divided between five government 
departments…and seven separate inspectorates.”314  The Health and Safety at 
Work etc. Act 1974 implemented his recommendation through the establishment 
of the Health and Safety Executive and the Health and Safety Commission as 
bodies corporate.315  Sections 10 and 11 of the 1974 Act established the Health 
and Safety Commission and Health and Safety Executive and their general 
functions.  The Commission was a small body, comprising of a chairman and 
between 6 and 9 members appointed by the Secretary of State and mainly 
responsible for defining the strategy for improving health and safety in the 
workplace.  The Executive, comprising of three people appointed by the 
Commission, one of whom was appointed as Director (with the approval of the 
Secretary of State) and the other two appointed after consultation with the 
Director, was mainly responsible for the execution of the Commission’s strategy.  
The Commission and the Executive were not exactly the ‘unified’ inspectorate 
that Robens recommended, and it would be more than thirty years before a truly 
unified authority was established.  In 2006, the Health and Safety Commission 
published a paper recommending the preparation of a consultation document for 
the merger of the Health and Safety Commission and the Health and Safety 
Executive.316 This led to the Legislative Reform (Health and Safety Executive) 
Order 2008 which abolished both the Executive and Commission and re-
established the Executive combining the former functions of both organisations.   
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With the establishment of the Health and Safety Executive, inspectors from the 
various inspectorates that existed prior to the 1974 Act were transferred to it 
with the exception of the agricultural inspectorate.  Agriculture was considered 
a special case and Sections 29 to 32 of the 1974 Act made special arrangements 
for that sector of industry but the Employment Protection Act of 1975 repealed 
those sections and the agricultural inspectorate joined the Health and Safety 
Executive shortly thereafter.317  Local authorities retained their role in health 
and safety enforcement, mainly in the low risk, service sector but remained very 
much the junior partner, taking instruction from the Health and Safety Executive 
in a range of different aspects of enforcement.  To clarify the extent of local 
authority responsibilities and to avoid inspection of a single premises by multiple 
agencies, regulations were made identifying the premises that local authorities 
would enforce.318  These regulations were amended over the years. 
Although a ‘unified’ inspectorate was established by the 1974 Act, there were 
some areas of inspection that fell outside its general area of responsibility, for 
example, offshore safety.  The 1974 Act was initially restricted to Great Britain 
but Section 84 allowed for its provisions to be extended beyond its territorial 
limits by Order in Council. It was subsequently extended to include workers and 
others working or associated with the offshore oil and gas industry by the Health 
and Safety at Work, etc., Act 1974 (Application outside Great Britain) Order 
1977  which came into force on 1 September 1977 and extended the main 
provisions of Parts I and II to offshore installations and pipelines within waters 
designated by the Continental Shelf Act 1964.  Section 13 of the 1974 Act 
allowed the Commission to enter into what were, in effect, agency agreements 
with any government department or other persons to perform any of its 
functions and accordingly enforcement of the 1974 Act in offshore oil and gas 
exploration and production, although the subject of major debate, was 
eventually transferred to the Petroleum Engineering Division of the Department 
of Energy which would report to the Secretary of State for Employment through 
the HSC and HSE.319  This decision to place responsibility for enforcement of 
safety legislation in the same government department responsible for production 
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received considerable criticism at the time.320   It was only the Piper Alpha 
disaster in 1988 that convinced government of the importance of a completely 
independent inspectorate for safety for the offshore industry and the 
responsibility for offshore safety was transferred to the Health and Safety 
Executive. 
Another significant area where the Health and Safety Executive did not have 
enforcement responsibility was the railways.  An agency agreement drawn up 
between the Health and Safety Commission and the Secretary of State for 
Employment transferred that function to the Railway Inspectorate which had 
been responsible for safety on the railways since the mid-nineteenth century.321  
Following the King’s Cross Fire and the Clapham Train Crash, in 1990 the 
responsibility for railway safety was transferred to the Health and Safety 
Executive with Her Majesties Railway Inspectorate becoming the division of 
Railway Safety within the HSE.322  The Railway Inspectorate was subsequently 
transferred to the Office of Rail Regulation on 1 April 2006.  Section 2 of the 
Railways Act 2005 makes the Office of Rail Regulation the enforcing authority for 
part 1 of the 1974 Act in respect of railways, tramways and fixed guidance 
transport systems (although there are exceptions).  The Office of Rail Regulation 
is not an agency of the HSC but the HSE and Office of Rail Regulation are 
expected to cooperate and coordinate their activities.323   
Since its establishment, the number of front-line staff employed by the Health 
and Safety Executive has been criticised as being too few to effectively enforce 
the Act.324  It is difficult to carry out a direct comparison of the numbers of field 
operatives in the Health and Safety Executive since its establishment following 
the 1974 Act due to changes in its enforcement responsibilities, but since 
railways safety was transferred to the Office of Rail Regulation, it has remained 
a fairly stable organisation.  In 2009, there were 1415 front-line inspectors, 
increasing to 1464 in 2010 but then falling back to 1422 in 2011 and 1388 in 
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2012.325  This timescale is too short to draw any conclusions, but it appears there 
is a pattern emerging of a loss of front-line staff.   
The role of local authorities in health and safety is laid out in the Health and 
Safety (Enforcement Authority) Regulations.326  The controversy over their 
involvement in health and safety enforcement continued after the 1974 Act 
came into force and the Löfstedt Review was heavily critical of the role of local 
authorities in health and safety enforcement, suggesting, amongst other alleged 
shortcomings, that too many routine inspections were made of ‘low risk’ 
premises.327  This conclusion seemed to be based on the fact that local 
authorities inspect many more premises that the Health and Safety Executive, 
even though they tend to be responsible for lower risk premises.  Local 
authorities routinely inspect premises with a lower risk than those enforced by 
the Health and Safety Executive which are not subject to routine inspection.  
The fact that many of the health and safety inspections undertaken by local 
authority inspectors are carried out at the same time as other statutory duties 
such as food hygiene inspections, is not discussed by Löfstedt even though it 
must be considered a good use of resources to undertake both at the same time.  
There is also an assumption that fewer inspections, irrespective of risk level, is 
the best approach.   
While the Health and Safety (Enforcing Authority) Regulations make local 
authorities responsible for the enforcement in certain premises and the 1974 Act 
also includes default powers should a local authority fail to perform its 
enforcement functions, they have been given wide discretion in exactly how 
they will carry out those functions. 328  One of the recommendations of the 
Löfstedt Review is the removal of that discretion and the Health and Safety 
Executive to be given the authority to direct all health and safety enforcement 
and inspection activities.329  The intention is for the Health and Safety Executive 
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to direct health and safety enforcement to only the highest risk premises in 
order to ensure a “…more consistent, targeted and proportionate approach to 
enforcement”.330 
The general attitude of the Health and Safety Executive towards health and 
safety in the workplace is one of guidance, advice and persuasion, which reflects 
the spirit of the Robens Report, “…the new inspectorate should be geared to an 
explicit policy which has as its prime objective the prevention of accidents and 
ill-health and the promotion of progressively better standards at work through 
the provision of information and skilled advice…” and “…criminal proceedings 
are inappropriate for the generality of offences…”.331  It is fair to say that the 
Health and Safety Executive are continuing the approach taken by the factory 
inspectorates from their earliest days, including a reluctance to prosecute.332 
This preference for informal action has met with some criticism over the years, 
for example, Tombs described it as “…more an article of faith than an 
empirically defensible approach to enforcement”.333 James and Walters 
suggested that too much emphasis was placed on the provision of advice and 
other informal action and a more rigorous enforcement policy should be 
adopted.334  Clayton suggested that the wearing of “two hats”, adviser and 
enforcer, resulted in confusion for inspectors and ambiguity and tension in their 
relationship with duty holders meaning that neither duty was carried out to the 
optimum.335  The reduction of front-line staff discussed previously in this 
Chapter and the de-regulatory nature of government in the United Kingdom will 
make any increased focus on enforcement unlikely in the foreseeable future. 
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3.6 Sanctions and Offences 
Prior to the 1974 Act, contraventions of workplace health and safety legislation 
were mainly dealt with informally or by prosecution. Robens  was keen to offer a 
range of alternatives, described as “administrative sanctions”, in the event of a 
suspected offence or contravention.336  The 1974 Act introduced Improvement 
and Prohibition Notices as alternatives to informal action and prosecution.337  
Where an inspector is satisfied that one or more of the relevant statutory 
provisions is being contravened or has been contravened in circumstances which 
make it likely that the contravention will continue or be repeated, then an 
Improvement Notice may be served in terms of Section 21 of the Act.  The 
notice is served on the person responsible for the contravention and requires the 
contravention to be remedied within a specified period of time.  A Prohibition 
Notice may be served where an inspector is of the opinion that activities 
involving risk of serious personal injury are taking place or about to take place.  
As the name would suggest, a Prohibition Notice prevents the activities being 
carried on until the matters giving rise to the risk are remedied.  It is worth 
noting that there need not be a contravention of any of the relevant statutory 
provisions, there need only be the risk of serious personal injury.  The recipient 
of an Improvement or Prohibition Notice has the right of appeal within 21 days 
of its receipt.  The appeal is made to the Industrial Tribunal which may affirm 
with or without amendments, or dismiss the notice.  Improvement Notices will 
be suspended until the appeal is dealt with but Prohibition Notices will remain in 
force unless the appellant makes an application to the Tribunal and it so directs.  
Failure to comply with an Improvement or Prohibition Notice is an offence.  As 
James noted, the introduction of improvement and prohibition notices led to an 
increase in formal enforcement action but a reduction in the number of 
prosecutions.338 
Section 33 of the 1974 Act lists the offences and penalties, some of which are 
triable only summarily but most are triable either way.  Prior to the Health and 
Safety (Offences) Act 2008, the maximum penalty for most offences tried 
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summarily was a fine not exceeding Level 5, and for offences tried on 
indictment, the penalty was a fine.  A limited number of offences, mainly 
relating to licensing and breach of prohibition notices could also attract a prison 
sentence of up to two years for conviction on indictment.  The current record 
fine for breach of health and safety legislation is £15 million, made against 
Transco in respect of a gas explosion in Lanarkshire in 1999 that killed a family 
of four.339 Charges of culpable homicide (ultimately unsuccessful) were also 
brought against Transco and the failure of these charges certainly contributed to 
the demand for a different approach to death arising from the activities of 
organisations.340  Other large fines in respect of health and safety offences 
includes £10 million (reduced on appeal to £7.5 million) made against Balfour 
Beatty Rail Infrastructure Ltd following the train crash at Hatfield in 2000, 
resulting in 4 deaths and a 102 injured.341  Fines of this level were very much the 
exception rather than the rule and the range of penalties available for health 
and safety offences was still somewhat limited.   
In many respects, the penalties provided by the 1974 Act are a reflection of its 
origins, both the regulatory approach that can be traced back to the very 
earliest days of health and safety legislation but, perhaps more importantly, the 
recommendations of the Robens Committee with its emphasis on self-regulation 
with the inspection agencies focussing on providing advice and assistance to 
employers, employees and others.  That, combined with the regulatory nature of 
the legislation where offences have traditionally been considered less harmful 
than other types of criminal activity, resulted in a situation where they were 
punished less severely than their consequences would otherwise suggest.  A 
more punitive approach to health and safety offences was called for resulting in 
the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008. 
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3.7 Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 
The introduction of the 2008 Act could be considered the most significant 
change in health and safety legislation since 1974 although its impact has 
perhaps not been fully appreciated by organisations, their directors and 
executives. With a wider range of penalties, particularly custodial sentences for 
various offences committed by individuals including company directors and 
executives, it has provided the opportunity for a more punitive approach to 
health and safety offences than previously existed.  The increasing use of 
custodial sentences for health and safety offences, in addition to being more 
punitive in itself, will begin to blur that rather artificial distinction between 
regulation and other forms of criminal law.  It can be assumed that the stigma of 
a prison sentence is not diminished as a consequence of it being imposed for a 
regulatory, rather than criminal offence.   
The 2008 Act has its origins in a private member’s bill sponsored by Keith Hill MP 
in 2007.  Hill identified 3 main reasons for the proposed changes; more effective 
punishment, better deterrence and improved efficiency by allowing more cases 
to be settled in lower courts due to the availability of a wider range of 
penalties.342  The Bill received broad support in both the Commons and the Lords 
and became law on 16 October 2008, coming into force on 16 January 2009.  The 
Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 is a very short piece of legislation which 
has the single purpose of extending the penalties available for contraventions of 
the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. The 2008 Act significantly increases 
and extends the penalties available for health and safety offences, providing 
imprisonment for a wider range, whether tried summarily or on indictment.  For 
most offences tried summarily, the maximum penalty can include a prison 
sentence not exceeding twelve months and/or a fine not exceeding £20000; for 
most offences tried on indictment, the maximum penalty can include a prison 
sentence not exceeding two years and/or a fine.  The Minister for the 
Department of Work and Pensions, Lord McKenzie welcomed the Act commenting 
that it “…will ensure that sentences can now be more easily set at a level to 
deter businesses that do not take their health and safety management 
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responsibilities seriously and further encourage employers and others to comply 
with the law.”343  
In itself, the 2008 Act is straightforward and has not generated significant 
comment (although Barrett expressed some disappointment that a more radical 
review of Section 33 of the 1974 Act which creates health and safety offences 
had not been undertaken344), and certainly very little controversy.  The very 
significant implications for company directors and senior executives become 
apparent when Section 37 of the 1974 Act is considered. Section 37 states that if 
it can be shown that an offence in terms of any of the relevant statutory 
provisions has been committed by a body corporate with the consent, 
connivance or negligence of a director, manager, secretary or other similar 
officer, that person will also be guilty of an offence and liable to be prosecuted. 
The 2008 Act allows such offences to be punished by up to two years 
imprisonment but it must be stressed that there is no liability on a director, etc. 
in terms of Section 37 unless the body corporate is guilty of an offence in terms 
of any of the relevant statutory provisions although it is possible that Section 7 
of the 1974 Act could still apply where the body corporate is not guilty of an 
offence. 
The terms ‘consent’, ‘connivance’ and ‘negligence’ have appeared in health and 
safety legislation since the nineteenth century and have been subject to much 
discussion and debate, particularly ‘negligence’.345  Bergman et al defined 
‘consent’ as requiring a person to be aware that an offence is taking place and 
agreeing to it, and ‘connivance’ as the “…turning of a blind eye, rather than 
agreement”.346  Both consent and connivance must include an element of mens 
rea, which negligence does not.347  Negligence is more difficult to define than 
consent and connivance and can come in various forms.  It is also more 
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important in the context of health and safety offences, as will be discussed in a 
later chapter.  Williams defined negligence as a “…failure to conform to the 
standard of care to which it is the defendant’s duty to conform”.348  In citing an 
unpublished transcript by Mackay, J., Bergman et al listed five circumstances 
that must be present for neglect to exist including the commission of an offence; 
the defendant should have known of the facts resulting in the offence; the 
defendant had a duty to act in respect of those facts; he neglected to take the 
reasonably practicable steps that should have been taken to prevent the offence 
occurring (he ‘shut his eyes’); the breach could be attributed to that neglect.349  
The distinction between ‘negligence’ and ‘gross negligence’ will be discussed in 
a later chapter. 
One of the first cases taken in terms of Section 37 of the 1974 Act and one of the 
first to be tried on indictment for an offence in terms of the 1974 Act was 
Armour v. Skeen.350  This case related to the death of a worker who fell from a 
suspended scaffold whilst working on a bridge under repair.  The employer was 
Strathclyde Regional Council and the Director of Roads was John Armour.  
Armour was prosecuted in terms of Section 2 for failing to issue a statement of 
health and safety policy applicable to the Roads Department.  In this case, it 
was held that the failure to comply with the legislation was attributable to 
Armour’s neglect.  Armour was found guilty and subsequently appealed 
unsuccessfully against the judgement. At the time of the offence, the maximum 
fine for an offence tried summarily (as in this case), was £400, with an unlimited 
fine where the case was taken on indictment.  There was no possibility of 
imprisonment.  As discussed above, with the changes introduced by the 2008 
Act, company directors, executives, etc. found guilty in similar circumstances 
could now face up to two years imprisonment, in addition to, or as well as a 
fine.  Between 1999/2000 and 2010/11, 282 prosecutions were taken against 
directors, etc. in terms of Section 37 of the Act with 187 resulting in 
convictions.351  It should be noted that these statistics do not include directors, 
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etc. who have been prosecuted for workplace deaths arising from gross 
negligence manslaughter although there were very few such prosecutions over 
the period in question.   
Although there is no record of it having ever happened, Barrett suggested that 
Section 37 of the 1974 Act could be used to prosecute a whole board of 
directors, rather than one individual as in Armour.352  With the introduction of 
the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008, this could mean that a board of 
directors could face imprisonment should their collective consent, connivance or 
negligence be held responsible for a health and safety offence, whether or not it 
resulted in a death arising from work activities.  The Health and Safety 
(Offences) Act 2008 is still a relatively untested piece of legislation and it is too 
soon to make a judgement on its effectiveness but with its introduction of more 
readily available prison sentences for a wider range of offences, it does hav e the 
potential to change how individual company directors view compliance with 
health and safety legislation.  This potential is sufficient in itself for the 2008 
Act to be considered more significant in improving workplace safety than the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 particularly since it is 
applicable to all offences, not just causing death at work.  
 
3.8 The European Union, Deregulation and Health and Safety in 
the UK 
It is impossible to discuss health and safety regulation in the UK in the twenty-
first century without reference to the influence of the European Union.  Since 
the introduction of the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations in 
1988, very few relevant health and safety statutory provisions have been 
introduced in the UK that did not have their origins in the European Union. As a 
consequence, the scope of the UK Government to amend, repeal or modify them 
has been greatly curtailed.  The involvement of the European Union in health 
and safety in the workplace can be traced back to its earliest days with the 
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original Treaty that established the European Coal and Steel Community.353  
Article 3 of that Treaty required the promotion of the “…improvement of the 
living and working conditions of the labor force in each of the industries under 
its jurisdiction so as to make possible the equalization of such conditions in an 
upward direction”.  Article 117 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC) reiterated Article 3 of the 1951 Treaty, and Article 
118 (subsequently replaced by Article 137) of the 1957 Treaty (‘The Treaty of 
Rome’) promoted close collaboration between members in a number of fields, 
including “protection against occupational accidents and disease” and 
“industrial hygiene”.354  However, as James pointed out, there was no specific 
mechanism in place to make legislation in respect of these issues.355 
The Single European Act, which was intended to establish a single market by 
1992, introduced a number of changes to the Treaty of Rome, including a new 
Article 118A (subsequently replaced by Article 138) which effectively restated 
the commitment to improve the working environment in respect of health and 
safety but, importantly, it also provided the Commission with the power to 
adopt directives to achieve that end.356  Article 100A, the other main instrument 
dealing with safety related issues, requires the application of ‘essential safety 
requirements’ for products sold within the European Union and is intended to 
remove barriers to trade on the basis of health and safety.357  Article 100A 
directives are based on a high level of safety rather than the minimum safety 
requirements typically required by Article 118A directives.  Article 118A 
directives were subject to qualified majority voting which means that unanimity 
was not required for them to be adopted.  This has led to conflict between the 
European Union and the UK government, particularly in respect of working 
time.358  Directives made under Article 118A are based on minimum 
requirements and member states can apply higher standards, unlike Article 100A 
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directives where member states cannot apply standards higher than those laid 
down in the directive, on the basis that higher standards than those laid down in 
Article 118A will not be a barrier to the free movement of goods, articles, 
services or people although it does mean different standards of worker safety 
across the Union.  Member states implement directives using their own legal and 
governmental framework, with some member states using criminal law to deal 
with certain regulatory matters whilst others use social insurance mechanisms to 
achieve their aims and objectives.359 The UK takes the former approach with 
Section 15 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 being used to create 
regulations implementing the relevant EU Directives. 
Since the Single European Act came into force in July 1987, a significant number 
of Article 118A directives have been introduced, most of which have been 
implemented as regulations in terms of Section 15 of the 1974 Act.  It is now the 
case that most work places and hazards have some form of regulation based on 
an Article 118A directive which makes it very difficult for the UK Government to 
exert any real influence on the direction of domestic health and safety 
regulation.  When an Article 118A directive has been adopted, the member 
states have no choice but to implement them within their own legal framework.  
This makes it impossible for member states to unilaterally repeal legislation 
based on such directives. 
There has been some criticism in the UK of directives being ‘gold-plated’, the 
implication being that the Government adds significantly to the requirements 
contained in the original directives when implementing them, including those 
dealing with workplace safety.360  Although this accusation is frequently levelled 
at government departments, the evidence would seem to suggest that ‘gold-
plating’ is not a common occurrence when implementing directives .361  The 
enforcement of the directives and penalties for non-compliance rests with the 
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member state which obviously raises questions about the consistency of 
implementation and enforcement across the European Union.362  In the event of 
any conflict between EU and UK law, EU law has primacy which means that 
where EU law contradicts or is in conflict with UK domestic laws, it will 
supersede them.363 The European Court of Justice is the judicial arm of the 
European Union and its judgements “…overrule those of national courts”.364 
The influence of the European Union in the field of workplace health and safety 
cannot be overstated.  As with many other social, environmental and financial 
issues, responsibility for developing strategy and policy with regards to 
workplace safety has been removed from the Government other than the 
influence that can be exerted as a member of the European Union.  The UK 
Government has little choice but to implement directives and determine 
enforcement strategy within the constraints imposed by the European Union.  
One of the recommendations of the Löfstedt report was for the Government to 
work more closely with the European Union to encourage a risk-based approach 
rather than the hazard-based approach that was considered by the author to 
impose unnecessary burdens on employers.  There was a recognition that an 
attempt to influence policy was all the Government can do in reducing the 
volume and nature of health and safety regulation emanating from Europe.365 
 
3.9 Deregulation 
Although it is based on the concept of self-regulation, the 1974 Act has been the 
subject of deregulation proposals a number of times since its introduction, most 
notably by the Thatcher government in the nineteen-eighties although Baggott 
suggested that self-regulation and deregulation are not “…necessarily 
incompatible…”.366  This may be the case but only where organisations can be 
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trusted to self-regulate in the interests of society in general and not just for 
their own shareholders or clients (or itself).  Deregulation is defined in the 
context of corporate crime by Slapper and Tombs as “…a removal of laws 
designed to regulate the corporation, or perhaps the explicit withdrawal from 
the enforcement of existing laws”.367  The origins of deregulation can be traced 
to the USA and the Carter administration in the late nineteen-seventies but it 
was accelerated by the Reagan administration in the early nineteen-eighties, 
which included the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, a piece of 
legislation Calavita describes as largely symbolic, at least initially.368  The 
deregulation of workplace health and safety in the USA as a result of the Reagan 
administration’s actions led to a dramatic reduction in almost every aspect of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s activities.369  Calavita is 
careful to point out that deregulation is not necessarily an outcome of any 
particular political party, the OSH Act was introduced by the Nixon 
administration, a pro-business Republican government and deregulation was 
introduced by the Carter administration, which was Democrat, although it must 
be recognised that the process was greatly accelerated by the Reagan 
administration.  If the introduction of deregulation was not a party political 
issue, it could only have been driven by ideology and that ideology was 
embraced by the Thatcher government elected in 1979.   
The Thatcher government is generally associated with the acceleration of a free 
market approach to industry and commerce along with a reduction in state 
regulation of a range of activities from bus services to the financial markets.  Its 
intent is best demonstrated by the publication ‘Lifting the Burden’ which stated 
the desire to reduce “…burdens imposed on business by administrative and 
legislative regulation” including health and safety regulation.370  In many 
respects the recommendations included in ‘Lifting the Burden’ relating to health 
and safety in the workplace, focussed on enforcement and the relationship 
between the regulators and businesses, rather than reducing the number of 
regulations.  ‘Lifting the Burden’ was followed up in 1986 by ‘Building Business, 
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Not Barriers’ which reported on the progress made in following the publication 
of the former.371  It was clear from both publications that health and safety 
regulation was perceived by the Government as a burden on business but it, and 
the 1974 Act, emerged generally unscathed from the deregulation fervour 
exhibited by the Government of the time.372  As James and Walters observed, 
“…the successive post-1979 Conservative governments did not prompt any 
fundamental changes to the regulatory system for health and safety established 
under the HSW Act” although it could be argued the level of enforcement 
activity by the Health and Safety Executive and local authorities was inevitably 
affected.373  With the election of a Labour government in 1997, the Deregulation 
Unit set up by the previous Conservative government was renamed the Better 
Regulation Unit and a Better Regulation Task Force was established.374 The 
Better Regulation Task Force was subsequently replaced by the Better 
Regulation Commission which was eventually disbanded in 2008.  The proposition 
that health and safety is a burden to businesses has been most recently revived 
with the appointment of Professor Ragnar E. Löfstedt to “…look into the scope 
for reducing the burden of health and safety regulation on business, whilst 
maintaining the progress that has been made in health and safety outcomes” 
which resulted in “Reclaiming health and safety for all: An independent review 
of health and safety legislation”.375  For the reasons discussed previously in this 
Chapter, there is no reason to suspect that Löfstedt will be any more successful 
in reducing health and safety regulation than his predecessors. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
As this Chapter has illustrated, the 1974 Act embodied a radical approach to the 
regulation of workplace health and safety but from the very start it was not 
without its critics.  The fact that it is still in force after so many years could be 
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considered confirmation, to at least some extent, that its risk-based approach 
and administrative measures for contraventions has worked to a greater or lesser 
extent.  The risk-based approach has been adopted in many other countries and 
although it did not have its origins in the 1974 Act, it was certainly given a 
degree of credibility that it might not otherwise have achieved.  The 
development of administrative enforcement mechanisms in the form of 
improvement and prohibition notices was also a significant change in approach 
to health and safety offences, although once again, not entirely original.  The 
concept of “so far as is reasonably practicable” as a qualification for duty 
holders has been subject to a great deal of discussion and debate since its 
adoption for the 1974 Act and it is inevitable it will continue to be so in the 
future.   
The 1974 Act and the relevant statutory instruments have withstood attack by 
various governments, at least in part due to the requirements of the European 
Union.  With all its faults, the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 continued 
relatively unchanged in its basic approach to workplace health and safety until 
the introduction of the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008.  The original 
emphasis on outcome, that  is, the protection of workers and others affected by 
work activities, rather than input which could include processes, systems, 
guidance, and so on, has resulted in a piece of legislation able to accommodate 
some significant changes in society and industry since its introduction.  The 
duties imposed upon employers and others by the Act have provided an approach 
to worker safety capable of meeting the demands of the twenty-first century.  
There have been no serious proposals to repeal and replace the 1974 Act which 
demonstrates that although it does have faults, it also has many strengths that 
maintain its relevance more than forty years after its introduction.  The 2008 
Act has addressed some of the earlier criticisms of the 1974 Act by creating a 
range of penalties that should start to see health and safety breaches as truly 
criminal, rather than regulatory and this in itself will see employers and others 
responsible for health and safety taking it more seriously since imprisonment is 
now a realistic outcome in the event of breaches of the legislation.  
There was one significant perceived area of weakness in the 1974 Act and its 
relevant statutory provisions, and that was its inability to deal effectively with 
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fatalities arising from work activities.  As discussed in this Chapter, the 1974 Act 
deals with contraventions of the relevant statutory provisions, not their 
consequences.  There is no offence in the Act or any of the relevant statutory 
provisions of causing death as a consequence of work activities and whilst 
fatalities may influence the penalties imposed by the courts, they form no part 
of the offence.  Following the introduction of the 1974 Act, a number of 
accidents with a significant loss of life led to an outcry against what was 
generally considered to be inadequate punishment for those held to be 
responsible, both individuals and organisations.  The larger the organisation, the 
less likely it was to be held to be properly accountable for its failings, or at least 
that was the perception amongst a large section of the community.  This 
apparent failing of the 1974 Act to properly account for workplace deaths will 









4.0 Corporate Killing 




While the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 was a radical approach to 
workplace safety when it was introduced, it did have a number of shortcomings, 
perhaps the most significant being its failure to specifically address deaths 
arising from work activities.  With an emphasis on prevention rather than 
punishment, it addressed the causes rather than the effects of the breaches and 
as a consequence tended to neglect fault, the impact on victims and their 
families, the social need for punishment and so on.  This attitude towards fault, 
impact and the need for punishment can be at least partly attributed to when 
the Robens Report was published but also reflects the character of the 
chairman.  It would be the nineteen-eighties before the behaviour of companies, 
corporations and other organisations would be called into question as a result of 
deaths arising from work activities, and in particular serious accidents with 
multiple fatalities. 
Breaches of the 1974 Act were based on failure to comply rather than any 
effects of that failure, although these would be taken into account in 
sentencing.  This apparently unsatisfactory state of affairs was highlighted 
following a series of major accidents in the United Kingdom each resulting in a 
large number of fatalities.  The perception that large organisations responsible 
for causing these deaths were not being properly punished led to a growing 
demand for a more effective response to such events.  This clamour for 
‘something to be done’ eventually led to the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 but before that Act is discussed in detail, it is 
necessary to examine the nature of corporations and consider why Robens’ 
statement that “…there is a greater natural identity of interest between ‘the 
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two sides’ in relation to safety and health problems than in most other issues”377 
would appear to be misguided at best and, more likely, completely wrong.  The 
question of whether or not corporations and other large organisations can 
realisitacally be expected to protect the safety and health of workers and others 
affected by their activities, perhaps at the expense of profit, must be 
addressed.  Without the threat of prosecution and subsequent punishment 
commensurate with the severity of the offence, will organisations spend the 
time, trouble and effort necessary to prevent fatal accidents arising from their 
activities?  The catalogue of workplace disasters in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries would suggest not. 
Whether or not the failure to effectively punish corporations for deaths arising 
from their activities can be blamed on the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 
1974 is questionable.  It was never Robens’ intention to tackle this issue; the 
emphasis of his Report and the 1974 Act was on making the law dealing with 
workplace safety more effective in protecting workers.  That being the case, any 
criticisms of the 1974 Act in respect of its inability to deal with workplace 
deaths is misplaced.  If the 1974 Act was neither intended nor able to deal with 
workplace deaths, there were few choices available to respond to such events in 
a manner acceptable to the population at large and this became increasingly 
apparent towards the end of the twentieth century. 
Many of the problems encountered in taking appropriate action following 
workplace deaths can be attributed to the nature and structure of organisations, 
particularly the larger ones with complex and extensive management structures.  
It is fair to say that in the United Kingdom there was no effective mechanism 
until the twenty-first century to punish large corporations specifically for work-
related accidents that resulted in the deaths of employees or members of the 
public.  This Chapter will examine the nature of corporations and why their 
priorities may not be the protection of the health and safety of workers and 
others who may be affected by their activities.  The concept of corporate crime 
will also be examined, including its perception by the legal profession and how it 
is addressed by the law.   
                                        






Before corporate crime can be discussed, it is necessary to consider the nature 
of corporations and in particular, why that nature can result in behaviour that 
would be unlawful were it to be conducted by an individual.  Whilst it should be 
noted that not all the organisations discussed in this thesis were established as 
corporations, they share at least some of the characteristics and in any case, 
2007 Act extends beyond the normal definition of corporation.  In order to 
understand why the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
was considered necessary, the concept of corporations must be examined 
including why some commentators argue that they cannot be expected to act in 
what could be considered a responsible manner.378  This apparent failure to 
behave responsibly is considered by some commentators to be at least partly as 
a consequence of their nature, and to understand something of that nature, it is 
necessary to examine the origins of corporations.  According to Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge, the Romans first established what could be considered corporate 
laws although it would not be until the 12th and 13th centuries that corporations 
started to emerge in anything like a form that could be recognised today with 
the Aberdeen Harbour Board, established in 1136, probably being the first 
recorded corporation, and one of the world’s best known corporations, the City 
of London was established during the same period.379  It is worth noting that the 
very earliest incorporations were public, rather than private, and that continued 
to be the case for many corporations through to the nineteenth century. 
From the development of corporation law in England as a coherent framework in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and until the late eighteenth/early 
nineteenth centuries, incorporation was a mechanism mainly used for local 
government administration, companies of merchants and guilds and 
universities.380  Although it may seem that these institutions had little in 
                                        
378 J. Bakan, The Corporation.  The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (Constable 2004) 2 
379 John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary 
Idea (Random House 2005) 12 
380 Joan C. Williams, 'The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change' 
(1985) 34 Am U L Rev 369 373 
107 
 
common with each other, each had charters which excluded them from feudal 
obligations.  According to Williams, the process by which these chartered 
institutions became corporations is obscure but in England it was viewed that 
charter grants were grants of corporate status.  The concept of public and 
private powers did not exist at that time with corporate boroughs undertaking 
activities that could fall under either category.  The distinction between public 
and private corporations would not properly appear until the mid-nineteenth 
century.381   
In his 1793 Treatise on the Law of Corporations, Kyd defined a corporation as 
“…a collection of many individuals, united into one body, under a special 
denomination (Kyd’s emphasis), having perpetual succession under an artificial 
form, and vested, by the policy of the law, with the capacity of acting, in 
several respects, as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, 
of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued, of enjoying privileges 
and immunities in common, and of exercising a variety of political rights, more 
or less extensive, according to the design of its institution, or the powers 
conferred upon it,  either at the time of its creation, or at any subsequent 
period of its existence.”382  Kyd’s definition extended Coke’s (as cited in Laski) 
who, in 1612, stated that “A corporation aggregation of many is invisible, 
immortal, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the law.”383   
The nature of corporations has not changed significantly since Kyd’s Treatise 
with many of the characteristics he identified still forming the basis of 
corporations today.  Kyd was absolutely clear that a corporation could only act 
in the capacity for which it was established and could not “…be considered as a 
moral agent subject to moral obligation…” having neither “…soul nor body”.  
The latter concept developed into an important part of the subsequent 
understanding of corporations and, in particular, the view that a corporation can 
have no moral fault or mens rea.  The idea that corporations have neither soul 
nor body was not new when Kyd was writing and is often attributed to Edward, 
First Baron of Thurlow (1731 -1806) who inquired “Did you ever expect a 
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corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no 
body to be kicked?”.384  The idea that corporations are not subject to any moral 
obligation (unless explicitly included in the terms of their incorporation) has 
frequently been used to explain their behaviour with regards to health, safety 
and the environment and is a recurrent theme in much of the research into 
corporate crime.  
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, incorporation in the United Kingdom 
required an Act of Parliament which was both time consuming and costly, and 
carried the potentially high risk of failure.  Between 1834 and 1885 various Acts 
of Parliament were introduced giving companies a range of rights, including 
limited liability (subject to registering under the Companies Act), although that 
particular right was one of the last to be afforded to all registered companies.385  
The nature of corporations changed during that time with Morawetz suggesting 
that “The ultimate object of every ordinary trading corporation is evidently the 
pecuniary gain of its shareholders” before going on to say that “…for this 
purpose and no other have the shareholders advanced their shares of the 
capital”.386  Whilst legislation dealing with companies and incorporation has 
continued to evolve over the succeeding century and a half, the process for the 
creation of corporations with limited liability and their nature and character 
was, to all intents and purposes, established in the UK by the end of the 
nineteenth century. Although the evolution of corporation law has been 
different in the United Kingdom and the United States, the nature of 
corporations in both countries is similar in many respects resulting in 
“…corporate law as evolving more less steadily towards its modern form as a 
result of the pressures exerted by self-interested businesses”.387 
Before moving on, it is worth considering one particular US case which has been 
cited on both sides of the Atlantic, The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
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Woodward, where Marshall, C.J. described a corporation as “…an artificial 
being, invisible, intangible… it possesses only those properties which the charter 
of its creation confers upon it either expressly or as incidental to its very 
existence”.   In spite of being US Case Law, Dartmouth College v. Woodward has 
had an important influence in understanding what a corporation is, both there 
and in the United Kingdom.   Involving the attempt by New Hampshire to change 
the charter of incorporation of Dartmouth College, the judgement by Woodward 
(in favour of the College) discussed at some length the nature of corporations.  
In addition to describing what a corporation was, he went on to propose that 
corporations were invented “…chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of 
men”.388  He went to state that corporations were “…deemed beneficial to the 
country…” and accordingly that benefit was to be considered an “ample 
compensation” for the faculty it afforded them.389  This would imply that, at the 
time of the judgement, corporations were perceived to be created for the public 
good, rather than shareholders or members although making a profit was not 
considered incompatible with that aim.390  The idea that incorporation was 
“…beneficial to the country…” would seem to have faded by the middle of the 
nineteenth century although the ‘public corporation’ created (normally by 
government) for the benefit of society at large, rather than shareholders and 
employees, continued but without the same degree of scrutiny as ‘private 
corporations’. 
It should be noted that in the United States at that time (and still to this day), 
incorporation was a state function with each state taking a different approach to 
the granting of limited liability to corporations.391  There can be significant tax, 
regulatory and administrative advantages for US and other international 
companies to incorporate in Delaware, best demonstrated by the statistic that in 
2012 almost half of all United States public corporations were incorporated 
there.392  One area where the approach in the United States differs from other 
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countries, including the United Kingdom, is that a public corporation in the US 
may refer to one whose shares are publicly traded whereas in the UK and other 
countries, it refers to an entity established by central or local government, or 
some other public entity.393  
Corporations and corporate law evolved over the late nineteenth, twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries, and “…continued growing and continued inventing 
and perfecting new methods for creating wealth.”394  The legal characteristics of 
corporations are variously described by commentators, for example, Calder 
identified four significant characteristics, it is a legal entity, has transferable 
shares, independence from shareholders and has limited liability.395  Kraakman 
et al identified five “core” characteristics of any corporation, legal personality, 
limited liability, transferable shares, centralised management and shared 
ownership.396  Although a slightly different approach has been taken in each, 
they are sufficiently similar to establish a common set of characteristics for any 
modern corporation which would include a separate legal entity or personality, 
limited liability, shareholders and an independent management.  In the UK, the 
establishment, management and operation of corporations and other 
organisations must conform to the requirements of the Companies Act 2006 
which comprises forty-six parts in over seven hundred pages and deals with most 
aspects of corporations including their characteristics discussed above and 
below.397  To enjoy the benefits that incorporation can bring, a company must 
comply with the requirements of the Companies Act 2006 including registration.  
Upon registration, a certificate of incorporation is issued by the registrar.  It 
should be noted that certain requirements of the Companies Act will apply to 
companies that are not incorporated 
The concept of a separate legal entity and limited liability have been discussed 
previously in this section but the role of shareholders in corporations requires 
further explanation.  Corporations are effectively owned by their investors, the 
shareholders, who are entitled to both participate in their control and receive a 
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share of profits in proportion to their investment.398  It is clearly in the 
shareholders’ interests to appoint directors and other senior managers who will 
focus on maximising their benefits, normally through focussing on profit, perhaps 
at the expense of other considerations.  Cahill and Cahill suggested that modern 
companies are “…constantly under pressure from shareholders and competitors 
to maximize output at minimum cost which means that what is best for the 
corporation and what is best for society are rarely the same thing.”399 
The next section will examine what it is about the nature of corporations that 
can lead them to conduct their activities in a criminal manner. 
 
4.3 Criminal Corporations 
Corporations are not the only form organisations can take; they also exist as sole 
proprietors and partnerships, amongst others, but there are particular 
characteristics of a corporation that makes it perhaps more attractive than the 
alternative forms.  Monks and Minow described corporations as “…a mechanism 
established to allow different parties to contribute capital, expertise, and labor, 
for the maximum benefit of all of them”.400  While this might express the 
purpose of a corporation, it does not explain what makes an organisation a 
corporation and while the process of incorporation in law has already been 
described, there are other very important characteristics of incorporation that 
may facilitate criminal behaviour.  These characteristics have been discussed in 
the previous section and include limited liability, independent entity with the 
sole aim of complying with the terms of its charter which would normally be to 
maximise the shareholders’ benefit.   
There are many other characteristics unique to corporations but for the purposes 
of corporate crime, those mentioned in the previous paragraph could be 
considered the most relevant and have been used to explain why corporations 
exhibit a particular type of behaviour.  Litowitz identified two main attitudes to 
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corporate criminality; either a “…destructive behemoth that needs to be 
radically changed” or corporations as sources of “…tremendous productivity, 
innovation and liberty” with any wrongdoing attributable to a few individuals 
employed by them and driven by personal greed.401  He suggested that it is not 
corporations in themselves that are “evil”, but any large, impersonal institution 
in which individual workers are reduced to “…an agentic state of submission…” 
where they allow others to direct their actions whilst at the same time being 
distanced from their consequences, since the responsibility is transferred to 
those giving the directions.402 He concluded that the most significant cause of 
corporate wrongdoing is an economy built on a workforce that lacks the ability 
to refuse orders in the workplace and that it is the “…economic and cultural 
system…” that causes individuals to act in a deviant manner when they work for 
the largest institutions.  While Litowitz may have been correct in suggesting 
that, ultimately, individuals are responsible for the actions of any large 
organisation, whether it is a corporation or not, and that size as well as the 
nature of the organisation will have an influence on its behaviour, there is a still 
an argument to be made that the specific nature of corporations can encourage 
them to behave in a manner that would be considered criminal under any other 
circumstances. 
Although corporations are “entities”, they may not be subject to criminal law in 
the same way that an individual could be under the same circumstances.  As 
Orland pointed out, a corporation cannot be imprisoned (although it can be 
‘executed’, in so far as it can be wound up) but neither does it engage in some 
forms of criminal activity, such as murder and sex.403  He went on, however, to 
suggest that there are had been exceptions to this rule, citing the manslaughter 
indictment brought against the Ford Motor Company in respect of manufacturing 
and design defects associated with its Pinto model and although it should be 
noted that the offences of murder and manslaughter are quite different, as will 
be discussed in the next Chapter, and while it was perhaps not the best example 
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to give, it did demonstrate the potential for corporate criminality.404 Given the 
number of deaths associated with corporate misbehaviour, it could be argued 
that cases like this are not necessarily the exception and there are many other 
equally persuasive examples demonstrating that corporations are more than 
capable of engaging in activities that could be described by some commentators 
as ‘murder’ if carried out by an individual. 
Kagan and Scholz proposed three theories of noncompliance to explain deviant 
behaviour by corporations; the corporation as an “amoral calculator”, the 
corporation as a “political citizen” and the corporation as “organizationally 
inept”, suggesting a different regulatory approach for each.405  The corporation 
as an amoral calculator describes behaviour resulting in deliberate unlawful 
actions taken in the single-minded pursuit of profit where potential gain will be 
assessed against any potential legal action arising as a consequence of law-
breaking.  The decision to act unlawfully will be based on a cost-benefit 
analysis, that is, the potential profit of the unlawful acts measured against any 
financial or other penalty should enforcement action be taken in respect of 
these acts.  The likelihood of any such enforcement action will also influence 
the calculation made by the corporation; if there is a small, or non-existent, 
chance of being caught, there is even less reason for the corporation to behave 
in a lawful way.   
The Ford Motor Company’s response to the deaths caused by fire engulfing its 
Pinto model in the nineteen-seventies referred to previously in this Chapter, is 
frequently used as an example of the corporation as an amoral calculator and a 
solid illustration why corporations can only be expected to act in their own 
interests.     The Ford Pinto has become something of a cause célèbre in the 
field of corporate killing and has been subject to much analysis, discussion and 
debate.  The Pinto was designed by Ford in the late nineteen-sixties to compete 
with a flood of imports of small cars from both Europe and Japan.406  As a 
consequence of competition from other manufacturers, and perhaps more 
                                        
404 Ibid 
405 Robert A. Kagan and John T. Scholz, 'The “Criminology of the Corporation” and Regulatory 
Enforcement Strategies' in Erhard Blankenburg and Klaus Lenk (eds), Organisation und Recht, vol 
7 (Organisation und Recht, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 1980) 
406 Mark Dowie, 'Pinto Madness' in Stuart L. Hills (ed), Corporate Violence  Injury and Death for 
Profit (Corporate Violence  Injury and Death for Profit, Rowman & Littlefield 1987) 16 
114 
 
importantly, an opportunity to take advantage of a relatively new market for 
Ford, the development of the Pinto was scheduled to be completed in twenty-
five months, rather than the more typical forty-three.  The critics of the Pinto 
suggested that safety suffered as a consequence of this compressed 
development stage resulting in a car that had fundamental safety flaws, not 
least of which was the location of the fuel tank between the rear bumper and 
rear axle, rather than saddling the rear axle which was a relatively common 
arrangement and much safer.  The Ford Pinto was very much designed to a price 
and even relatively low cost design modifications were omitted to keep the cost 
as low as possible. 
At least partly as a consequence of its design and decisions made to keep costs 
as low as possible, the Pinto was prone to leak fuel following rear-end collisions, 
even at relatively low speed, and should the leaked fuel ignite deaths or injuries 
could result to drivers and passengers, which proved to be the case.  The actual 
number of deaths from burning or smoke inhalation is unclear, with Dowie 
suggesting that by “…conservative estimates Pinto crashes have caused 500 burn 
deaths…”, whereas Wells, citing Cullen et al put the estimated number of burn 
deaths caused by the design features of the Pinto at 26.407  Although the 
discrepancy in the number of burn deaths in Pintos is not particularly relevant 
here, it is worth commenting upon because these figures will almost certainly 
have informed public opinion and influenced how Ford was perceived at the 
time.  Dowie provided no evidence for his figures but the figure of 26 cited by 
Wells is close to the estimated 27 burn deaths from Pinto accidents published by 
the NHTSA.408 Some of these deaths and injuries resulted in various actions 
against the Ford Motor Company, perhaps one of the more interesting being its 
indictment in Indiana for reckless homicide following the deaths of three 
teenagers when their Pinto was driven into from the rear resulting in a fuel 
explosion.  Although the prosecution was ultimately unsuccessful, a great deal of 
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publicity was generated by this case, including the revelation of what 
subsequently became known as the Grush-Saunby Report. 
The existence of the Grush-Saunby Report has been used by a number of 
commentators to paint the Ford Corporation as an amoral calculator in respect 
of the safety of its motor vehicles generally, and in particular the well-
established vulnerability of the Pinto to fuel leakage following a rear-end 
collision.409  The Grush-Saunby Report was produced by two Ford engineers in 
response to proposals by the US Government to regulate certain aspects of 
motor vehicle design in order to improve survivability in various types of 
accidents, including those resulting in fire and explosion.410  The report focussed 
specifically on fuel leakage following rollover-type accidents, so it was not 
immediately relevant to the types of accident discussed above where the fuel 
leakage arose from rear-end collision, but very importantly and somewhat 
damningly, the Report included a cost-benefit analysis which provided the 
evidence that Ford had put a value on human life when considering the costs of 
improving safety.  The cost-benefit analysis was based on the cost of reducing 
the likelihood of fuel leakage following a rollover accident for all vehicles (not 
just the Pinto) and comparing that cost against the cost to the Corporation of 
paying compensation for those killed or injured as a consequence.  Based on 180 
burn deaths per annum at a cost of $200 000 each (slightly lower than the cost 
of a life calculated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) of $200 725 (although the NHTSA made it clear that was the minimum 
value when considering highway safety improvements)411), 180 serious burn 
injuries at a cost of $67 000 each and 2100 vehicles damaged by fire at $700 
each, the benefits in making the improvement would be around $49.5million.  
The cost to the motor industry was based on reducing the likelihood of fuel 
leakage ($11 per vehicle) for 11 million cars and 1.5 million light trucks (these 
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figures related to the total motor vehicle production in the US, not just those 
produced by Ford), amounting to a total of $137 million, resulting in a cost 
almost three times the benefit, when measured monetarily.   
The Grush-Saunby report has been referred to as the “smoking-gun”, and 
incontrovertible proof that Ford cared little about the safety of its customers 
but that is reading far too much into what could be considered a fairly sensible, 
if somewhat misguided, approach to vehicle safety.  There can be no doubt that 
every motor vehicle manufacturer will carry out a similar calculation when 
developing and marketing their products.  From seatbelts to airbags, motor 
vehicle manufacturers have always put a price on safety, knowing that the 
inclusion of various design features will save lives and Ford is not the only 
manufacturer to allow their vehicles to continue on the road knowing that they 
could result in death or injury.  In an article criticising the decision to take 
criminal action against Ford following the accident and subsequent deaths in 
Indiana, Epstein pointed out that in carrying out a cost-benefit analysis of the 
type described above, “… Ford did so in compliance with court decisions 
announcing that such computations will avoid civil liability…”.412   Ford may have 
got it sums wrong in this case but that does not necessarily make the basic 
approach wrong.  The nature of the deaths associated with the Pinto and the 
rather compassionless language used by Grush and Saunby in their report 
certainly made Ford appear as an amoral calculator and its response to the 
Grush-Saunby report would seem to demonstrate there was no place for 
compassion in the corporate structure prior to any accidents.  The Ford Pinto 
was by no means the worst performing small motor vehicle in respect of burn 
deaths on sale in the US at that time but as a consequence of circumstance, it 
and the company responsible for its manufacture became notorious in what has 
been described by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America as one of the top 
10 civil cases of the millennium.413  At least partly on the basis of the Ford Pinto 
and the Chevrolet Corvair manufactured by General Motors in the 1960’s414, 
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Pearce drew the conclusion that some corporations will, from time to time, act 
as “…ruthless and knowing ‘amoral calculators’”.415 
The Ford Motor Corporation (and General Motors) may have satisfied many of the 
characteristics associated with the theory of amoral calculator in respect of the 
Pinto and Corvair and most observers would certainly describe their behaviour as 
such, at least in Kagan and Sholz’ terms there is one very important area where 
they did not, namely their activities were not illegal, no laws in force at that 
time were contravened.  Ford was found not guilty of the culpable homicide 
charge brought against it in Indiana although it was found guilty of negligence 
and strict liability in a civil action where it was require to pay $2.5million in 
compensatory damages and $125 million (subsequently reduced to $3.5 million) 
in punitive damages to the victim of the crash, who survived but suffered serious 
and life changing burns to his face and body, and $560 000 to the family of the 
driver of the car who subsequently died.416  
If the absence of unlawful activity meant that Ford did not satisfy all the criteria 
for amoral calculator in respect of its attitude in the Pinto case, and it could be 
argued that the absence of unlawful activity should not be taken into account, 
using the theories of Kagan and Sholz, its actions might better fit the theory of 
the corporation as political citizen, which is predicated on corporations being 
“…generally disposed to obey the law…” but adopting a policy of non-compliance 
when faced with what they consider to be unreasonable or arbitrary regulatory 
burdens.  In effect, corporations will tend towards social responsibility unless 
faced with what they consider to be unreasonable demands imposed by the 
state, categorised by Pearce as unreasonable laws, excessive damages, 
unworkable regulations and refusal of product certification.417  Pearce suggested 
that although corporations may wish to see themselves as socially responsible, 
claiming to be political citizens as defined by Kagan and Sholz, he considered 
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such a claim to be untenable, concluding that “…many corporations act, on 
occasion, as amoral calculators…”.418  
The final theory put forward by Kagan and Sholz to explain deviant behaviour by 
corporations is that of incompetence, where disorganisation or corporate 
mismanagement is at the root of much of their unlawful acts and activities.419    
They went on to discuss the identification of “…corporate ignorance, 
incompetence, inattention and internal conflict to regulatory violations…” by 
regulators and executives as a common cause of deviance by corporations.  As 
Kagan and Sholz pointed out and has been discussed elsewhere in this thesis, 
Robens in his report on occupational health and safety legislation argued that 
most contraventions arose through “carelessness, oversight, lack of knowledge 
or means, inadequate supervision or sheer inefficiency”.420  Pearce suggested 
that “…safe firms are efficient firms and vice versa” implying that disorganised, 
mismanaged, incompetent firms are unsafe.421  The theory of incompetence 
might explain the immediate causes of deviation, particularly in the area of 
workplace health and safety but it does not explain the root causes which may 
still be attributed to the corporation as amoral calculator in so far as the 
disorganisation or mismanagement has been allowed to develop within it. 
The view of corporations as amoral calculators is one of the most commonly 
subscribed to by those commentators who view corporations as ‘evil’ or 
‘psychotic’, an attitude perhaps best expounded by Bakan who stated that there 
were “No internal limits, whether moral, ethical, or legal…what or whom 
corporations can exploit to create wealth for themselves and their owners”.422  
In a similar vein, Mintz accused corporations of acting “…without compassion 
and no matter what damage they cause, without remorse”.423  Kagan and Sholz 
acknowledged that the perception of corporations as amoral calculators will 
“…dominate the ‘criminology of the corporation” in modern Western society.  
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Pearce drew attention to the distinction made by Kagan and Sholz between the 
vast majority of large corporations claiming to be socially responsible and the 
minority of small, marginal corporations behaving as amoral calculators 
suggesting that there is little evidence to support such a distinction with large 
corporations having at least as many, if not more, offences recorded against 
them.424  Orland found that in his examination of 1978 Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) filings “…14 out of 100 of the largest industrial corporations 
disclosed criminal convictions…” indicating a significant proportion of 
corporations participate in criminal behaviour and since these are only the 
recorded convictions, it must be assumed that the actual level of crime is 
higher.425  Indeed, he suggests that “…the gap between recorded and actual 
corporate crime may be even greater than for other forms of crime”.426  In his 
survey of Factories Acts’ offences by 200 firms between 1961 and 1966, Carson 
found that each had been guilty of at least 2 violations, with one firm being 
responsible for 94 violations.427  This would tend to support the view that 
corporations and other organisations will routinely commit violations, whether as 
amoral calculators, political citizens or organisationally incompetent. 
Other theories have been developed to explain the behaviour of corporations, 
for example, Yeager identified the ‘moral’ corporation which complies with 
legislation, the amoral corporation which takes a “…rational/calculating…” 
approach to compliance, but he also introduced a further category, that of the 
immoral corporation.  He described the immoral corporation as having “…an 
aggressively antiregulation culture…” that demonstrates an abhorrence of 
regulation or other interference with its activities.428  It must be assumed that 
immoral corporations are on the margins of society, an extremely small minority 
and, by their very nature, operating outside the legal framework, unlike the 
other forms of non-compliant behaviour where the corporation will almost 
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certainly be law-abiding to a greater or lesser extent.  Importantly, Yeager 
pointed out that within any large, complicated organisation, attitudes to 
morality will almost certainly vary.   
Although taking a slightly different approach to Yeager and Kagan and Scholz, 
Punch also identified three categories based on the “…intentional element of 
management decision-making” which overlap with their approach.429  Whilst his 
first category is based around the deliberate decision by the organisation to 
participate in deviant behaviour, he did not believe that any legitimate 
corporation would take a decision or decisions that would knowingly lead to 
death or injury, instead suggesting that “…much of this is completed within 
“normal” and mostly legal business practice…”, making it much more akin to 
Kagan and Scholz’s ‘political citizen’ than ‘amoral calculator’.  Punch’s next 
category of management decision making was ‘incompetence’, almost identical 
to Kagan and Scholz’s third theory, but his final category, based on work done by 
Vaughan430 and one that he described as “interesting”, is where an organisation 
considers it is acting within the formal procedures laid down whilst unaware or 
heedless of the unacceptable level of risk it is accepting.  Vaughan, taking a 
sociological approach to organisational deviance, which she also described as 
‘routine nonconformity’, suggested that they are “…the causal origins of 
unanticipated negative outcomes…” which would include the type of events 
discussed in this and subsequent chapters.431  Vaughan identified three forms of 
routine nonconformity; mistake, misconduct and disaster, describing them as 
“…systematic products of complex structures and processes…” allowing “…social 
context to decouple rational choice from outcomes…” thus resulting in decisions 
being taken that may lead to unwanted and unintended consequences.432 What 
Vaughan effectively suggested is that corporate deviant behaviour may occur 
unknowingly, at least for the organisation, there may be a perception within it 
of no wrongdoing and certainly none that could result in the devastating effects 
seen in some of the major accidents discussed in the next Chapter. 
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Unlike Bakan, Minitz and others discussed previously in this Chapter, not all 
commentators hold the view that corporations are fundamentally amoral.  
Litowitz discussed at length the conflicting perspectives of those commentators 
who hold the view that corporations by their very nature will undertake what he 
describes as immoral conduct to achieve their ends (most probably increased 
profits) and what he described as the apologist view, which holds that the 
immoral conduct arises from the actions of a few individuals, rather than 
corporations as entities.433  He went on to argue that it is not corporations, or 
other specific legal entities to blame for immoral conduct, but “…the real evil 
lies in institutions of a certain size…”, thus drawing a direct correlation between 
the size of an institution and its propensity to act in what would be considered 
an immoral or illegal way.434  Whilst there may be some merit in Litowitz’s 
argument, it is clear that small organisations are just as capable of acting in an 
immoral or illegal way but the senior management are more likely to be directly 
involved in those actions than the senior managers of large organisations. 
Byrne pointed out that from their origins in medieval England, corporations had 
a dual function to provide both a return for their investors but also provide a 
public service such as infrastructure and facilitate commerce.435  He went on to 
suggest that the perception of the corporation as a tool only to generate profit 
for shareholders and with no social or public responsibility only started to hold 
sway from the late eighteenth century before becoming the dominant theory in 
the twentieth century.  Byrne recommended that corporations must be made to 
consider their responsibility to the public and society at large as well as their 
shareholders and in many respects this change in attitude can be seen in the 
growing interest in good corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility.  In support of corporations, Micklethwait and Wooldridge made a 
strong defence for their role in shaping the western world over the past few 
centuries, excusing misbehaviour, irresponsibility and scandal in the context of 
what they considered to be the benefits associated with the corporate 
structure.436  They argued that it is in a corporation’s interests to actively 
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engage with society at large and they illustrated that engagement with a number 
of positive examples ranging from education and health care to supporting 
disadvantaged and under-represented groups.  In their view, this is not just to 
maximise profits, but to do good more generally.  It should be noted, however, 
that although not alone in their support for corporations, the case made by 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge is very much in the minority amongst 
commentators on the behaviour of corporations. 
Although mainly outside the scope of this thesis, the concept of corporate social 
responsibility is worth exploring in more detail since it has been mooted as an 
answer to some of the criticisms levelled against corporations in respect of some 
of their worst excesses discussed here and elsewhere in this thesis.  The concept 
of corporate social responsibility has gained in popularity over the past 10 years 
or so, but Carroll traced its origins to the 1930’s and in the ‘modern era’, to 
Bowen in 1953 with the publication of Social Responsibilities of the 
Businessman.437  Carroll went on to define social responsibility as encompassing 
“the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of 
organizations at a given point in time.”438  Although one of the earliest 
definitions of corporate social responsibility, it is by no means the only one;  
Dahlsrud identified thirty-seven separate definitions by 2006, so it can 
reasonably be assumed that more will have been developed in the last ten years 
or so.439  His research suggested that most definitions of corporate social 
responsibility included five dimensions; stakeholder, social, economic, 
voluntariness, environmental.  It is important to note that corporate social 
responsibility is a voluntary activity, there is no legal basis for it.  Dahlsrud 
pointed out that none of the definitions “…actually defines the social 
responsibility of business …but rather describe CSR as a phenomenon”, how 
organisations develop and implement a corporate social responsibility strategy 
within a particular context.440  As mentioned previously, the implementation of 
corporate social responsibility policies has become much more common over the 
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past few years but there is absolutely no evidence that it will have any real 
consequences for corporate morality (or immorality) and it could be argued that 
it is a relatively low cost strategy for organisations to improve their public image 
without actually changing their business practices. 
In theory, a commitment to corporate social responsibility should address most 
of the criticisms levelled against organisations discussed above but although 
many national and international organisations subscribe to its principles, it is not 
without controversy.  Milton Friedman was one of the earliest critics of 
corporate social responsibility and citing his own book, argued that “…there is 
one and only one social responsibility of business - to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the 
rules of the game…”.441  In many respects this reflects the evolution of 
corporations discussed previously in this Chapter with the sole aim of a 
corporation being legally bound to the terms of its incorporation and in most 
cases that would be to maximise profit and shareholder return.  Bakan, who 
could be expected to take a diametrically opposed view to Fieldman in most 
things, agreed in this respect and goes further to suggest that any corporation 
engaging in social responsibility activities would be acting illegally, unless it 
could be demonstrated that there is some kind of benefit to the organisation 
that would improve its competitiveness, profitability, etc. 442  In effect, any 
activity, including social responsibility, must be in the interest of the 
corporation and/or its shareholders.  In addition to being generally critical of the 
whole concept of corporate social responsibility, Glasbeek predicted its ultimate 
failure at least partly as a consequence of the various stakeholders (workers, 
consumers, environmentalists, and so on) having differing and in some cases 
conflicting interests whereas the corporate entities have only one main interest, 
that is, making a profit.443  He went on to suggest that while corporate image 
may improve “…for a while…” as a consequence of the development and 
implementation of a corporate social responsibility strategy, nothing will have 
really changed. 
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The potential for effective corporate social responsibility to reduce or prevent 
deaths arising from corporate activities is self-evident and, irrespective of 
whatever definition or dimensions are adopted, worker and public safety must 
be part of it.  That being the case, it would be assumed that an organisation’s 
commitment to corporate social responsibility would be generally welcomed but 
that would appear not to be the case.  Davis argued that voluntary initiatives 
such as corporate social responsibility have been shown to be ineffective in 
improving corporations’ health, safety or environmental performance.444  When 
arguing for corporate accountability through regulation, Christian Aid argued 
that voluntary approaches are totally inadequate in ensuring organisations live 
up to their corporate social responsibility commitments.445  Hart associated 
corporate social responsibility with self-regulation, at least so far as 
occupational health and safety is concerned, and concluded that the business 
case supporting it is weak, describing its use by government, regulatory agencies 
and corporations to support self-regulation as limited.446  It is inevitable that the 
concept of corporate social responsibility will continue to be encouraged by 
government, corporations and regulators as an alternative to regulation with its 
voluntary approach being preferred by each, although perhaps for different 
reasons, but as with all self-regulation strategies, the cost-benefit analysis will 
always give preference to the main purpose of a corporation, that is, to 
maximise profit and shareholder return at the expense of worker and public 
safety. 
The nature of corporations perhaps inevitably results in them committing 
immoral or deviant acts from time to time, which may or may not be illegal, but 
are certainly amoral.  For most, their emphasis will be on maximising profit and 
shareholder return and it is all too common for that to be achieved at the 
expense of the safety of workers and other people, including customers.  It is 
too easy to describe corporations that behave in what is subsequently considered 
immoral or deviant manner as amoral calculators, and whilst that will be 
appropriate in some cases, it does not properly describe all aspects of any 
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corporation and its behaviour.  The evidence in this and other Chapters would 
indicate that most corporations will behave as amoral calculators at least some 
of the time but perhaps more commonly, incompetence is the root cause of the 
type of crime discussed in the following section.  Incompetence is no more 
excusable as a cause of deaths and injury than acting amorally, indeed, it could 
be argued that it is less acceptable since it would imply an unacceptable level of 
thoughtlessness or carelessness exhibited by the corporation.  Whether or not 
corporate social responsibility will have any real impact on corporate behaviour 
is yet to be determined but the evidence to date would suggest not.   
The following section will now examine how the behaviour of criminal 
corporations results in corporate crime 
 
4.4 Corporate Crime 
The previous section considered the nature of corporations and why it resulted 
in criminal corporations, this section will now consider concept of corporate 
crime which can include deviant behaviour such as corruption, fraud and other 
financial wrongdoing as well as causing death and injury to members of the 
public and workers.  The focus of this Chapter will be on deaths arising from 
work activities to both workers and members of the public although it can be 
difficult to isolate one form of corporate wrongdoing from others.   
Cullen et al identified E.A. Ross as one of the first commentators to observe in 
1907 what he considered to be the pervasive criminal behaviour carried out by 
people engaged in major business activities, that is, white collar, or corporate 
criminality.447  Slapper and Tombs traced the concepts of corporate criminality 
to the first half of the nineteenth century and the publication in 1840 of What is 
Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government  by Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon, whose ideas were further developed as the century progressed 
by others including Marx and Engels.448  One example of widespread corporate 
criminality in the nineteenth century and one of the first subject to specific 
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legislative control was the adulteration and sale of food unfit for human 
consumption.  The deliberate addition of various substances to bulk-up 
foodstuff, extend shelf-life or change its appearance was done on an industrial 
scale to maximise profit at the expense of the consumer.449  Burnett identified 
food adulteration as a crime of urbanisation becoming more common in the 
United Kingdom towards the end of the eighteenth century and ubiquitous in the 
nineteenth.450  Many staple foodstuffs were adulterated including bread, beer 
and tea and Burnett referred to an official report from the early part of the 
nineteenth century which estimated 4 000 000 lbs of curled and dried leaves 
from English hedgerows were passed-off as ‘tea’ compared to the 6 000 000 lbs 
of genuine tea imported into the UK by the East India Company.  This gives some 
idea of the scale of the criminality but Burnett went on to suggest that ale and 
porter were even more prone to adulteration, in some cases with highly toxic 
and poisonous substances.  According to Burnett, the decade between eighteen-
forty and eighteen-fifty was the nadir of food adulteration in the UK, at least so 
far as consumers were concerned.  In 1848, Mitchell published his Treatise on 
Falsifications of Food, and the chemical means employed to detect them in 
which he discussed the results of his analysis of a range of commonly adulterated 
foodstuffs.451  The most basic staple foodstuff at the time was bread which could 
be adulterated with a range of contaminants including carbonate of ammonia, 
carbonate of magnesia, chalk, sulphate of copper, sulphate of zinc (both 
described by Mitchell as “highly poisonous”), bicarbonate and carbonate of 
potash, plaster of Paris and pipe clay.452  A common adulterant added to bread 
was alum (potassium aluminium phosphate) which ‘improved’ poor quality flour 
allowing it to be used to bake bread that could subsequently be sold as best 
bread.  It also allowed a higher proportion of non-wheat flour to be used further 
adulterating the bread.  In his analysis of various breads, Mitchell did not find a 
single sample that was not adulterated with alum.  It would be 1875 before this 
type of adulteration was made an offence.453  Although food adulteration in 
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nineteenth century London could be considered outside the main focus of this 
thesis, it does demonstrate that corporate crime was commonplace across a 
range of industrial and commercial sectors and would remain so until effective 
legislation and enforcement mechanisms were introduced to properly control it. 
This would suggest that corporations and similar organisations have undertaken 
what could only be described as criminal behaviour since the eighteenth century 
(and probably prior to that),  but it was only in the twentieth century that such 
activities would be described as corporate or white collar crime.  The first use of 
the term ‘white collar crime’ is generally attributed to Edwin Sutherland 
(described as the “father of white collar crime” by Lilly et al454), most notably in 
his book White Collar Crime published in 1949, although he did use the phrase 
earlier in his 1940 paper, White-Collar Criminality to describe the activities of 
some of the more notorious employers of the late nineteenth century United 
States.455   Sutherland described white collar crime as “ …a crime committed by 
a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation” 
but he did stress that the term itself was not definitive and was intended to 
describe crimes that would not normally fall under the scope of criminality.456  
Sutherland’s description implied that white collar crimes were committed by 
individuals, either for personal gain or for the benefit of the organisation but the 
examples of white collar crime he subsequently described arose mainly from the 
actions of organisations, rather than individuals; as Wheeler pointed out, White 
Collar Crime “…was devoted… to the crimes of organizations, not of 
persons…”.457   
Tappan was critical of Sutherland’s broad approach to what constituted white 
collar crime and in particular the widening of the term to include behaviour 
which although it could be considered antisocial or immoral in some way, or 
“socially injurious”, was not in itself illegal (see the discussion on the Ford Pinto 
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previously in this Chapter).458 He also commented upon the general vagueness of 
the term “white collar crime” and the difficulties of the enforcement of 
legislation dealing with what he called business crimes.  Orland described 
Sutherland’s approach to white collar crime as Marxist, focussing on the socio-
economic status of the offender rather than the crime itself, and he also pointed 
out that Sutherland’s definition of crime went far beyond the accepted legal 
categories of criminal behaviour in existence at that time.459  Orland was 
generally critical of Sutherland’s approach to white collar crime but more as a 
result of his interpretation of what it was, rather than its existence, indeed, he 
suggested that “…the gap between recorded and actual corporate crime may be 
even greater than for other forms of crime.”460 
As discussed previously, the term “white collar crime” is rather vague and it can 
apply equally to crimes carried out by individuals at various levels (management 
rather than shop floor) of an organisation but also crimes carried out by the 
organisation as an entity (although it could be argued that ultimately an 
individual or individuals must be responsible for the actions of the organisation).  
Hartung’s definition of white collar crime, “…a violation of law regulating 
business, which is committed for a firm by the firm or its agents in the conduct 
of its business”461 was much narrower than Sutherland’s but probably more in 
keeping with the current concept of corporate crime and certainly more 
applicable to the concept of corporate manslaughter and corporate homicide.  
Edelhertz followed a similar route defining white collar crime as “…an illegal act 
or series of illegal acts committed by nonphysical means and by concealment or 
guile, to obtain money or property, to avoid the payment or loss of money or 
property, or to obtain business or personal advantage.”462  This definition is one 
of the more comprehensive attempts and includes a number of important 
characteristics of white collar crime including the illegal act or acts, the non-
violent nature of the criminal act and obtaining business or personal advantage.  
The question of whether or not the law must be broken in order for corporate 
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crime to be committed is still subject to some debate with Frank and Lynch 
including “…socially injurious and blameworthy acts, legal or illegal…” in their 
definition, in some respects following Sutherland’s approach in including a wide 
range of otherwise legal (or perhaps more accurately, not illegal) activities.463  
Whilst the desire to include legal, but undesirable, immoral or reprehensible 
activities in the definition of corporate crime is understandable, it is difficult to 
see how a crime can be committed if no laws are broken. Gobert and Punch 
raised the same question and suggested that Sutherland and his followers “…may 
have been guilty of confusing corporate misconduct which they felt should be 
criminal…with what was actually proscribed by the law.”464  They suggested that 
this confusion may have arisen because similar misconduct undertaken by an 
individual would almost certainly have been unlawful and this leads on to a 
further question of why corporate misconduct has not been criminalised in the 
way that might have been expected.  They answered this question by referring 
to the influence that powerful corporations have over government policy with 
significant resources being expended on influencing politicians and law makers.  
Even where statutory control seems inevitable, Gobert and Punch suggested that 
it mainly takes the form of regulation, rather than “true” criminal law.465  This 
rather artificial but very important distinction will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Six. 
The sociology of deviance may explain to some extent the “confusion” 
attributed to Sutherland by Gobert and Punch discussed above.  The concept of 
deviance and deviant behaviour has been touched upon previously in this 
Chapter but it is worthy of further exploration.  Vaughan defined organisational 
deviance as “…an event, activity, or circumstance, occurring in and/or produced 
by a formal organization, that deviates from both formal design goals and 
normative standards or expectations, either in the act of its occurrence or in its 
consequences, and produces a suboptimal outcome.”466  She went on to suggest 
that “…much organizational deviance is a routine by-product of 
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the characteristics of the system itself”, that is, a form of routine non-
conformity.467  Lilly et al described this routine non-conformity in terms of 
Vaughan’s theory of the “normalization of deviance” going on to describe it as 
“…a cultural set of beliefs and norms that guides decision making…” that 
neutralise perceptions of danger.468  Burns and Orrick included activities by 
“…elites and management…” in their definition which, although not criminal, are 
harmful in some way.469 One advantage of referring to corporate deviance rather 
than corporate crime is it includes legal (or at least not illegal) as well as illegal 
activities and starts to address some of the difficulties in labelling corporate 
activities that are socially unacceptable or otherwise reprehensible but not in 
themselves unlawful.  Whilst the concept of corporate deviance is, in some 
respects, useful to explain some characteristics of corporate behaviour, it is 
focussed more on the sociology of that behaviour than its criminality.  There is 
still uncertainty about the nature and form of corporate deviance, whether it 
includes corporate crime or if it is something different.  
Slapper and Tombs described ‘white collar crime’ as criminal activity carried out 
by individuals (“individually rich or powerful”) within an organisation for their 
own benefit or furtherance.470  In this way, they distinguished between white 
collar crime and the more mundane criminal activities carried out by workers at 
a much lower level in an organisation for their own financial benefit.  In effect, 
they differentiate between criminal activity carried out by the rich and powerful 
(white collar crime) and the ordinary workers (straightforward crime) even 
though the criminal activity may be carried out in the same organisation for the 
same ultimate purpose, namely personal benefit.  They then differentiated 
between white collar crime and corporate crime by describing the latter as 
criminal activity or illegality with the intention of meeting or furthering an 
organisation’s goals rather than directly benefiting an individual, supporting 
McMullan’s view that corporate crimes were committed for the organisation, not 
against it.471  Proposing it as a subset of white collar crime, Gruner described 
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corporate crime as “…crime undertaken in corporate business activities…” 
usually committed for the benefit of the organisation but he also included 
actions by individuals for personal benefit or to avoid negative consequences of 
their failure.472  There is very little difference between Gruner’s definition of 
corporate crime and the widely accepted definition of white collar crime; 
including actions by individuals for their own personal benefit blurs the 
distinction between white collar and corporate crime.  Whilst it is attractive to 
include corporate wrongdoing which is lawful but morally and socially 
reprehensible, for the purposes of this thesis, corporate and white collar crime 
will be assumed to be criminal, that is, involving unlawful activities.  This 
approach mirrors that of Slapper and Tombs who also implied some regret that 
corporate crime cannot be extended to include what they refer to social 
harms.473  This approach fits with most of the accepted definitions of corporate 
crime and will form the basis for the subsequent discussion on corporate 
criminality.  Describing their work as “…the first large-scale comprehensive 
investigation of corporations directly related to their violations of law…”, 
Clinard et al suggested that the cost of corporate crime ran into billions of 
dollars each year, giving some idea of the scale of the problem in the US at that 
time.474 It is unlikely that the cost of corporate crime has come down since 
Clinard et al’s report, indeed following the worldwide financial collapse of the 
banking system in 2008, it is likely that the costs of corporate crime would have 
run to hundreds of billions of dollars. 
At least part of the explanation for corporate criminality can be found in the 
origins and nature of incorporation discussed previously in this Chapter, in 
particular the direction taken towards the end of the nineteenth century which 
saw an increasing emphasis on the corporation for the benefit of the owners 
(shareholders) rather than society more generally.  This has been interpreted as 
profit above all else and although most corporations do not deliberately 
undertake unlawful activities, their behaviour can be morally and socially 
reprehensible, lawful or otherwise.  This is be best illustrated by Kagan and 
Sholz who suggested that the most widely accepted model of corporate 
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criminality presented the corporation “…as an amoral, profit-seeking 
organization whose actions are motivated wholly by rational calculation of costs 
and opportunities….”475  Unlawful behaviour can be deliberately undertaken by 
corporations but it is frequently the consequence of incompetence, carelessness 
or thoughtlessness, encouraged by the nature and structure of corporations 
discussed previously in this section.  It should also be recognised that not every 
organisation associated with corporate crime or misconduct of the type 
described previously is a corporation but they do tend to share at least some of 
the characteristics associated with them. One characteristic of corporate crime 
is any investigation will primarily focus on whether or not a crime has been 
committed rather than who did it.476 
Gobert and Punch took a fairly sophisticated approach to corporate criminality, 
suggesting in the first instances that there is no single causal explanation for it, 
arguing that if it was only about the pursuit of profit or other benefit to the 
company, then all companies would be inclined to criminality all of the time 
rather than just some and then only on occasion.477  There is some debate about 
the extent of criminality by corporations and Gobert and Punch assumed that 
not all companies were engaged in criminal behaviour although as discussed 
previously in this Chapter, Carson’s research into Factories Acts’ contraventions 
indicated almost ubiquitous non-compliance.  To determine the extent of 
corporate crime, Slapper and Tombs reviewed a range of published work based 
on both quantitative and qualitative approaches starting with Sutherland’s work 
and concluded that corporate crime “…results from almost every business 
activity, in almost every area of economic activity, amongst corporations and 
organisations of all sizes.”478 
Gobert and Punch identified five variables that can contribute to corporate 
criminality although they suggested that there may be other reasons why some 
corporations engage in criminality.479  The five ‘key’ variables identified include 
social, economic and cultural factors; the nature and structure of organisations; 
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intent, rationality and competence; defence mechanisms and techniques of 
dissociation; crime facilitative and crime coercive industries.  This approach 
resulted in a much more complex explanation for corporate criminality which 
extended beyond the desire just to maximise profit and shareholder return or to 
avoid the consequences of previous questionable behaviour and they emphasise 
that although the corporation may provide the opportunity and mechanism for 
crime to be committed, the role of the individual must not be ignored.   Clinard 
et al emphasised the importance of individuals when describing corporate crime 
as a form of white collar crime “…but it is white collar crime of a particular 
type. Actually it is organizational crime that occurs in the context of extremely 
complex and varied sets of structured relationships, and inter-relationships 
between boards of directors, executives, and managers on the one hand and 
parent corporation, corporate divisions and subsidiaries on the other.”480  This 
view of corporate crime is mirrored by the Harvard Law Review which stated 
that corporate crime “…typically involves the concerted action of several 
individuals within the corporation, so an investigation or prosecution will likely 
implicate them as well as the corporation itself.”481   
Although much of this Chapter has been devoted to discussing the corporation as 
an entity, it must be recognised that it is not a living person and in itself, it does 
not have the ability to develop and implement strategy and make decisions; 
these must be undertaken by its employees, directors or executives, 
shareholders, customers or any other stakeholder.  Where the actions of an 
individual or individuals results in unlawful activity which benefits the 
corporation, it is right and proper that the corporation is properly punished but 
depending upon the circumstances, it must also be equally right and proper 
those individuals are also considered for appropriate punishment if their acts of 
omission or commission are responsible for the unlawful acts.  The relationship 
between the corporation guilty of committing a criminal act and the individuals 
responsible for circumstances leading to that act will be discussed in more detail 
in in the next Chapter. 
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While considered ubiquitous by some commentators, the true extent of 
corporate crime is not known with any certainty but it would appear to be 
endemic in some sectors.  There has been an almost continuous litany over the 
past thirty or forty years of scandals in the banking and financial sectors, most 
recently including the mis-selling of PPI, market manipulation (LIBOR, FOREX), 
money laundering, bribery and tax evasion to name but a few.  It is not just the 
banking and financial sectors that are guilty of law breaking on a major scale, in 
2015 the Volkswagen Group admitted installing software in eleven million 
vehicles to cheat emissions testing procedures, an action both illegal and 
morally reprehensible.482  Many of these scandals arose through straightforward 
law breaking; there was no confusion or ambiguity about the requirements of 
the law which would suggest that if there is a benefit to criminal activities (most 
likely increased profits), then the crimes will be committed (although it could be 
assumed that the perpetrators acted on the basis that their crimes would 
probably not be detected).  There is no reason to suspect that other sectors are 
any less likely to willingly participate in criminal activity, if there is a benefit to 
it and the chances of being caught are considered small. 
 
4.5 Corporate Killing as Crime 
Corporate crime covers a wide range of illegal activities but the remainder of 
this chapter will focus on one particular category – corporate killing.  Perhaps 
the most obvious manifestation of corporate killing arises from workplace 
accidents and exposure to various substances whilst at work.  The International 
Labour Organisation estimated that approximately 2.3 million people worldwide 
die each year from accidents, disease or illness as a consequence of being at 
work.483  In Great Britain, with its long history of workplace safety legislation 
and enforcement, 133 fatal injuries to workers were recorded for 2013/14 (these 
figures do not include fatal injuries to members of the public and others caused 
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by work activities and Northern Ireland is excluded).484  Much more difficult to 
collect is data on deaths arising from work related disease and illness but the 
Health and Safety Executive estimated that in Great Britain in 2013/14, around 
13000 people died from respiratory illness and cancer caused mainly through 
exposure to chemicals and dust.485  It must be assumed that many more workers 
die as a consequence of illness or disease acquired through workplace exposure 
to various substances and activities.  These figures also exclude members of the 
public and others who may have died as a consequence of work activities.  There 
is a danger that corporate killing is seen as something that happens to workers 
but it must be viewed as something much wider than that.  The people killed as 
passengers or drivers of Ford Pintos discussed previously in this chapter were 
just as much victims of corporate killing as workers killed through the negligence 
or connivance of their employers so when considering what is meant by 
corporate killing, it is important to include all those killed as a consequence of 
corporate crime, not just workers. 
It can safely be assumed that deaths arising from corporate activities have 
occurred for as long as corporations and other institutions have existed.  The 
term corporate killing can include deaths from a wide range of activities 
including the sale of adulterated food and medicines, counterfeit and sub-
standard engineering parts and equipment, operation of unsafe aircraft and 
vessels, poor maintenance and servicing, and so on.  While all of these activities 
have resulted in deaths that can be directly attributed to the activities of 
corporations, the rest of this Chapter will focus on those fatalities, both to 
workers and others, that have arisen directly as a result of work activities.   
The possibility of being killed or suffering a fatal illness or diseases as a 
consequence of work activities has been ever-present since the concept of work 
first existed but industrialisation in the nineteenth century made it much more 
likely and also more likely to affect a wider range of people, including children 
and women.  In many cases, these work related fatalities were considered a part 
of working life with compensation sometimes, but not always, being paid to the 
victim’s family following an industrial accident.  The widespread acceptance of 
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death as a consequence of work activities in the nineteenth century is 
demonstrated by the prosecution of Bryant and May in 1898 following the 
identification of seventeen cases of phosphorous poisoning resulting in six 
deaths, mainly (but not only) of women and girl workers who were collectively 
known as the “match girls”.486  In 1898, Bryant and May were prosecuted for 
failing to notify the appropriate authorities following the discovery of cases of 
necrosis caused by exposure to white phosphorous. It is important to emphasise 
that the prosecution was not because of the disease, or even the deaths arising 
from it, but as a consequence of failing to notify the appropriate authorities of 
the cases.  The reason that the Bryant and May case is worthy of note is that it 
received significant press coverage at the time and there was a national outcry 
following the disclosure of the working conditions and dangers faced by the 
match girls and other workers in that industry.   This is just one of many 
thousands of cases of death arising from work activities but it shows how little 
regard was held for human life, not just by employers but also the State and, to 
a lesser extent, the trades unions.  It is fair to say that the emphasis in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the payment of compensation following 
workplace deaths and disease rather than punishing the employer for allowing 
them to happen. 
The attitude to deaths arising from work activities started to change following 
the Aberfan disaster discussed in Chapter Two, although the emphasis at that 
time was on preventing its recurrence rather than punishing the employer; there 
was no suggestion that the National Coal Board or its officers would be 
considered criminally responsible for the deaths that occurred as a consequence 
of their negligence. The concept of punishment where employers or companies 
were considered responsible for the deaths started to gain momentum following 
a number of high profile accidents that occurred towards the end of the 
twentieth century.  The nineteen-eighties and -nineties saw a number of multi-
fatality, high profile accidents in the UK, including the Bradford City Fire in 
1985; the Herald of Free Enterprise capsize and Kings Cross fire in 1987; the 
Piper Alpha explosion and the Clapham rail crash in 1988; the Hillsborough 
disaster and the sinking of the Marchioness in 1989; the Southall rail crash in 
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1997; the Ladbroke rail crash and the Larkhall gas explosion in 1999 and the 
Hatfield train derailment in 2000.  This is by no means an exhaustive list of the 
disasters that occurred during that period but it does include those mainly 
responsible for the rising public dissatisfaction with the legal response to this 
type of event.  Some of these cases will be discussed in more detail in the next 
Chapter but they are all notable in that there was either no prosecution for 
corporate manslaughter or if there was, it failed in some way, although it should 
be noted that prosecution for health and safety offences often succeeded where 
a manslaughter prosecution failed or was not undertaken.  During the period in 
question, there was a small number successful corporate manslaughter 
prosecutions and the most notable of these will also be discussed in the next 
Chapter. 
The idea that an organisation or corporation in England and Wales can commit 
manslaughter is not new and the historical development of the offence of 
corporate manslaughter (and corporate homicide in Scotland) will be discussed 
in more detail in this and the next Chapter.  Wells pointed out that the 
Interpretation Act 1889 (“…the expression ‘person’ shall, unless the contrary 
intention appears, include a body corporate”487) and case law had established 
that corporations could be both directly and vicariously liable for many criminal 
offences.488  In Mousell Brothers, Limited v London and North-Western Railway 
Company, Disturnal and Wingate-Saul argued that a “…body corporate can only 
act through its officers and servants. The act and intention of its officer are the 
act and intention of the corporation.”489  Although this statement was not 
subsequently referred to in the judgement in Mousell, it did reappear in R. v ICR 
Haulage, one of the leading cases in establishing criminal liability of 
corporations.490 In this case, which involved fraud, it was held that “… the acts 
of the managing director were the acts of the company and the fraud of that 
person was the fraud of the company…”.491 Although this judgement would apply 
to most criminal offences, there are specific types that cannot be committed by 
a corporation due to their “…very personal nature…”, for example, perjury, 
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bigamy, murder and various sexual offences, in effect, “…by their very nature 
can only be committed by a natural person…”.492  This case established that 
manslaughter or culpable homicide could be committed by a corporation and, as 
will be discussed in the next Chapter, successful prosecutions for manslaughter 
were brought against corporations, but in very restricted circumstances as a 
consequence of Tesco v Nattrass.493  The importance of Tesco v Nattrass in 
subsequent prosecutions of corporations for manslaughter (and other criminal 
offences) cannot be overstated and in many respects is one of the main reasons 
why the law dealing with corporate killing was considered inadequate.  Tesco v 
Nattrass will be discussed in more detail in the next Chapter. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Corporations are a ubiquitous part of twenty-first century society and it is 
difficult to imagine any part of life they do not impact upon in one way or 
another.  There are many advantages to incorporation for owners (and 
shareholders), perhaps the most beneficial being limited liability, but this is not 
its only significant characteristic.  Although not human, corporations do have a 
legal personality which also affords them particular advantages but without the 
moral and legal responsibilities that a human personality must adhere to.  
Transferable shares, centralised management and shared ownership complete 
the picture of what a corporation is but the emphasis on it as a vehicle to 
maximise shareholder return is one of the further characteristics most often 
associated with corporate crime.  All of these characteristics contribute to the 
apparent widespread criminality associated with corporations.  Whether or not 
corporations can be guilty of committing various types of crime has been subject 
to much debate but case law in the twentieth century has clearly established 
that their behaviour can be criminal in most circumstances.  The only crimes 
that corporations cannot commit are those that require a very specific type of 
human involvement, such as bigamy, perjury and crimes of a sexual nature.    
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Corporate crime (for the benefit of the organisation, rather than the individuals 
within it, although they may also benefit) has a long and ignoble history with the 
evidence suggesting that corporations and other organisations frequently 
participate in criminal behaviour as a matter of normal business practice.  
Corporate crime is often associated with financial and economic activity but can 
include environmental and safety violations. A number of theories have been put 
forward to explain criminality by organisations but none of them are able to do 
so entirely and it is likely that only by combining the various theories can it be 
properly understood.  Some commentators have linked size with criminality, 
arguing that corporate wrongdoing is associated with the very largest companies 
but there is no evidence that they are more likely to commit crime than the 
smallest.  Where size does count is in the likelihood of being caught and 
convicted; small organisations are more likely to be found guilty of an offence as 
a consequence of the identification doctrine.  The late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries saw corporate killing confirmed as both a possible 
consequence of corporate activity and a crime in its own right, albeit one that 
was very difficult to prove in court for the reasons explained in the next chapter 
where the development of corporate killing into the offence of corporate 




5.0 The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007 
5.1 Introduction 
In 1969 a prosecution was brought against Tesco Supermarkets Ltd in respect of 
a contravention of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 following an advertisement 
posted in the window of a Tesco branch for an offer on soap powder that was 
not available in the store.494  Tesco was convicted but appealed to the Divisional 
Court which also found against it, but did not agree entirely with the decision of 
the Justices in the original case.  Tesco further appealed to the House of Lords 
where their appeal was upheld.  The basic question addressed in this case was 
whether or not the manager of the store was “…acting as the company and his 
mind which directs his act is the mind of the company.”495  Amongst the many 
cases referred to in Tesco v Nattrass, Denning, LJ’s comments in H.L. Bolton 
(Engineering) Co. Ltd. v. T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd. are particularly important, 
“Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents who are 
nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the 
mind or will. Others are directors and managers who represent the directing 
mind and will of the company, and control what it does.  The state of mind of 
these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as 
such”.  The view that there are some people in an organisation who represent its 
“directing mind and will” whilst others do not has had a significant influence in 
the success or failure of any prosecution for corporate manslaughter.   
Returning to Tesco v Nattrass, Pearson, LJ supported the view that “…some 
officers of a company who may for some purposes be identified with it, as being 
or having its directing mind and will, its centre and ego, and its brains.”496  
Pearson went on to suggest that the directing mind or ego of the company 
(Tesco in this case) could only be vested in a person at a senior level in the 
company responsible for “…managing the affairs of the company…”.  Diplock, LJ 
took the view that determining the natural persons who are to be treated in law 






as the company would be done by reference to the articles of association of the 
company and that the negligence of any such natural person would be taken to 
be negligence of the company itself.  In most circumstances, the natural persons 
referred to by Diplock would include company directors, company secretaries 
and senior managers but this could vary from company to company.497 
As stated previously, Tesco v Nattrass had a significant influence on subsequent 
prosecutions of companies and corporations and, as would be expected, has 
been subject to much commentary and has become known as the “identification 
doctrine”, that is, the identification of the person or persons “…whose state of 
mind would constitute the state of mind of the corporation” and whose actions 
could be considered the actions of the company.498  At its simplest, this would 
be the person or persons who issued instructions, rather than received them.499 
This means that for a corporation to be guilty of manslaughter, one or more of 
its directors or most senior managers must also be guilty of manslaughter.500  
One of the consequence of this interpretation of corporate liability was the 
introduction of a two tier justice system, with the largest corporations 
effectively being immune from prosecution for manslaughter but a very different 
possible outcome for the smaller organisations where the senior management 
was closer to the day-to-day decision making process. 
According to Wells, the decision reached in Tesco v. Nattrass resulted in 
“…interpretive absurdities…”501 while Burles suggested that while it was logical, 
it was not necessarily sensible.502  In a rather critical commentary of the depth 
of knowledge of large corporations demonstrated by their Lordships in reaching 
their decision, Parsons suggested that the identification doctrine existed “…as a 
legal barrier to potential corporate criminal liability and this arises from their 
Lordships' dated (even for 1971) understanding of the way large corporations 
operate.”  Almond pointed out that while the interpretation of the controlling or 
directing mind provides a “…degree of doctrinal certainty, it also severely 
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restricts the capacity of the law to hold corporate bodies liable for criminal 
offences.”503  The consequences of this restriction in holding corporate bodies 
liable for criminal offences, and in particular manslaughter or culpable homicide 
will now be explored in more detail since it led to the circumstances responsible 
for the popular clamour “for something to be done”.  That “something” resulted 
in the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. 
The concept of corporations and corporate crime was discussed at length in the 
previous Chapter and it is clear that there was a great deal of uncertainty and 
ambiguity in respect of the liability of corporations in the event of deaths arising 
from their activities.  This had led to the general consensus that while a 
corporation could be prosecuted for manslaughter, there would be a number of 
barriers in the way of any such prosecution being successful.  A number of major 
accidents in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries demonstrated 
just how difficult prosecuting large corporations would be, even where there 
was clear evidence of gross negligence.  The first part of this Chapter will focus 
on the actual or perceived inability of the law to punish large corporations for 
their apparent failures that subsequently resulted in major loss of life, starting 
with the with fifty-six fatalities arising from the Bradford City Stadium Fire in 
May, 1985 before moving on to a examine a number of other accidents with a 
major loss of life that took place over the following fifteen years or so.   
What all these incidents had in common was the perceived failure of the health 
and safety legislation to effectively punish the corporations considered 
responsible for the accidents and the deaths arising from them.  The 
Government’s response was to review the law of manslaughter to consider how 
it could be extended to include deaths caused by work or work activities.  One 
of the main stumbling blocks in the few unsuccessful corporate manslaughter 
prosecutions attempted in the years since the Bradford Fire was the difficulty in 
satisfying the ‘identification doctrine’, in effect the need to identify an 
individual at senior level who could be considered directly responsible for the 
accident.  The difficulties encountered with the identification doctrine will be 
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discussed at length in the following sections but to all intents and purposes, it 
made the prosecution of large corporations for manslaughter all but impossible. 
It was almost fifteen years before the Government’s various consultations 
resulted in the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.  
Whilst this Act does address, to some extent, the main barriers to successful 
corporate manslaughter prosecutions, it did introduce a raft of other issues that 
perhaps made it more difficult than it should be to prosecute the very largest 
companies for manslaughter.  These issues will be analysed and discussed 
towards the end of this Chapter. 
 
5.2 The Disasters 
The Bradford City Stadium Fire in May, 1985, which resulted in fifty-six deaths, 
was the first disaster with a major loss of life where the behaviour of the 
organisation responsible for the operation of the stadium and consequently, the 
fire that resulted in the deaths, was called into question.  Investigators 
concluded that the fire was initially started by discarded smoking materials 
falling through the stand onto an accumulation of combustible wastes.504  The 
fire quickly took hold and spread rapidly through the stand.  Escape was difficult 
due to inadequate fire exits to the rear of the stand.505  The stadium did not 
meet the relevant standards laid down in guidance, and previous warnings had 
been given in respect of the accumulation of combustible materials below the 
stand but, perhaps surprisingly, there seemed to be no discussion of prosecution 
of the stadium owners for manslaughter, nor was there a prosecution taken by 
the Health and Safety Executive.  Hopwood and Adams suggested that the 
Bradford City Fire signalled the start of the concern over the lack of 
accountability of large organisations in the event of major accidents.506  
Although that view would appear not to be supported by lack of action by the 
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Health and Safety Executive or any other public authority, the widow of one of 
the victims and a police officer took an action against the club, the Health and 
Safety Executive and the County Council.507  The case against the Health and 
Safety Executive was dismissed but it was held that the club was two-thirds 
responsible for the fire and the County Council one-third responsible, leading 
the way for compensation to be paid to the survivors and victims’ families.  In a 
newspaper article twenty-five years after the fire, the coroner, James Turnbull, 
revealed that he had considered directing the jury to a manslaughter verdict, 
rather than the death by misadventure that was eventually recorded.508  His 
reason for not doing so was the difficulty in attributing liability to a corporate 
body. 
The next major disaster in the UK with multiple fatalities changed everything.  
On the 6th March, 1987 the roll-on, roll-off ferry, the Herald of Free Enterprise 
operated by Townsend Car Ferries Limited capsized with the loss of one-hundred 
and eighty-eight lives (the number of deaths varies slightly from source to source 
but this is the number cited in the Report of Court) shortly after setting sail from 
Zeebrugge to Dover.509 The immediate cause of the accident was ingress of a 
large volume of water through the open bow door causing the vessel to capsize 
shortly after leaving its berth.  The Report of Court identified a number of 
failures in the operation of the vessel, including the assistant bosun responsible 
for ensuring the bow doors were properly closed sleeping through the muster call 
and the captain setting sail without confirming that the vessel was in a safe 
condition but it also identified significant failings of the management of the 
Company, “…leads inexorably to the conclusion that the underlying or cardinal 
faults lay higher up in the Company.”510 In the same section, the report went on 
to say “From top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of 
sloppiness…”, a clear indication that the Company, as an entity, had failed in its 
duty to protect the safety of both employees and passengers.  Unlike the 
Bradford City Fire, subsequent charges for manslaughter were laid against both 
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the Company and a number of named individuals who were considered directly 
accountable for the events leading up to the capsize of the vessel and the 
subsequent loss of life. 
There would appear to be no significant differences between the Bradford City 
Fire in 1985 and the Herald of Free Enterprise capsize in 1987, both had a 
significant loss of life that was directly attributed, at least in part, to the 
behaviour of the senior management, but there was clearly a major change in 
the public reaction.  The damning Report of Court discussed previously placed 
the blame for the accident squarely on the company and that report was 
followed by the Coroner’s Inquest where the jury returned a verdict of unlawful 
killing.  In his decision, the Coroner made a number of statements that seemed 
to contradict previous case law; in his opinion there was no case of manslaughter 
against any of the five individuals who had been named in the inquest as being 
directly responsible for the accident, a company could not, in law, be indicted 
for manslaughter, and even if such a charge was possible, there was no evidence 
that would support it, and finally, a charge of manslaughter could not be found 
on the aggregation of a number of individual acts that in themselves did not 
constitute gross negligence.511 As a consequence of these conclusions, relatives 
of the victims sought leave to seek judicial review on the grounds that the 
Coroner misdirected the inquest jury.  Although the request was refused, it was 
established that a company could be guilty of manslaughter, given the 
appropriate circumstances, a view confirmed by Turner, J. in R v. P & O 
European Ferries Ltd.512 
On the basis of the verdict of the Coroner’s Inquest jury and the subsequent 
confirmation by Turner, J. and others that a corporation could be found guilty of 
manslaughter, the Director of Public Prosecutions charged seven individuals 
(including two company directors) and the company (Townsend Thoresen was 
acquired by P & O shortly after the accident consequently acquiring liability).513  
Before the prosecution had finished presenting its case, the judge dismissed the 
charges against both company directors which, on the basis of the identification 
doctrine, meant that the charges against the company also had to be 
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dismissed.514  The Director of Public Prosecutions then withdrew the charges 
against the remaining 5 defendants.   The Herald of Free Enterprise disaster 
resulted in extensive discussion and debate amongst legal, transport and safety 
experts but the general consensus was that the various court hearings resulted in 
two major outcomes; corporations could be found guilty of manslaughter but 
given the application of the identification doctrine, it be extremely unlikely ever 
to happen.515  The principle of the identification doctrine established in Tesco v. 
Nattrass effectively prevented corporate manslaughter actions against any but 
the very smallest organisations.  Without the identification of a senior manager 
who could held directly responsible for the deaths, it would be impossible to 
find against the company.  Although he would be subsequently proved wrong (for 
reasons discussed later in this Chapter) Slapper suggested that it would be 
“…virtually impossible for a company to be convicted for manslaughter.”516  
The nineteen-eighties would see further incidents which resulted in a major loss 
of life with subsequent inquiries indicating significant failures of the companies 
or corporations involved but no consequent corporate manslaughter 
prosecutions.  Following the King’s Cross Fire in 1987 with the loss of thirty-one 
lives, Desmond Fennel summarised that although he found that the London 
Underground management considered fires were inevitable, in his view “…they 
were fundamentally in error in their approach.”517 The Cullen Inquiry into the 
fire on Piper Alpha Platform in 1988, which resulted in the loss of one-hundred 
and sixty-five men on the platform and two rescue workers, identified 
“…significant flaws in the quality of Occidental’s management of safety which 
affected the circumstances of the events of the disaster.”518  The report went on 
to point out that the company “…adopted a superficial response when issues of 
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safety were raised by others” as well as other, more specific, shortcomings 
exhibited by the company.   
In December 1988, a train collision at Clapham resulted in the loss of thirty-five 
lives with a further five-hundred injuries.519  The immediate cause was a signal 
failure arising from bad wiring practice but the Hidden Inquiry identified failures 
at nearly every level of the train and track operator, British Railways.  Hidden 
described them as “…faults that are inherent in the way the railway has been 
run for a number of years.  They are many and they must be pointed out”.520   
As can be seen from this relatively small sample of accidents, even where there 
was evidence of significant management failure, there seemed to be no appetite 
to embark upon a prosecution against any of the perpetrators for corporate 
manslaughter although the principle had already been well established.  The 
difficulty of prosecuting large corporations for manslaughter was further 
demonstrated by the prosecutions taken following the Southall and Hatfield train 
crashes in 1997 and 2000 respectively, and the case against Transco following a 
gas explosion at Larkhall in 1999.  In the Southall case, a train operated by Great 
Western Railway passed a series of warning signals, including one at red, before 
colliding with another train resulting in seven deaths.  The two main warning 
devices in the cab were either disengaged or not working properly, facts that 
were known to the driver who had been distracted when the trains passed 
through the warning signals.521  In R v Great Western Railways Ltd, Scott Baker, 
J dismissed seven counts of manslaughter against the company on the basis of 
the identification doctrine.522  The Attorney-General subsequently referred the 
case to the Court of Appeal requesting its opinion on two questions, one being 
could a corporation be found guilty of gross negligence manslaughter without a 
human individual in the corporation being guilty of the same offence.  The clear 
and unambiguous answer to that question was no, “…the identification principle 
remains the only basis in common law for corporate liability for gross negligence 
manslaughter.”523  A similar outcome was experienced in the Hatfield Train 
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Crash where the manslaughter charges against the company and the company 
directors were dismissed by the judge.524 
One of the final attempts at prosecuting a large organisation for corporate 
manslaughter prior to the introduction of the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 was in respect of the gas explosion in Larkhall in 
1999 that resulted in the deaths of four members of the same family.525  What 
makes this case different to those discussed previously is that it fell within the 
Scottish legal system and this was certainly a consideration in the subsequent 
prosecution.  The gas transporting company, Transco, which was responsible for 
the maintenance of the gas pipeline and accordingly held responsible for the 
leak that subsequently led to the explosion, appealed against the refusal of the 
trial judge to dismiss the charge of culpable homicide.  Their appeal was based 
on the argument that “…under the existing law of Scotland, a non-natural person 
could not in any circumstances be guilty of the common law crime of culpable 
homicide…”.526  Importantly, and different to the cases discussed previously, the 
Crown’s case for corporate culpable homicide was based on a series of decisions 
made by a number of committees with delegated responsibility; no individuals 
were identified as being directly responsible for the decisions made leading to 
the accident.527 
In upholding the appeal, the Court agreed that while a corporation can be guilty 
of culpable homicide, the Crown’s case (“…fatally flawed…”528) failed to show 
that the actions of individuals or groups of individuals acting as the corporation 
demonstrated the necessary state of mind amounting to the level of culpability 
required for a guilty verdict to be returned.  Making reference to Tesco v. 
Nattrass, it was held that the requirements of the identification doctrine had 
not been met by the Crown.  In the same judgement, a significant distinction 
was drawn between the crime of manslaughter in England and the crime of 
culpable homicide in Scotland, with the latter requiring mens rea to be 
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demonstrated, which was not necessarily the case in England.529  Described 
twice by Lord Osborne in his judgement as “valiant”, the Crown’s case, although 
unsuccessful, would appear to have had some merit and it did raise the profile 
of the corporate homicide debate in Scotland and was instrumental in the 
creation of an expert review group to examine the issue.530  The report of the 
expert group will be discussed in more detail later in this Chapter. 
These failed attempts at prosecution for corporate manslaughter would appear 
to support Slapper’s view discussed previously that it would be virtually 
impossible to prosecute a company for corporate manslaughter but R v Kite, 
Stoddard and OLL Ltd in 1994 showed that was not quite true.  Following the 
deaths of four children who were on a canoeing trip organised by OLL Ltd, the 
company, its managing director (Kite) and the centre manager (Stoddard) were 
each charged with four counts of manslaughter.531 Kite was found guilty of 
individual manslaughter and given a prison sentence of three years (reduced to 
two years on appeal) and OLL Ltd made legal history in the United Kingdom as 
the first company to be found guilty of corporate manslaughter (at common law) 
and was fined £60 000.  The jury failed to reach a decision in respect of 
Stoddard and the case against him was dropped.   
The main difference between OLL Ltd and the other cases discussed previously 
in this Chapter was quite simply the size of the company.  OLL Ltd was a very 
small company employing few people and Kite had day-to-day involvement in 
management and operational issues and although he was not immediately 
responsible for the accident, he had been warned of the inadequacies of the 
systems in place prior to it and had failed to comply with the British Canoe 
Union guidelines.  His role as “directing mind” was easily established and the 
jury concluded that he was grossly negligent in his actions.  That being the case, 
it was relatively straightforward to also find OLL Ltd guilty of corporate 
manslaughter but as Wells pointed out, there was little benefit to prosecuting 
OLL Ltd in addition to Kite since it was a company that very few people had 
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heard of before the case and would only survive following the guilty verdict as 
an historical footnote.532  In this respect, it could be argued that the corporate 
manslaughter verdict in respect of OLL Ltd was symbolic rather than substantive; 
it was a very small company, operating in a quite specialist sector, whose only 
claim to fame (or infamy) was to be the confirmation of an already well-
established legal principle, that is, a corporation can, under certain 
circumstances, be guilty of manslaughter. 
Although it could not be described as opening the floodgates, R v Kite and OLL 
Ltd was the first of a handful of successful corporate manslaughter cases taken 
against small organisations where the “directing mind” was easily identified and 
directly associated with the company.  Large companies, irrespective of their 
nature, were to all intents and purposes immune to prosecution for 
manslaughter as a consequence of the difficulty in establishing a directing (or 
controlling) mind responsible for the actions held directly responsible for the 
death or deaths.533  There must be some question about the benefit from 
prosecuting these very small companies, they employed few people and had a 
relatively insignificant impact on the attitudes and culture of the large, multi-
national corporations, but perhaps more importantly, it was patently unfair.  
The size of the organisation had become the determining factor for the success 
or failure of a prosecution for corporate manslaughter and this inevitably had an 
influence on the relevant government law officers when determining the most 
appropriate course of action in the event of a fatality or multiple fatalities 
arising out of work activities.534 
This state of affairs led to pressure for ‘something to be done’ to address the 
apparent inadequacies of the legislation to punish corporations considered 
responsible for fatalities arising from their activities which eventually resulted in 
the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act of 2007. Before 
discussing the 2007 Act in more detail, it is necessary to consider the changing 
nature of the manslaughter or culpable homicide offence.  The use of the terms 
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‘manslaughter’ and ‘homicide’ in the title of the Act reflects the differing 
nature of Scottish law and the law of England and Wales and will be further 
explained in the next section of this Chapter. 
 
5.3 Manslaughter, Culpable Homicide and Corporate Killing 
The disasters discussed in the previous section illustrated some of the barriers 
encountered when applying the common law of manslaughter or culpable 
homicide to the act of corporate killing.  The situation is complicated by the 
different legal systems in Scotland and England and Wales.  In England and 
Wales, there is no offence of homicide, instead the term includes the common 
law offences of murder and manslaughter, along with a number of other 
offences created by statute such as causing death by dangerous driving.535 In 
England and Wales, the phrase ‘malice aforethought’ is the distinguishing 
feature of the offence of murder with mens rea being the intent to kill or cause 
grievous bodily harm. 536  Although Herring expressed doubt about the validity of 
the term ‘malice aforethought’, he went on to describe different forms of 
malice that could result in a charge of murder, including general, express and 
implied malice.  Intent to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm are relatively 
straightforward interpretations of malice aforethought and Williams added a 
third set of circumstances where it may be present, “risk taking of certain (or 
uncertain) kind”.537  Herring suggested that the defendant would need to have 
realised that the resulting death was a “…virtual certainty…” of his or her 
actions, even if it was not the intention, for this third set of circumstances to be 
applicable.538 
The common law crime of murder in Scotland is very similar to that in England 
and Wales, including no distinct offence of homicide, which is a category 
                                        
535 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law op. cit. n.347, p.245; The Crown Prosecution Service, 
'Death by Dangerous Driving' (CPS, 2012) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/sentencing_manual/death_by_dangerous_driving/> 
accessed 10 November 2014 
536 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law op. cit. n.347, p.245  
537 Ibid 
538 J. Herring, Criminal Law (6th edn, Palgrave McMillan 2009) 150 
152 
 
containing a group of offences including culpable homicide.539  Similar to 
England and Wales, the mens rea for murder in Scotland is the wicked intent to 
kill but previously, it had also included causing death through wicked or 
“…callous recklessness…”.540  MacDonald defined ‘wicked recklessness’ as “…a 
disposition depraved enough to be wholly regardless of consequences” and 
although this definition has been widely used in Scottish murder trials for many 
years it has recently been subject to qualification and criticism.541  In HM 
Advocate v. Purcell it was held that it was not enough to show ‘wicked 
recklessness’, there also had to be the intent to cause physical injury.542  
Confirming this decision in Samuel Petto v. HM Advocate, the Lord Justice Clerk 
suggested that review of the mental element in murder was long  overdue, being 
“…defined with the use of terms such as wicked, evil, felonious, depraved and so 
on, which may impede rather than conduce to analytical accuracy”.543, 544 
Given the above, it is unlikely that mens rea for corporate murder could ever be 
established in respect of deaths arising from work activities, proving that a 
senior manager or managers showed intent to kill as a consequence of work 
activities would be extremely difficult if not impossible, but as discussed 
previously in this Chapter, attempts have been made use the law to punish 
organisations for the specific crime of causing death as a result of their 
activities.  The common law crimes of manslaughter in England and Wales and 
culpable homicide in Scotland have both been used, with varying degrees of 
success, against organisations following deaths arising from their activities.  
Manslaughter has traditionally been defined as unlawful killing in the absence of 
malice aforethought.545  It is also been used as an alternative to the charge of 
murder which carries a mandatory life sentence, particularly in cases where the 
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partial defences of provocation, diminished responsibility or suicide pact have 
accepted.   
Two types of manslaughter are generally recognised in England and Wales, 
voluntary and involuntary (although there is only one common law crime of 
manslaughter with no distinction between voluntary and involuntary).  For the 
purposes of corporate killing, involuntary manslaughter which describes the 
crime of unintentional unlawful killing is the most relevant.546  There are 
variously considered to be two or three forms of involuntary manslaughter 
typically described as constructive, gross negligence or reckless, although some 
commentators cast doubt on whether or not the last is actually a separate 
form.547  The inconsistency over the forms of involuntary manslaughter is 
demonstrated by Williams’ previous categorisation of the crime as reckless 
manslaughter or constructive manslaughter.548   
Constructive manslaughter, also referred to as unlawful act manslaughter, 
describes the circumstances where the victim is killed in the course of an 
unlawful and dangerous act but where the accused is lacking the mens rea of 
murder.549  It is interesting to consider why constructive manslaughter is not 
considered relevant in cases of death arising from work activities where the 
death can be directly attributed to an unlawful act (for example, a 
contravention of health and safety legislation).  There would appear to be no 
prohibition in law on this form of manslaughter forming the basis for the 
prosecution of a corporation for causing deaths as consequence of their 
activities.   The use of constructive manslaughter for deaths arising from work 
activities was discussed by Wells who, although holding the view that the idea of 
constructive manslaughter is in itself unappealing, was of the opinion that there 
was no reason why it could not be used and, indeed, could be easier to prove in 
cases of corporate killing.550  In 1994, the Law Commission argued that it would 
not be rational for unlawful act manslaughter to be used against corporations.  
This recommendation was based at least partly on the context of its 
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recommendation to abolish that particular offence but also to use it for the basis 
for serious criminal liability “would be likely to have effects which would be 
wholly random and erratic in their nature” but without giving any further 
explanation or justification for that view.551 The offence of constructive or 
unlawful manslaughter has not been abolished so one of the reasons given by the 
Law Commission for not considering it in the context of corporate killing, that is 
its abolition, did not happen.    Although the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 abolished the application of the common law 
offence of gross negligence manslaughter to corporations, it says nothing about 
constructive manslaughter.552  
The final category of manslaughter considered in this Chapter, the common law 
offences of gross negligence or reckless manslaughter in England and Wales, or 
culpable homicide in Scotland, was the most likely criminal prosecution for 
corporations held responsible for deaths arising from work activities.  The Law 
Commission Report, Criminal Law: Involuntary Manslaughter muddies the waters 
a little by conflating the terms reckless and gross negligence, “…that of gross 
negligence or reckless manslaughter…” implying they are one and the same 
thing.553  Gross negligence manslaughter/culpable homicide and how they 
formed the basis of the corporate manslaughter and corporate homicide 
offences will be discussed in more detail in the next Section of this Chapter.  
There are further forms of murder, manslaughter and culpable homicide, 
including infanticide (in England and Wales), causing death whilst in charge of a 
motor vehicle and causing or allowing the death of a child or young adult.  Each 
of these forms have little or no relevance to corporate killing so will not be 
discussed further in this thesis. 
Whilst in theory, corporations could be guilty of the common law offences of 
gross negligence manslaughter or culpable homicide, the legal barriers for 
successful action against them, particularly the larger corporations were just too 
high.  The identification doctrine made it all but impossible to prosecute large 
companies for manslaughter or culpable homicide and there was no prospect of 
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that changing unless there was change in the law which would recognise 
corporate killing as an offence in itself and for the identification doctrine to be 
confined to history.  The following sections of this Chapter will discuss the 
tortuous path taken that finally resulted in the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007.  
 
5.4 Reforming the Law 
As illustrated in the previous section, the offence of manslaughter (and culpable 
homicide) has continued to evolve to reflect the changing nature of society, and 
the statutory response to corporate killing could be considered just one stage in 
its fragmentation.  The concept of punishing employers directly for deaths 
arising from their activities has proved to be a contentious issue since the very 
earliest days of legislative control of safety in the workplace.  As discussed in 
Chapter two, the Seventh Earl of Shaftsbury, Lord Ashley, in his Bill of 1833 
proposed that if an operative was killed as the result of negligence in fencing 
dangerous parts of a machine, the mill-owner responsible was to be committed 
for trial on a charge of manslaughter.554  Needless to say, this particular proposal 
was not well received by the manufacturers of the day and was quickly expunged 
from the Bill but it is perhaps one of the first attempts to legislate for a specific 
class of manslaughter.  It would be a further century and a half before the 
principle of holding employers directly accountable for deaths arising from their 
activities would gain widespread support. 
The sequence of major accidents in the late nineteen-eighties discussed 
previously in this Chapter resulting in a significant loss of life demonstrated an 
apparent failure of the legal process to properly punish the corporations 
responsible for them.  In some of those cases, large fines were imposed for 
contraventions of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 but the regulatory 
nature of the 1974 Act and its relevant statutory provisions meant that 
corporations found guilty were not subject to the stigma that would be attached 
to the ‘real’ crime of manslaughter.  Although by that time it had been 
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established that a corporation could be found guilty of manslaughter, the 
‘identification doctrine’ meant that any hope of a successful prosecution for the 
manslaughter offence could be expected only in respect of the very smallest 
organisations where the directing mind could be identified.  In effect, large and 
medium-sized corporations could operate confident of their immunity from 
prosecution for manslaughter for deaths arising from their activities. 
What could be considered the first major response by the establishment to the 
clamour for ‘something to be done’ took the form of the Law Commission 
consultation document, Involuntary Manslaughter (LC135), which was published 
in 1994.555  As the title suggests, the consultation extended beyond just 
corporate killing and considered the law relating to involuntary manslaughter 
more widely but, importantly, the Consultation Document did acknowledge that 
corporations could be guilty of manslaughter but it was emphatic that there 
should not be a separate law for corporate manslaughter, it should, instead, fall 
under the general law of manslaughter.556  The Consultation Document identified 
the difficulty in attaching “…conscious wrongdoing…” to corporations and their 
behaviour, or misbehaviour, but it went on to suggest that the crime of 
corporate manslaughter was not one of conscious wrong doing, but one of failure 
to do something.557  To address that particular difficulty, it suggested a different 
approach to corporate liability based on the question “…did the company’s 
operation fall seriously and significantly below what could reasonably be 
expected of it in the context of the significant risk of death or injury of which it 
should have been aware?”.558  Although the Consultation Document’s 
recommendation that corporate manslaughter should not be separated from the 
law of general manslaughter did not survive, its approach to corporate liability 
did, at least in part. 
Following the consultation period, in 1996, the Law Commission published its 
report Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter.559  The Report 
was based on the proposals contained in LC135 and comments received from a 
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range of individuals, organisations and other interested parties.  The 
recommendations contained in the Report generally followed the proposals 
contained in the earlier consultation document and included the abolition of 
unlawful act killing and the creation of two offences to replace the single 
manslaughter offence, reckless killing and killing by gross carelessness.  It 
recommended that the laws dealing with motor manslaughter should be left 
unchanged. 
The Report recommended the creation of a new offence of corporate killing 
which would correspond with the individual offence of killing by gross negligence 
but unlike that offence, it would not be necessary for the risk to be obvious or 
for the defendant to be capable of appreciating that risk.  The Report did 
recommend that it should not be possible for an individual to be charged with 
the offence of corporate killing.  An interesting recommendation included in the 
Report was the possibility for the jury to convict the defendant of an offence 
under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 where they were found not 
guilty of the offence of corporate killing.  The Report also recommended that, 
on the application of the prosecution, the Health and Safety Executive or other 
appropriate body or person, an order could be made to require remedial action 
by the corporation to address the failures identified as the cause or causes of 
the deaths.  The apparent close relationship between the Health and Safety at 
Work etc. Act 1974 and the proposed new offence of corporate killing was 
commented upon by Cahill and Cahill who observed that the implied need for 
safe systems of work reflected the requirement of the 1974 Act for risk 
assessment to be undertaken.560 
The report included a draft Involuntary Manslaughter Bill which laid down the 
new offences of reckless killing, killing by gross carelessness and corporate 
killing and included definitions of each offence and the penalties.561 
Importantly, the proposed corporate killing offence focused on management 
failure of the corporation rather than the direct actions of an individual or group 
of individuals thus dispensing with the identification doctrine. A further point of 
note was the explicit inclusion of the potential prosecution of a corporation for 
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both reckless killing and killing by gross carelessness. It was a relatively short 
Bill, running only to eleven sections but had it been adopted and implemented 
as it stood, it would have resulted in the most significant changes to the 
manslaughter offence in modern times with Wells describing them as “…daring 
and innovatory”, at least in respect of corporate killing.562  Wells went on to 
express some reservations about both the establishment of a separate corporate 
killing offence, on the ground that it might marginalise corporate killing even 
further, and the exclusion of directors and other senior managers from action for 
this offence.563  Making reference to other commentators, she suggested that 
enforcement action against companies was much more effective when taken 
against senior managers at the same time, although it is debatable that the 
corporate killing offence could be considered enforcement action in its truest 
sense. 
Mays expressed some doubt that prosecutors would view “management failure” 
holistically in the context of an organisation’s activities which may have resulted 
in a death, instead he feared that prosecutors would look at the “…actions and 
conduct of senior actors in the corporate hierarchy…” when assessing 
management failure.564  To all intents and purposes, this is a reversion, at least 
in part, to the identification doctrine.  This view was support to some extent by 
Wells, who commented upon the lack of a definition of “management” in the 
Law Commission’s Report, and expressed some doubt that the difficulty in 
proving “management failure” may still have resulted in a failed prosecution in 
the P&O case.565   
Whilst recognising the benefits of the proposed new “corporate killing” offence 
in facilitating successful prosecutions, Clarkson argued that it should be resisted 
for two reasons.566  Although the new offence may have made it easier to 
convict in the event of a death arising from an organisation’s activities, it would 
                                        
562 C. Wells, 'The Law Commission report on involuntary manslaughter: the corporate 
manslaughter proposals: pragmatism, paradox and peninsularity' (1996) Criminal Law Review 545 
545 
563 Ibid 
564 Richard Mays, 'The criminal liability of corporations and Scots law: learning the lessons of 
Anglo-American jurisprudence' (2000) Edinburgh Law Review 46 69 
565 Wells, 'Corporate Killing' op. cit. n.532, p.1468 
566 C. M. V. Clarkson, 'Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls' (1996) 59 The Modern 
Law Review 557 569 
159 
 
have no effect on any other offence committed by it.  In respect of these 
offences, the identification doctrine would still apply, a point also made by 
Wells.567 Of major concern to Clarkson was the danger that the new offence 
would be considered something different from manslaughter and may lose some 
of the stigma and seriousness associated with it and lead to a further 
marginalisation in terms of enforcement.  Perhaps one of the most critical 
commentators on the Law Commission Report was Trotter who identified a 
number of what she described as disadvantages including its restriction to deaths 
arising in the UK, the failure to include an individual offence applicable to senior 
executives, the failure to make senior executives personally liable for any 
penalties, inadequate level of fines and remedial orders that were too narrow in 
scope and application, the failure to have any systems to compensate victims’ 
families and the failure to require an improvement in corporate safety 
culture.568 
In the main, most of the criticism of the Law Commission report focussed on the 
failure to include an individual offence as well as the corporate killing offence, 
the vagueness and difficulty in establishing “managerial failure” and the danger 
that the new corporate killing offence may in some way reduce the stigma or 
seriousness that should be associated with causing death as a consequence of an 
organisation’s activities.  How these criticisms were addressed by the 
Government’s proposals will be discussed below. 
It would be a further four years before the Government published a formal 
response to the Law Commission Report in the form of Reforming the Law on 
Involuntary Manslaughter: The Government’s Proposals.569  In the forward to 
that document, the Home Secretary at the time, the Right Honourable Jack 
Straw MP, acknowledged the deficiencies of the law dealing with involuntary 
manslaughter in general, and corporate killing more specifically.  Most of the 
Law Commission’s proposals were accepted although there were number of 
areas where a different view was taken.  The Government accepted the proposal 
for two new offences to replace the existing manslaughter offence, reckless and 
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gross carelessness killing but proposed a third offence to address concerns over 
the proposed abolition of unlawful act manslaughter.  The third offence would 
cover those situations where a minor injury caused through an unlawful act 
subsequently led to death which was unforeseeable.  The Government argued 
that a person who embarks upon illegal violence should be responsible for the 
consequences although they might be unforeseeable.   
By far the largest part of the Government’s proposals focussed on corporate 
killing.  Although the Law Commission’s proposal for the new offence of 
corporate killing was accepted, there were a number changes and additions put 
forward.  To begin with, there was some concern over the restrictions imposed 
through the use of the term ‘corporation’ in so far as some organisations might 
fall outside its normal understanding and it was proposed that the application of 
the offence to ‘undertakings’ rather than ‘corporations’ would be preferable.  
The question of Crown immunity was raised but no proposal was made other 
than to seek comments on the issue.  On the question of investigation, the 
Government proposed that in England and Wales, the Health and Safety 
Executive, local authorities and other health and safety enforcing authorities 
should be given the powers to investigate and prosecute the new offence, as 
well as the Crown Prosecution Service and police. 
The Law Commission explicitly excluded action being taken against individuals in 
a company for corporate killing although they could still be prosecuted using the 
more general new offences of reckless or gross carelessness killing.  The 
Government expressed some concern at this approach on the grounds that it 
would not provide sufficient deterrence to large, wealthy companies and it 
would not prevent ‘culpable individuals’ from establishing a new business 
following the successful prosecution of their previous companies for the new 
offence.  To address that concern, it was proposed that an individual who could 
be shown to have had some responsibility for the management failures leading to 
the deaths and subsequent prosecution for the new offence should be 
disqualified from subsequently acting in a management role in any undertaking.  
Comments were sought on the questions of whether or not such individuals 
should be subject to action in relation to the offence of corporate killing.  As 
stated previously, most of the other Law Commission proposals were accepted, 
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including the power to require remedial works, and responses were invited for 
submission by 1st September 2000.  It should be noted that the Government’s 
proposals only extended to England and Wales with Scotland and Northern 
Ireland excluded as a consequence of their different legal systems.  The Scottish 
response to the corporate killing question will be discussed later in this Chapter. 
In 2003 following attempts by the Labour backbencher, Andrew Dinsmore, to 
table an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill which was being debated at that 
time, the Home Secretary, David Blunkett made a statement confirming that the 
Government would publish a bill creating the offence of corporate 
manslaughter.570  In his statement, Blunkett stated that the criminal liability of 
company directors would not be included as part of the bill creating the new 
offence.  It would be another two years before the draft bill was published, and 
then a further period of consultation before the Home Affairs and Work and 
Pensions Committees published their responses to the Government’s 
proposals.571, 572  The offence contained in the draft bill focussed on gross 
management failure based on conduct that would fall far below what could be 
reasonably expected.  Importantly, the application of the Act to individuals was 
excluded even though the Government itself expressed concern that the failure 
to extend the offence to include individuals could diminish its effectiveness.  
Individuals could still be subject to prosecution for the common law offence of 
manslaughter, offences under the health and safety legislation and 
disqualification as a director under the then existing legislation. 
Much of the debate that resulted as a consequence of the publication of the 
Government’s proposals reflected that which followed the Law Commission’s 
Report and focussed on the lack of an individual offence and the difficulty in 
establishing “management failure”.  Berry questioned whether the draft Bill 
really brought anything new to the table, mainly on the grounds that it did not 
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include an individual offence for company directors.573  Clarkson also 
commented upon the failure to include an individual offence but he also 
expressed disappointment that the Bill was limited to deaths arising from an 
organisation’s activities, and he suggested that it should have included the 
offence of causing serious personal injury.574  He also commented on the change 
of name of the offence from “corporate killing” to “corporate manslaughter”, 
without any explanation.  He considered the original offence of corporate killing 
a more appropriate description of the wrongdoing, although as discussed 
previously in this section, that view is not necessarily shared by other 
commentators. 
Almond commented upon the allocation of investigation of possible corporate 
manslaughter cases to the police, rather than the Health and Safety 
Executive.575  This contradicted the Government’s original response to the Law 
Commission Report which was to allocate enforcement of the new offence to the 
Health and Safety Executive.  Almond associated this change to the 
decriminalisation of health and safety law in the preceding years. 
The role of “senior management” in establishing the offence of corporate 
manslaughter was discussed at length by Griffin who expressed concern not just 
in the determination of who “senior management” would be, but also the need 
to show their activities were a substantial component of the gross breach of a 
relevant duty of care.576  The need to demonstrate gross negligence by the 
organisation also caused Griffin some concern and he considered, apart from the 
vagueness of the term, the size, type of industry and wealth of the company will 
all conspire to produce variable outcomes.  Concluding, Griffin did not consider 
the Bill to be a radical departure on the common law it would replace, there 
would be few additional prosecutions and it was regretful that individual board 
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members would be able “…to hide behind the corporate veil, free from any 
personal responsibility…”.577 
The Bill applied only to England and Wales and between the publication of the 
draft Bill in March 2005 and the Committee’s Report mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, the Corporate Homicide Expert Group set up by the Scottish 
Executive published its report on Corporate Homicide.578  In many respects, it 
was similar to the Government Bill for England and Wales, in particular the focus 
on ‘management failure’, although some of the differences between the two 
documents were quite significant.  The Expert Group considered ‘recklessness’ 
to be an important component of the new offence of corporate homicide 
whereas in England and Wales, the term ‘gross breach’ was adopted.  The Expert 
Group also felt there was little benefit in adopting the concept of ‘duty of care’ 
which was an important part of the England and Wales Bill.  Perhaps one of the 
most significant differences was the approach by the Expert Group to individual 
liability.  Its Report recommended both an individual offence and a secondary 
offence where the individual offence could apply to any person in the 
organisation responsible for causing the death as a consequence of their work 
activities.  This offence would not require the organisation to also be guilty of 
corporate homicide.  The secondary offence would apply to individual directors 
or senior managers and would apply where the organisation had been found 
guilty of corporate homicide and it was held that the acts or omissions of an 
individual at a senior level directly contributed to the death.579  As the Expert 
Group pointed out, this reflected the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 
where an individual offence existed in terms of Section 7 of that Act and a 
secondary offence in terms of Section 37.  The Expert Group did accept that it 
would be desirable for the UK legal jurisdictions to be aligned in dealing with 
corporate manslaughter/corporate homicide, but it was critical of the draft Bill 
published for England and Wales and considered it unsuitable for application in 
Scotland.   
Chalmers was rather critical of the report of the Expert Group, suggesting that 
one of its main shortcomings was the failure to rule any options out which meant 
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that there were no clear recommendations for the Scottish Executive to accept 
or reject.580  Chalmers also expressed concern about the dismissal by the Expert 
Group of the view that making individual senior managers and directors liable 
for the offence could be a disincentive for executives to accept these posts in 
Scotland although he did accept that some of his reservations could be allayed if 
the individual liability was more clearly explained.  Other concerns expressed by 
Chalmers included the failure of the Group to examine in depth the relationship 
between the proposed offence and the existing health and safety statutory 
provisions, going as far as to suggest that if there was no offence in terms of 
health and safety legislation, there could be no proceedings for the new offence 
and conversely, if there was a breach of health and safety legislation then there 
would be no need to demonstrate management failure in terms of the new 
offence.  In this suggestion, Chalmers viewed the new offence as an extension, 
in some ways, to the health and safety legislation and whilst it could be assumed 
that most corporate homicide offences would be related to health and safety 
offences, there could be circumstances where the deaths arose from other forms 
of management failure.  Chalmers’ last area of concern was in sentencing where 
he felt that there was just too wide a range of options available to the courts 
and that expertise in sentencing corporate homicide offences would not be 
developed. 
The Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committee Report Draft Corporate 
Manslaughter Bill was published on 12th December 2005 and although it 
welcomed the Government’s proposals to introduce the new offence of 
corporate manslaughter (rather than corporate killing), it did express a number 
of concerns and made recommendations.581  The Government’s response to the 
Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committee Report was published in March 
2006 and the revised Bill eventually receiving Royal Assent on 27th July 2007 as 
the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. 582  It is 
interesting to note that even at that late stage, the Government’s draft Bill still 
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extended to only England and Wales, although the Home Affairs and Work and 
Pensions Committee suggested that the recommendations contained in its report 
would bring the draft Bill close to the reforms proposed in Scotland.   
In June 2006, Karen Gillon, MSP, published a consultation paper containing a 
draft Culpable Homicide Bill for Scotland which, amongst other things, 
introduced the new offence of corporate culpable homicide by causing death 
recklessly.583 Gillon’s consultation document also included a secondary offence 
where office holders in an organisation could also be guilty of the offence if they 
were held responsible for the activities that caused the death, something that 
was not included in the UK Government’s Bill.  At some point in time after the 
publication of Gillon’s consultation document, it was decided that corporate 
manslaughter/corporate homicide was too closely linked to health and safety 
issues which was a reserved matter for Westminster and as such, the 
Westminster Act would apply to the whole of the UK.584  Some commentators in 
Scotland were far from impressed by this turn of events and Bob Thompson, 
writing in the Scottish Left Review argued that “Out of the blue, Whitehall 
stated that Health and Safety was a reserved matter for Westminster and the 
Scottish Bill was not competent. The Scottish Executive cravenly agreed without 
any discussion, and the Bill was dropped”.585 
The outcome of thirteen years formal consultation was the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007(the “Act”) which was given 
Royal Assent on the 26th July 2007 and applied to the whole of the United 
Kingdom. 586  The Act came into force on 6th April 2008 with the intention of 
clarifying the law in respect to fatal accidents arising from an organisation’s 
activities.  Paul Goggins, the Criminal Justice Minister at the time of the Act’s 
commencement, stated that “This important UK-wide legislation is a major step 
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forward for protecting consumers and workers from grossly negligent 
corporations”.587 
 Although Goggins clearly focused on consumer and worker safety, the Act is not 
‘health and safety legislation’ in the normal meaning of the term, nor is it 
enforced by the health and safety enforcing agencies in the UK although there is 
clearly a close link between it and the existing health and safety legislation, as 
demonstrated by the decision to remove corporate homicide from the Scottish 
Parliament’s ambit, as discussed in preceding paragraphs. Instead, investigations 
were to be led by the police and any proceedings for corporate manslaughter 
would be the responsibility of the Crown Prosecution Service in England and 
Wales, the Procurator Fiscal in Scotland and the Public Prosecution Service in 
Northern Ireland.   
It was expected that the expertise of the Health and Safety Executive and other 
enforcing agencies would be “properly harnessed” in the event of any 
investigation that could lead to charges in terms of the Act.588 
 
5.5 The Act  
The Act, which came into force on 6th April, 2008, applies to the whole of the UK 
and introduces two new offences, corporate manslaughter (England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland) and corporate homicide (Scotland).  Many of the comments 
and recommendations made and received throughout the extended consultation 
period informed the final contents and wording of the Act but equally, some of 
the concerns expressed, particularly by the Scottish Executive Expert Group, 
were not included in the Act.  In some respects, there seems to have been a bit 
of a rush to introduce the Act in the last few months of its gestation, given the 
previous 13 years of what could best be described as a relatively leisurely pace 
of development. 
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The Act applies to most companies, corporations, partnerships, trades unions, 
police forces and government departments.  Schedule 1 of the Act lists the 
departments that it applies to and Section 21 allows the Secretary of State to 
extend the categories of organisations subject to the requirements of the Act.  
There are some types of organisations that fall outside its scope but most will be 
included.  It is worth noting that the Act applies to Crown Bodies, the Armed 
Forces and the Police although there are exemptions for military activities, 
policing operations in respect of civil disorder, terrorism or serious disorder, and 
other emergencies.  This will be discussed in more detail later in this section.    
Section 1 of the 2007 Act makes it an offence for an organisation to cause the 
death of a person as a consequence of its “…gross breach of a relevant duty of 
care…” owed to the victim.  The term ‘organisation’ includes a corporation, 
department or other body as listed in Schedule 1 (discussed in the previous 
paragraph), a police force, partnership, trade union or employers’ association 
where they are an employer.  It is important to note that a prosecution for 
corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide can only be taken against a 
company; individuals within the company cannot be guilty of this offence 
irrespective of their role leading to the death but they can be prosecuted for 
gross negligence manslaughter. 
For an offence to be committed in terms of the Act, the organisation must have 
owed a relevant duty of care to the victim, a “gross” breach of that duty of care 
resulting in the victim’s death must be demonstrated with a substantial part of 
the gross breach of duty attributed to “…the way in which its activities are 
managed or organised by its senior management”. A relevant duty of care is one 
owed in the law of negligence and would not include the statutory duties 
imposed by health and safety legislation although there would clearly be 
significant overlap between the two types of duties.  The used of ‘duty of care’ 
was specifically considered by the Scottish Executive Expert Group which 
concluded that there were “…no particular advantages…” to the importation of 
the concept and it had concerns about “…adopting wholly civil concepts into 
criminal law…”.589  The implementation of what could be considered a foreign 
concept into the Scottish legal system, at least so far as criminal law is 
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concerned was addressed in the Ministry of Justice guide in a single sentence, 
“…the concepts of negligence and duty of care are familiar from the civil law”, 
effectively ignoring the concerns expressed by the Expert Group although the 
subsequent definition of duty of care shown below does include circumstances 
familiar to Scottish Law.590 
Section 2 (1) of the Act explicitly defines an organisation’s duty of care as “…any 
of the following duties owed by it under the laws of negligence” and includes a 
duty owed to employees or other persons working for it, a duty owed as occupier 
of premises, a duty owed in the connection with the supply of goods or services, 
the carrying on of any construction or maintenance operations, the carrying on 
of any other activity on a commercial basis or the use or keeping of any plant, 
vehicle or other thing, and finally, a duty owed to a person for whose safety the 
organisation is responsible in terms of subsection 2 of the Act. 
Although only a duty of care owed in the law of negligence will be a ‘relevant 
duty of care’, there is considerable overlap with those found in health and 
safety legislation, in particular sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Health and Safety at 
Work etc. Act 1974.   The duty of care contained in the 2007 Act is more 
extensive than the statutory duties contained in the 1974 Act and could include 
products and environmental liabilities.591  Pointing out that the ‘duty of care’ 
requirement was not included in the 1996 or 2000 consultation papers and its 
inclusion was advised against by the Home Affairs and Work and Pensions 
Committee in 2005, Gobert suggested that it is “…otiose…” and would only 
provide defendants with an opportunity to deflect attention from the 
organisations role in causing the death which led to the prosecution.592 
Whether or not an organisation owes a duty of care will be a question of law and 
the judge must make “any findings of fact necessary to decide that question” 
(S.2(5)).  In effect, it is for the judge to decide whether or not the duty of care 
was owed by the organisation to an individual.  This would appear to contradict  
the common law position where the jury would decide if a duty of care exists 
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but Whelan suggested that the complexities of determining whether or not the 
victim was an employee of the organisation could prove too challenging.593  
Hopwood, Edum-Fotwe and Adams suggested that S.2(5) will clarify whether or 
not a duty of care is owed making appeals on these grounds much less likely.594 
A useful reference point to establish whether a duty of care is owed can be 
found in Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman.  This case led to the creation of the 
“three-fold test”; harm must be a “reasonably foreseeable” consequence of the 
defendant’s actions; a relationship of “proximity” between the defendant and 
the claimant must exist; it must be “fair, reasonable and just” to impose 
liability on the defendant.595  The term ‘proximity’ is difficult to define and 
means more than physical closeness.  It can be considered the extent of the 
relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff and it has been described 
as a relationship equivalent to contract or only falling just short of a direct 
contractual relationship.  It has also been related to the assumption of 
responsibility by the defendant prior to the loss.  In Sutradhar (FC) v Natural 
Environment Research Council, Lord Hoffman described proximity as “…the 
sense of a measure of control over and responsibility for the potentially 
dangerous situation.”596  In the same case, Lord Mance commented on the “…the 
imprecision of the concept and the many criticisms it has attracted down the 
years…” and it is likely to continue to present challenges in the interpretation of 
duty of care in respect of corporate manslaughter and corporate homicide cases. 
A ‘gross breach’ of a relevant duty of care will occur where the breach of that 
duty “…falls far below what can reasonably be expected of the organisation in 
the circumstances”.   With terms like “far below” and “can reasonably be 
expected”, establishing gross breach may not be an easy task and it wi ll fall to 
the jury to decide whether or not such a breach has taken place.  The threshold 
of the offence is gross negligence597 which was discussed in the case of R v 
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Adomako where, making reference to Andrews v DPP,  Lord Mackay proposed 
that in the case of manslaughter, four facts must be established:- there is a duty 
of care owed by the defendant to the victim; the duty of care was breached;  
the breach of duty caused the victim’s death; the breach of duty can be 
characterised as gross negligence. 598 It is interesting to note that the 
recommendations of the Scottish Executive Expert Group which proposed 
“recklessness” as the key component for the corporate homicide offence were 
not included in the 2007 Act.599   
Determining whether or not the breach of duty amounted to gross negligence 
will require the jury to decide whether or not the defendant’s conduct departed 
to such an extent from what could reasonably be expected that it should be 
considered criminal.  In R v Adomako Lord Mackay commented on the circularity 
of this approach but was satisfied that it was a correct test of how far conduct 
must depart from what would be considered acceptable to what would be 
judged criminal. Whether it is, as Mackay suggests, the correct approach or not, 
determining if a gross breach of a duty of care has occurred will not be an easy 
task for any jury.  Almond points out that “…the requirement that the 
management of corporate activities should amount to a gross breach of a duty of 
care allows for uncertainty to exist over exactly how bad a breach must be to be 
gross…”600  although Section 8 of the Act provides a number of factors for the 
jury to consider when determining whether or not the actions of the organisation 
amount to a gross breach of their duty of care to the victim.  
Section 8 of the Act requires the jury, when determining if there has been a 
gross breach of duty, to consider whether the organisation failed to comply with 
any health and safety legislation relating to the breach of duty and if so, how 
serious that failure was, and how much of a risk of death it posed.  Griffin 
suggested that determining how serious the failure was and how much of a risk 
to death it posed “…will require the jury to navigate a number of problematical 
questions of interpretation…”.601 When considering the extent of the 
organisation’s failure, the jury can have regard to any health and safety 
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guidance relevant to the alleged breach of duty including Approved Codes of 
Practice, industry standards, and any other guidance thought appropriate in the 
circumstances.  The jury can also have regard to any other matters they think 
relevant.  As discussed previously, the Act is not health and safety legislation 
and its application is wider than deaths arising from work activities, whether to 
employees or anyone else, but section 8 specifically refers to the failure of an 
organisation to comply with health and safety legislation.  Whilst this may assist 
the jury in cases where the death has arisen from workplace accidents, it may 
be of little benefit in non-work related deaths and there is a danger that the 
2007 Act will be seen as an extension of health and safety legislation. 
The jury can also take into account how far the attitudes, policies, systems or 
accepted practices contributed to or encouraged the failure or developed a 
tolerance to it.  This introduces the concept of organisational or corporate 
culture and the phrase “…including cultural issues within the organisation…” is 
used in the explanatory notes.602  Before an organisation can be found guilty of 
the offence of corporate manslaughter, it must be shown that the death or 
deaths arose due to the way the senior management managed or organised its 
activities (S1(3)), that is, it must be shown that the culture of the organisation 
was in the main responsible for the fatality.   The concept of culture is now well 
established in the field of health and safety and is typically defined as an 
organisation’s “…appropriate behaviour, bonds and motivates individuals and 
asserts solutions where there is ambiguity”.603  Wells suggests that corporate 
culture can be “…found in an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or 
practice within the corporate body…”.604  The culture of organisations has 
frequently been identified as the root cause of many of the accidents discussed 
previously in this Chapter, including Piper Alpha, the Herald of Free Enterprise 
and the Clapham Train Crash but obtaining information on a corporation’s 
culture at any point in time, or the culture of a division or group within a large 
organisation, could prove difficult.605 
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For an organisation to be guilty of an offence, the way its “senior management” 
manages or organises its activities must be a substantial element of the 
circumstances leading to the victim’s death.606  “Senior management” is defined 
as persons who play a significant role in making decisions about how the whole 
or a substantial part of the organisations activities are managed or organised, or 
the actual managing or organising of the whole or substantial part of the 
organisations activities, in effect, the corporate culture of the organisation.  
Almond expressed some concern about this focus on senior management, 
suggesting that it could cause the identification principle to endure since it 
would be necessary to identify the senior manager(s) responsible the 
organisation or management of its activities in order to demonstrate that the 
actions of senior management were a significant element of the offence.607  
Almond’s view is supported by Clough who goes on to suggest that larger 
organisations may delegate the health and safety responsibility to “…non-senior 
level managers…” although this is more difficult than it may appear for the 
reasons discussed below.608  Clough also suggests activities that may fall under 
the responsibility of senior management in a small organisation may be at a 
much lower level in a large organisation resulting in the Act having a 
disproportionate effect on them.   
The Explanatory Notes to the Act state that management failure “need not have 
been the sole cause of death; it need only be a cause…”609  but this is qualified 
by the need to show it was a “substantial element” in the circumstances giving 
rise to the offence.  This makes the liability of the organisation conditional 
rather than absolute and allows employers the defence of “the break of chain of 
causation” where an employee may have been the immediate cause of the 
accident through their own actions contrary to the organisation’s instructions.610   
If it could be reasonably expected that employees may ignore or contravene any 
such instructions, or there was inadequate supervision, this could indicate a poor 
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safety culture and the organisation could still be found guilty of the offence of 
corporate manslaughter/corporate homicide.  In the case of English v Wilsons & 
Clyde Coal Co Ltd, Lord Wright concluded that employers had a duty "…which is 
personal to the employer, to take reasonable care for the safety of his workmen, 
whether the employer be an individual, a firm or a company and whether or not 
the employer takes any share in the conduct of the operations…” which has been 
construed as meaning that health and safety duties cannot be delegated.611  It is 
not enough for an organisation to put a safe system of work or other safety 
measures in place, they must ensure that they are properly implemented.  The 
consequences of requiring the offence to have a substantial element attributed 
to the way senior management organises or manages its activities will only be 
known when cases similar to Piper Alpha, the Herald of Free Enterprise or the 
Larkhall gas explosion (and others) occur at some point in the future. In all of 
these cases (and many others), management failures were identified as 
substantial elements of the circumstances leading to the accidents.  
Section 2(1(d)) of the Act deals specifically with people who could be considered 
in the care of the State at the time of death and Section 2(2) goes on to list the 
categories that this part of the Act applies to include:-persons detained in prison 
or similar institution, a police station or a custody area in a court; persons 
detained at a removal centre or holding facility; a person being transported or 
held for transport as part of a prison or immigration escort arrangement; a 
person living in secure accommodation; a detained patient.  The application of 
the Act to these categories led Gobert to suggest that prisons could be 
prosecuted for deaths in custody arising from inadequate staffing levels caused 
by budgetary constraints imposed by government.612  Ormerod  and Taylor took a 
different view and stated “If the death is attributable to a resourcing issue the 
duty of care will be one relating to a decision on a matter of public policy and 
therefore be totally excluded by s.3(1)”.613  This section has not been tested at 
the time of writing and when, or if, it is, it will almost certainly be contentious 
since resourcing issues may or may not be a matter of public policy and only 
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when it is, will the public authority be excluded as a consequence of S.3(1).  
This section states that any duty owed by a public authority which is subject to 
public policy (the Act specifically makes mention of the allocation of public 
resources) will not be a relevant duty of care.  While the debate about whether 
or not public authorities should be exempt from the Act will continue, this will 
make their prosecution for corporate manslaughter more difficult than would 
otherwise be the case, particularly in times of budgetary cutbacks imposed by 
central government.  There will, however, be a difference between resource 
allocation as a consequence of public policy and resource allocation as a 
consequence of local budgetary decisions. 
Section 3 goes on to exclude any duty of care owed in respect the carrying out 
an “exclusively public function” or inspections in the exercise of a statutory 
function.  The exclusion of these two categories is qualified and where the duty 
of care falls under S.2(1)(a), (b) or (d), i.e., owed to employees and other 
persons working for it, or owed as the occupier of premises or to persons in the 
care of an organisation, it will still be “a relevant duty of care”.  This means 
that only the duty owed in terms of S.2(1)(c) will be subject to the “exclusively 
public function” exclusion.  The exclusion on the basis of “exclusively public 
function” was commented upon in the Home Affairs and Work and Pensions 
Committee Report with some witnesses to its inquiry suggesting that it 
introduced Crown Immunity by the back door.614  Perhaps of more concern was 
the lack of clarity in what was meant by “exclusively public function” with the 
Committee identifying both a narrow and broad interpretation of what it would 
include.  The Committee recommended that this exclusion should be removed 
and if it was to be retained, a much clearer definition of what it included should 
be provided.  Neither of these recommendations was accepted by the 
Government and the “exclusively public function” exclusion and its 
interpretation remained unchanged in the Act.  The Explanatory Notes to the Act 
discuss the concept of “exclusively public function” but other than to give the 
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example of the Government providing services in the event of civil emergency, it 
does not clarify what the exclusion would or would not include.615   
Sections 3 to 7 of the Act deal with branches of government at both local and 
national levels and in effect exempts some or all of the activities carried on by 
them from prosecution under the Act.  Section 3 has already been discussed and 
deals primarily with the relationship between public policy decisions, exclusive 
public functions and statutory inspections and the “relevant duty of care”.  The 
other significant exemptions include certain types of military activities such as 
peacekeeping operations, anti-terrorism actions, civil unrest and serious public 
disorder where members of the armed services come under attack or the threat 
of attack or violence.  Hazardous training is also excluded from “relevant duty of 
care”.  Outside these exclusions, the Ministry of Defence may still be prosecuted 
in terms of the Act for corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide where it 
can be shown that it has failed in its duty as an employer or occupier.  An 
interesting exception to this is any duty of care owed by the Ministry of Defence 
to any member of the special forces is not a “relevant duty of care”, as Ormerod  
and Taylor observed, so far as special forces are concerned “everything is off 
limits”.616 
Described by Ormerod and Taylor as “complex”, there are similar exemptions, 
for the police contained in Section 5 of the Act.617  Section 5(1) and (2) make 
any duty of care arising from certain types of operations described below, 
including their preparation and support, not a “relevant duty of care” and are 
absolutely excluded under these specific circumstances.  These operations 
include counter-terrorism, civil unrest or serious disorder.  This would suggest 
that the police would not be subject to corporate manslaughter or corporate 
homicide charges should a case similar to that of Jean Charles de Menezes recur 
in the future, although individual officers could still face manslaughter charges.  
De Menezes was shot to death by firearms officers of the Metropolitan Police 
who wrongly suspected him of being a terrorist and subsequent investigations by 
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the Independent Police Complaints Commission identified a catalogue of errors 
at almost every level of the Police operation and made recommendations to the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).618  In a subsequent press release, a CPS senior 
lawyer, Stephen O’Doherty confirmed that although charges of murder, 
manslaughter, forgery and health and safety offences were considered, only the 
health and safety offences would be pursued. 619  The Metropolitan Police was 
subsequently found guilty for offences in terms of the Health and Safety at Work 
etc. Act 1974 in respect of the killing of de Menezes and fined £175 000 with 
£385 000 in costs awarded against it.  Should a police officer die whilst on an 
anti-terrorist operation as a direct consequence of inadequate training, 
instruction or protective equipment, the only possible prosecution that could be 
brought against the employing police force would be in terms of the health and 
safety legislation, unless an individual(s) was prosecuted for gross negligence 
manslaughter. 
Section 5(3) of the Act introduces a narrower exclusion but for a wider range of 
general police or law enforcement activities in so far as any duty of care is not a 
“relevant duty of care” unless it falls under Section 2(1)(a), (b) or (d), that is, 
those subsections dealing with the duty to employees and members of the 
public, duty as occupier and duty to persons under its care.   This means that 
any death arising as a consequence of the pursuit of law enforcement activities 
will be excluded from the offence of corporate manslaughter or corporate 
homicide, as made clear in the Explanatory Notes to the Act.620  The Explanatory 
Notes give examples where this exclusion will apply including “…decisions about 
and responses to emergency calls, the manner in which particular police 
operations are conducted, the way in which law enforcement and other coercive 
powers are exercised, measures taken to protect witnesses and the arrest and 
detention of suspects”.  This section extends beyond just police forces and 
applies to other public authorities with statutory functions such as the 
Immigration and Border Agency, Customs and Excise, and so on.  As with the 
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armed forces, police forces could still be prosecuted under the Act in respect of 
their duties as employer or occupier so long as these duties do not fall under the 
exemptions stated above and individuals could be prosecuted for gross 
negligence manslaughter.   
Section 6 of the Act exempts the emergency services from the offence of 
corporate manslaughter only in respect in the way in which they respond to 
emergency situations.  This exemption is much more limited than for either the 
police or armed services and focuses on the speed of response to emergencies 
and how they are subsequently dealt with.  The Act will still apply in respect of 
medical treatment but not the order in which persons are given treatment, i.e., 
triage carried out at the site of the emergency would still be exempt from the 
Act.  Failures in vehicle maintenance, training, etc., directly resulting in death 
even if it did occur during an emergency response could still result in a charge of 
corporate manslaughter being laid against the emergency service.   
Horder expressed a number of reservations over the exemptions afforded in 
general, but seems to be particularly concerned in respect of those for the 
military and the police.621  He suggested that exempting these organisations 
from prosecution for corporate manslaughter may make it more likely that 
individual police officers and service men and women will be prosecuted for 
gross negligence manslaughter since there will be no alternatives for 
prosecutors.  Holder also suggested that these exemptions could encourage the 
police and, more likely, the military to ignore all health and safety 
considerations when planning certain types of operations.  He went on to say 
that “…There is a case for saying that the exemption is undesirable and 
unnecessary” at least partly on the grounds that any prosecution would require 
the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Procurator Fiscal which 
would result in the public interest test being applied. 
The final major exemption from the Act is child protection and probation 
functions, and are not particularly contentious.  Section 7 extends partial 
exemption from the Act in respect of the duty of care owed by a relevant 
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authority in terms of Parts 4 and 5 of the Children Act 1989, and its equivalent in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland.  A similar exemption is extended to the 
probations services in terms of the duty of care owed in terms of The Criminal 
Justice and Court Services Act 2000.   The exemption from the Act described in 
Section 7 does not include the duty of care owed as employers, occupiers of 
premises and relating to detention (in the case of probation boards).  These will 
still fall under the category “relevant duty of care” and as such, a breach of 
them resulting in a death could still be prosecuted in terms of the Act. 
The penalties for offences will be discussed in detail in the next section but the 
final few sections of the 2007 Act are mainly administrative in nature and have 
been touched upon elsewhere in this Chapter.  Sections 11 to 14 expand upon 
the application of the Act to specific categories of organisations, including 
Crown bodies, the armed forces and police forces.  The exemptions previously 
discussed notwithstanding, the Act will generally apply to these organisations.  
Section 14 extends the Act to partnerships, which are to be treated as bodies 
corporate. 
One significant departure from the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 is 
the process for proceedings for an offence in England and Wales. The Director of 
Public Prosecution’s consent must be obtained (in Northern Ireland, the Director 
of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland) prior to proceedings being initiated.  
It is very unlikely that this will have a significant effect; given the serious nature 
of the circumstances that could lead to a possible prosecution in terms of the 
2007 Act, it is unlikely that an Inspector in England and Wales would prosecute 
in the magistrates’ court as allowed by the 1974 Act in similar circumstances. 622  
In Scotland, the Lord Advocate instigates all proceedings on indictment negating 
the need for a consent mechanism which would normally ensure that there is a 
reasonable chance of a successful prosecution and that it is in the public interest 
to pursue one. 
The Act prohibits any individual liability for the offence of corporate 
manslaughter or corporate homicide although the charge of gross negligence 
manslaughter can still be brought against individuals held responsible for the 
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deaths of others.  The individual offences included in health and safety 
legislation as discussed in Sections 3 and 5 of this paper will also still apply.  
Prosecutions can be taken under both the 2007 Act and relevant health and 
safety legislation in respect of the same set of circumstances. 
Finally, the Act abolishes the common law offence of manslaughter by gross 
negligence in its application to corporations and other organisations to which the 
new offence applies. 
 
5.6 Penalties 
All criminal enactments in a sense serve the double purpose of singling 
out wrongdoers for the purpose of punishment or correction and of 
regulating the social order.623 
The penalties available for corporate wrongdoing cannot be exactly the same as 
those for individuals found guilty of unlawful activity, for example, a corporation 
cannot be imprisoned.  The impact of even a large fine on a corporation will be 
different from a small fine imposed upon an individual who is personally 
responsible for paying it, whereas any fine imposed upon a corporation will 
ultimately be paid by clients, customers or shareholders.  If the 2007 Act is to 
have any impact upon organisations, penalties that have real implications for 
offending corporations must be available to the courts.  Before the nature of 
punishment can be discussed, it is necessary to consider whether a corporation 
can actually be punished, rather than it deserving of punishment.  The effective 
punishment of corporate crime has been identified as serious problem by many 
commentators; before going on to suggest a number of approaches to address 
the perceived difficulties of punishing corporations, Coffee restated the general 
view that “…the problem of corporate punishment seems perversely insoluble: 
moderate fines do not deter, while severe penalties flow through the corporate 
shell and fall on the relatively blameless”.624 Various penalties can be imposed 
upon corporate law breakers but whether or not a non-sentient entity in the 
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form of a corporation can be effectively ‘punished’ will always be questioned, 
no matter how severe the penalty.   
Before addressing how a corporation can be effectively punished, the purpose of 
punishment must be considered and this will normally include one or more of 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation.  Retribution or 
deterrence can be considered the more traditional goal(s) (although 
incapacitation and rehabilitation may have a role to play even in the case of 
corporate crime) and while there have been centuries’ worth of debate on which 
is most appropriate, effective or even fairest, an element of both will inevitably 
be a consequence of any penalty imposed upon conviction, particularly when it 
comes to corporate crime.625  At their most basic, deterrence is intended to 
prevent crime occurring in the future while retribution is a form of retaliation 
for crimes already committed.  Reflecting on some of the major accidents 
discussed previously, such as the Herald of Free Enterprise, the Southall and 
Hatfield train crashes and the Larkhall gas explosion, it must be assumed that 
there would be a desire for punishment as just deserts (and possibly even 
revenge) as well as acting as a deterrence for organisations behaving in a similar 
way in the future.  When discussing the minimum term for murder, the Law 
Commission points out that it must be long enough to satisfy the demands of 
both retribution and deterrence thus illustrating the importance of satisfying 
both possible goals of punishment.626 
Gerber and Jackson defined retribution as “…the support of punishment to 
restore justice and balance in society, or as a preference for retaliation and an 
expression of vindictiveness.”627  They went on to define two separate categories 
of retribution; as a mechanism for revenge or for “…restoring a sense of justice 
through proportional compensation from the offender…”, commonly referred to 
as just deserts, although there is a rather fine distinction to be drawn between 
revenge and just deserts.  The debate about the role of retribution as a form of 
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punishment was particularly well illustrated during the gathering of evidence for 
the Home Affairs and Works and Pensions Committees with one contributor 
stating “Retribution—the product of raw emotion—is an illogical and animalistic 
response to misfortune”628 and another suggesting that “Few people would 
disagree that justice requires that corporations be punished where death or 
serious injury results, where the conduct of the corporation has been seriously 
blameworthy in the circumstances. This is the notion of retribution—the 
vindication of the victim(s) in recognition of the violation of their rights.”629 
Khanna suggested that deterrence has, for a number of years, been considered 
the most appropriate and effective purpose of punishment, at least so far as 
corporations are concerned.630 MacAdams went further and stated that “… 
deterrence is the fundamental aim and purpose in holding corporations 
criminally liable”631, supporting an unsigned note in the Harvard Law Review 
which suggested that deterrence is the major goal for corporate criminal 
sanctions but then going on to argue that even where the aim is deterrence, 
rehabilitation or incapacitation, criminal sanctions can only be applied where 
the offender is morally culpable.632  There is an argument to be made that the 
very threat of punishment should be sufficient deterrence for corporations to 
disengage from or avoid unlawful activities so long as the penalties available are 
truly punitive.633    The deterrence effect of a punishment can only be effective 
if it has had a significant negative impact on the organisation (or individual) 
found guilty but Wells suggested that the effectiveness of deterrence must be 
questioned and there is an ethical dimension to imposing severe penalties on one 
corporation pour encourager les autres.634  Slapper and Tombs agreed that 
deterrence is flawed at both a practical level and conceptually when considered 
in the context of “’street’ or ‘traditional’” crime, but went on to suggest that it 
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has “considerable potential” in sanctioning corporate crime.635  Another problem 
with the deterrence theory is the possibility that if the penalty is relatively 
insignificant, it could encourage unlawful activity by similar organisations since 
it will present insufficient incentive for them to change their behaviour.636 
Incapacitation and rehabilitation both belong to the utilitarian theory of 
punishment, along with deterrence, but probably have less of a role to play in 
the punishment of corporations than retribution and deterrence although either 
may be intended or unintended consequences of any penalty imposed.   
In many respects, the debate on whether punishment for corporate crime serves 
the purpose of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation is less 
important than its potential for modifying corporate behaviour to reduce 
accidents and illness.  Fisse identified three desired outcomes from the threat of 
punishment of corporations; the adoption of sound policies of compliance, the 
activation of existing internal disciplinary procedures and the activation of 
preventive operating procedures, all of which should serve to prevent corporate 
offending.637  When considering statutes enacted for the purposes of addressing 
various forms of corporate criminality, an unsigned note in the Harvard Law 
Review proposed that they were not intended primarily to punish “…morally 
culpable violators…”, but to deter criminal or otherwise undesirable behaviour, 
which goes back to the deterrence theory of punishment.638  When the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 is considered in the context of 
the debate on the purpose of punishment, deterrence must be considered the 
primary aim but the threat of retribution in the event of a corporation being 
found guilty of an offence, or just deserts, will always be a consideration.  How 
effective either deterrence or rehabilitation can ever be is questionable when 
there is continuing debate over whether corporations can ever be effectively 
punished, irrespective of the penalty imposed. 
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Schlegel identified fines as the most common approach to punishing corporate 
crime and the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 does 
not move too far from that form of punishment with the main penalty for any 
organisation found guilty of the offence being an unlimited fine.639   Since this 
penalty can already be imposed in respect of contraventions health and safety 
legislation (for example, Transco fined £15 million following a gas explosion in 
Scotland), there does not appear to be any additional financial deterrent 
introduced by the Act.  Offences in terms of the Act are indictable only in the 
High Court of Justiciary although given the severity of the offence that is 
probably not surprising.  The Sentencing Guidelines Council suggests that the 
offence of corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide will normally be more 
serious than a health and safety offence because of the “gross breach at a senior 
level”.640  That being the case, the proposed level of fine will typically be at 
least £500 000 and could be “measured in millions of pounds”.  In comparison, 
the Sentencing Guidelines Council proposes that for health and safety offences 
resulting in fatality, the fine would seldom be less than £100 000 and could be 
measured in hundreds of thousands or more.  These guidelines could have the 
unintended consequence of reducing the level of fines currently imposed in 
respect of health and safety offences, irrespective of whether or not deaths 
have occurred as a result.  Multi-million pound fines for health and safety 
offences have become increasingly common and fines into the hundreds of 
thousands of pounds are no longer unusual.  The Sentencing Guidelines Council 
would appear to imply that fines of this level are inappropriate for health and 
safety offences by suggesting that even for serious offences, they should be in 
the hundreds of thousands rather than millions. 
On 13th November 2014, the Sentencing Guidelines Council published a 
consultation paper for sentencing health and safety, food safety and corporate 
manslaughter and corporate homicide offences.641  The previous Sentencing 
Council Guidelines published in 2010 covered only corporate manslaughter, 
corporate homicide and health and safety offences resulting in death.  In 
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addition to the inclusion of food safety offences, the consultation document 
proposed extending the guidelines to include all health and safety offences, 
irrespective of the harm done and also offences committed by individuals.  When 
discussing the level of fine to be set, the Sentencing Council reiterated the 
criteria laid down in Section 164 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 where first and 
foremost, the seriousness of the offence must be reflected, but it must also take 
into account the financial circumstances of the offender.642  According to the 
Sentencing Council consultation paper, any fine must “…remove any economic 
gain…” and must have a real economic impact on the organisation, sufficient to 
persuade management and shareholders of the need to comply with legislation 
intended to protect workers and members of the public. 
Before going on to discuss the proposals contained in the Sentencing Council 
consultation paper in more detail, it is worth reflecting on the use of fines to 
punish corporate crime.  Coffee pointed out that the maximum meaningful fine 
imposed upon any company would be limited by its wealth, suggesting that a 
small company is no more threatened by a fine of $5 million than one of $500 
000, if it would be unable to pay either.643  He described this as the wealth 
boundary, above which there is no deterrent effect, irrespective of the size of 
the fine but as discussed previously, the fine must be sufficiently large to both 
remove any economic gain and have real impact on the organisation.  When the 
minimum fine recommended by the Sentencing Council for corporate 
manslaughter and corporate homicide offences “…will be seldom less than £500 
000 and may be measured in millions…”, the wealth boundary proposed by 
Coffee could very well be exceeded for small companies thus removing the 
deterrent effect of the fine.  Whilst it could be argued that the Sentencing 
Council did attempt to address the criticism raised by Wells, Clarkson, Slapper 
and Tombs644 and many others in respect of the low level of fines that had 
typically been imposed previously following fatal workplace accidents, fines as 
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effective punishment for corporate crime are called into question by many 
commentators.   
In the absence of any real alternative, it is inevitable that fines will remain the 
most commonly applied penalty for corporate crime but the consultation 
document published by the Sentencing Council demonstrates continued attempts 
to try to achieve an optimum level that could be applied consistently for similar 
types of offences.  In their draft guidelines published in 2014, the Sentencing 
Council recognised that in some cases (but, importantly, not all), the fines 
issued were too low to achieve the aims of sentencing and there was some 
inconsistency in respect of how the various factors were applied.645  It went on 
to suggest that its draft proposals would result in higher fines, particularly for 
the more serious offences committed by large organisations but less serious 
offences and offences committed by small organisations and individuals would 
generally remain at similar levels.  This recognised that the ability to pay must 
be an important factor when determining an appropriate level of fine.  The draft 
guidelines were a much more detailed approach to setting fines than the 2010 
Guidelines, with four different categories of companies based on turnover and 
described as Large, Medium, Small and Micro.  There were two categories of 
offence for each group, A and B, and for each offence category, a starting point 
and category range.  For example, the starting point for a Category A Offence 
for a Micro company would be £450 000 with a category range of between £270 
000 - £800 000, whereas for a Category A offence committed by a large 
company, the starting point would be £7 500 000 and the category range would 
be £4 800 000 - £20 000 000.646  Although there is a starting point indicated for 
each size of company and category offence, the court will still have discretion to 
impose a penalty well below that starting point.  The proposed starting points 
and category ranges are well above those in the 2010 Sentencing Guidelines for 
large and medium companies and above those proposed for small companies.  
Only Micro companies had a proposed range of fines slightly less than those 
recommended in the 2010 Guidelines.  It is worth noting that by the start of 
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2015, the only prosecutions taken under the 2007 Act have been taken against 
small or micro-sized companies. 
Fines for health and safety offences follow a similar but even more detailed 
process based once again on the turnover, but for each category of company, 
the culpability is classified as into very high, high, medium and low, with each 
classification further broken down into four separate categories of harm.  This 
results in sixty-four separate starting points and sixty-four category ranges for 
the level of fines for health and safety offences committed by organisations 
based on the size of the company, culpability and harm.647  The Sentencing 
Council proposals would result in fines ranging from £50 for the lowest range of 
fine for the lowest degree of harm and lowest level of culpability for a micro 
company, up to £10 million for the highest range of fine for the highest degree 
of culpability and the highest degree of harm.  That level of fine exceeds the 
target level of £7 500 000 set for a corporate manslaughter offence committed 
by a large company.  The Sentencing Council also proposed guidelines for health 
and safety offences committed by individuals and once again, there is a very 
detailed process proposed for sentencing based upon the culpability of the 
individual (deliberate, reckless, negligent, low culpability) and for each degree 
of culpability, four categories of harm, resulting in sixteen separate starting 
points and sixteen category ranges.  Penalties could include custodial sentences, 
community orders and fines based on a percentage of relative weekly income.  
The lowest fine category proposed would be 25% - 75% of relevant weekly 
income with a normal starting point of 50% (Band A) and the highest fine would 
be 500 – 700% of relevant weekly income with a normal starting point of 600%.  
Custodial sentences would range from twenty-six weeks for low culpability 
offence with a Harm Category of 1, and up to two years for a deliberate offence 
with a Harm Category of 1.  With the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 
introducing a much wider range of offences to the possibility of custodial 
sentences, the Sentencing Council proposed guidelines could result in a far 
larger number of individuals being imprisoned for health and safety offences. 
As discussed previously, fines are by far the most common penalties imposed 
upon organisations found guilty of corporate crime but the 2007 Act introduces 




additional penalties, namely remedial and publicity orders.  An apparently 
uncontroversial measure, remedial orders were introduced by Section 9 of the 
Act giving the court the powers to require any organisation guilty of an offence 
to remedy the relevant breach, to remedy matters arising from the breach that 
appear to the court to be the cause of death, and any deficiencies in the 
organisation’s health and safety policies, systems or practices.  The prosecution 
may make an application for a remedial order and if it is granted by the court, it 
must specify a time by which the measures contained in the order are to be 
complied with and may require the organisation to provide the enforcement 
authority with evidence that it has been complied with.  It is an indictable-only 
offence to fail to comply with a remedial order and the penalty, if found guilty, 
is an unlimited fine.  Remedial orders could be considered analogous to 
rehabilitation, in so far as they require the corporation to ‘make good’ and avoid 
committing the offence in the future.  Gobert suggested that correction of the 
circumstances leading to the offence being committed “…is so crucial that a 
remedial/rehabilitative probation condition should be virtually automatic unless 
the company could show that it had already taken adequate steps to prevent a 
reoccurrence of the offence.”648   
Remedial orders are not new in the context of workplace health and safety, 
Section 42 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 gives the courts the 
power to make an order remedying the matters giving rise to an offence for 
which a person has been convicted in addition to, or instead of any other 
penalty.  This does not appear to have been a power extensively used by the 
courts; a search of the Health and Safety Executive prosecutions database does 
not reveal any successful prosecutions where an order to remedy matters giving 
rise to the offence has been made.  It is likely that Improvement Notices served 
in terms of Section 21 of the 1974 Act have been used in preference to remedial 
orders as a more effective and efficient way of achieving appropriate remedy 
which makes Section 42 rather superfluous.   
Perhaps of more interest and with more potential in the punishment of 
corporate offenders is the publicity order introduced by Section 10 of the 2007 
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Act which allows the court to make an order requiring an organisation which has 
been successfully prosecuted for corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide 
to publicise that fact in a specified manner.  The “Publicity Order” can include 
the conviction, details of the offence, the level of fine imposed and the 
requirements of any remedial order imposed.  Before a publicity order is made, 
the court must consult with any relevant enforcement authority and take into 
account any representations made by the prosecution or by the defence on 
behalf of the guilty organisation.  The order must specify the period within 
which the order is to be complied with and the organisation may be required to 
supply any relevant enforcement authority with evidence, within a specified 
period of time that the order has been complied with.  As with Remedial Orders, 
failure to comply with a Publicity Order is punishable by unlimited fine.   
The purpose of a publicity order can only be to attach some form of stigma to 
corporate offending with the intention of encouraging it to modify its behaviour 
with Fisse suggesting that such an order is “…perhaps the quintessentially 
stigmatic corporate sanction…”.649  Ormerod and Taylor noted that the ability to 
make Publicity Orders was added to the Bill during its passage through the Lords 
on the basis that bad publicity may be more of a threat to large organisations 
than unlimited fines.650 Fisse and Braithwaite, after examining a number of high 
profile cases where publicity orders or similar had been made, concluded that 
they can be effective in some circumstances but should be “prominent” in the 
“armory of sanctions” available to courts.651  Schlegel was much less enthusiastic 
about the use of adverse publicity as punishment for corporate crime on the 
basis that its actual impact on corporations had not been established and it 
could not be shown to be either proportionate or commensurate.652  For these 
reasons, Schlegel did not consider adverse publicity to be an appropriate 
punishment for corporate crime and there must be some question over whether 
or not it will really have any long term impact on corporate behaviour. In her 
research into administrative sanctions for offences committed in the Dutch 
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financial sector, van Erp found that small organisations were disproportionally 
affected when compared to larger organisations with the latter having more 
resource to defend themselves against publicity orders or similar sanctions.653  
She went on to describe publicity as a “messy sanction” suggesting that 
“…effects are arbitrary and may turn out to be disproportional in terms of the 
severity of the underlying offense”. 
 
5.7 The Controversy 
The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 has had a difficult 
and rather lengthy gestation and in its final form, is not without controversy.654  
The whole purpose of the Act has been called into question;  for example, 
before going on to generally welcome the Act, Ormerod and Taylor suggested 
that some commentators may view it as “…making a symbolic statement about 
corporate responsibility, which it will struggle to fulfil in practice…” further 
suggesting that any corporate manslaughter cases would be far from 
straightforward.655  It would be difficult to be more dismissive of the 2007 Act 
than Wells who prefixed it with the descriptor “…curdled sauce…” having 
previously expressed some concern that the focus on ‘senior management 
failure’ retained an “…affinity with identification liability…” which was the main 
reason for the failure of corporate gross negligence manslaughter cases prior to 
its introduction.656  Gobert did not quite go as far as Wells in associating 
‘management failure’ with the identification doctrine, but he did suggest that 
proving management failure was the cause of the death would be much easier to 
achieve in a small organisation than in a large one.657  Ormerod and Taylor also 
commented on the need to associate the deaths, at least in part, with the 
“relative contribution” of an individual or group of individuals at senior 
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management level but they described the process of doing so as a “qualified 
aggregation principal”.658  What is clear is that it is not enough to demonstrate 
that a death arose from work activities as a consequence of corporate failure; it 
will still be necessary to show that a group of individuals also failed in some 
respect to prevent the death from occurring. 
One of the most significant omissions from the Act and one that received 
significant criticism was the prosecution of individual directors and other senior 
managers which met with disappointment in many quarters and ran contrary to 
the original proposals contained in the Home Office consultation document.659  
In addition to taking action against individual directors or senior managers in 
relation to the offence of corporate manslaughter, the consultation document 
proposed that individuals who could be shown to be responsible for a person’s 
death should be disqualified from acting in a management role in Great Britain.  
The pressure group, Families Against Corporate Killers, in one of the more 
extreme responses to the publication of the bill suggested that it was “fatally 
flawed” in so far as it did not hold any individual liable and what they described 
as “the only penalty” was an unlimited fine which already existed for breaches 
of existing health and safety legislation.660  Wright also pointed out that the 
2007 Act holds corporations to account for deaths arising from their activities, 
but not the individuals within the corporation whose negligence, consent or 
connivance resulted in the offence being committed although, as discussed a 
previously, they could still be guilty of the offence of gross negligence 
manslaughter.661   
One interesting, and almost certainly unintended, consequence of the exclusion 
of individual liability in the 2007 Act was pointed out by Antrobus who argued 
that, on the increasingly popular assumption that targeting the individuals who 
run the business is more of a deterrent than targeting the business itself, the 
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authorities may develop a more aggressive approach to pursuing gross negligence 
manslaughter charges against individual directors in addition to any corporate 
manslaughter or corporate homicide charges laid against their companies.662 The 
Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 also provides additional opportunity for 
custodial sentences to be imposed on individuals at all levels of an organisation 
following breaches of the health and safety legislation.  The exclusion of 
individual liability from the 2007 Act could result in a more imaginative 
approach to obtaining custodial sentences for senior managers but once again, 
small organisations will be much more affected by this possible change in 
prosecution strategy. 
In some respects, the failure to extend the Act to include individuals along the 
lines discussed previously perpetuates the two-tier approach that existed prior 
to its introduction.  Directors and senior managers of large organisations will, to 
all intents and purposes, be exempt from criminal liability, at least for 
manslaughter or culpable homicide, while similar individuals in small 
organisations are still likely to be charged for common law offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter or culpable homicide, whether or not their 
organisations are charged with corporate manslaughter and, as will be discussed 
below, this has proved to be the case.  The Act seems to have introduced little 
additional incentive for company executives to take a greater interest in health 
and safety although the symbolic importance of the legislation should not be 
ignored. Almond suggested that the Act’s main failing is that it is “…too 
corporate in nature to impact meaningfully on the individual decisions of 
directors and not corporate enough to herald a true sea change in the law”.663  
On the face of it, there is little for large organisations to fear from the 
introduction of this Act although the threat of a Publicity Order may focus the 
minds of some senior executives.  Although not intended as a response to the 
crime of manslaughter, the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 introduced 
the possibility of custodial sentences for a wide range of health and safety 
offences including those where deaths occurred as a result.  As a consequence of 
the 2008 Act, it is possible that company directors, chief executives and other 
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senior managers could be imprisoned for up to two years where deaths arise 
from work activities even where there is insufficient evidence for either 
corporate or gross negligence manslaughter.  The relationship between the 2007 
and 2008 Acts will be discussed further in the Conclusions. 
Some commentators have also suggested that the focus on deaths arising from 
work activities is too narrow.  Although death is obviously the most severe of all 
the possible outcomes from corporate behaviour it is still, in statistical terms, 
relatively uncommon particularly when compared to the incidence of serious 
injury or ill-health.  In 2013/14, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) recorded 
133 fatal accidents to workers (including self-employed) and a further 264 
accidents to members of the public arising from work activities (including 194 
relating to incidents on railways).664 Although each fatality will have a 
devastating impact on friends and family, the UK record for fatal accidents is 
generally good when compared to other countries but death is only one possible 
consequence of incidents in the workplace.  A range of injuries and diseases are 
required to be reported to the Health and Safety Executive in terms of the 
Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations and in 
2013/14, the HSE recorded 18 877 “Major or Specific Injuries” and 58 716 “Over-
7-day Injuries” and it should be noted that the HSE suspects that fewer than half 
of all non-fatal injuries are actually reported even though it is an offence not to 
do so.665  These statistics would tend to support Gobert’s proposal that a crime 
of corporate grievous bodily harm would be much more effective in encouraging 
organisations to review and perhaps change their safety culture.666 
Although much more difficult to associate with a particular activity or employer, 
occupational illness and disease accounts for many more fatalities each year 
than workplace accidents.  The HSE estimates that in 2013/14, 13 000 people 
died as a consequence of respiratory illness or cancer caused by workplace 
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exposure to substances or chemicals and a further 1.2 million were made ill.667  
Although the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 does not 
preclude prosecution for deaths arising from occupational illness and disease, it 
is difficult to see how the Act can be applied in many such circumstances.  The 
chronic nature of most of these diseases and the potentially long incubation 
periods between exposure and symptoms appearing (up to fifty years in the case 
of mesothelioma caused by exposure to asbestos fibres), will make it almost 
impossible for the police or Crown Prosecution Service to build a case against 
organisations held responsible for deaths arising from chronic exposure to 
substances.  That is not to say that all illness and disease would be excluded 
from prosecution under the 2007 Act; there have been successful prosecutions 
under the 1974 Act taken against organisations held responsible for deaths 
arising from Legionnaires ’ disease and while there have been no prosecutions 
for corporate manslaughter in these circumstances, so long as the sources of the 
bacteria can be identified and deaths have arisen as a consequence of exposure, 
there is no reason why such a prosecution would not be successful.  Having said 
that, successful prosecutions where death has occurred as a consequence of 
occupational illness or disease will only ever be an insignificant proportion of the 
total number of deaths they cause each year. 
Prosecution for corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide will be 
undertaken by the Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales and the 
Procurator Fiscal in Scotland following investigations carried out by the police 
supported by the Health and Safety Executive or other relevant enforcing 
authority.  The relationship between the police, the Crown Prosecution Office 
and the Health and Safety Executive (and other enforcing authorities) in 
prosecutions for corporate manslaughter will be fundamental to the effective 
prosecution of the more complicated cases and guidance from the Ministry of 
Justice, whilst making it clear that any investigations for corporate 
manslaughter will be undertaken by the police, they will be expected to call 
upon the expertise of appropriate enforcing authorities, including the Health and 
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Safety Executive.668    Once again, this is contrary to the proposals included in 
the Home Office consultation document which recommended that, at least in 
England and Wales, the Health and Safety Executive and possibly other enforcing 
authorities should investigate and prosecute the new offences in addition to the 
more traditional approach of the police and Crown Prosecution Service 
prosecuting for manslaughter. 669  The main justification for giving the police the 
investigation role for the 2007 Act was the concern expressed that, at least in 
some circumstances, there would be parallel investigations carried out by the 
police and the enforcing authorities but extensive experience had been accrued 
in these exact circumstances prior to the introduction of the 2007 Act.  It was 
relatively common for both police and the appropriate enforcing authority to 
undertake joint investigations in relation to workplace deaths and well-
established protocols were already in place for such occasions.  The guide to the 
Act published by the Ministry of Justice makes reference to a range of protocols 
in existence in the various home nations of the UK to facilitate liaison between 
the police, the Crown Prosecution Service (or equivalent) and the enforcing 
authorities.670  Wright was critical of the decision to allocate the main 
investigatory role for the 2007 Act to the police, pointing out that they may have 
different priorities to the Health and Safety Executive.671  Instead, he proposed 
the establishment of a specialist, multi-disciplinary team to investigate deaths 
arising from work activities.  This proposal does not appear to have been 
discussed elsewhere and there is very little likelihood of it being adopted. 
The inclusion of public bodies, charities and other non-profit making 
organisations has resulted in comment from both sides of the argument.672   
While there may be little sympathy for corporations which profit at the expense 
of safety, there is a question about whether or not it is appropriate to put 
organisations such as hospitals, clinics, trades unions, charities, etc. in the same 
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category. There can be no distinction made between organisations that cause 
death because the profit motive trumps the safety imperative, and the non-
profit organisations that cause death through incompetence, mismanagement, 
underfunding or any other reason. The victim is no less dead and their family no 
less bereaved because they were killed by the failure of a non-profit 
organisation rather than a large, multi-national company and it must be noted 
that at least some of the accidents referred to at the start of this Chapter were 
caused by organisations in the public sector at the time.  It should be noted that 
the breadth of application, in particular to public bodies, has been welcomed by 
some commentators with concern being expressed by the extent of the 
exemptions offered to them.673   
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 is not a 
particularly long piece of legislation and in many respects it is very narrow in its 
application, which could be considered both a strength and weakness, and has 
been seen as such by various commentators.  Its impact on organisations will be 
discussed in detail in the final Chapter but it could be argued that it has 
achieved what it set out to, that is, removed the explicit requirement to satisfy 
the identification doctrine which proved to be such an insurmountable hurdle 
when prosecuting larger organisations for corporate manslaughter.   
As a piece of legislation, it has a number of complex arrangements for 
determining its application, particularly to public bodies, determining whether 
or not a duty of care exists, what constitutes a “gross” breach of the duty of 
care, and so on.  As a number of commentators have observed, except in the 
most straightforward of cases achieving a conviction could prove difficult.  
Although there had been a number of prosecutions by the end of 2015, none of 
them could be described as contentious or difficult.  It is fair to say that the 
2007 Act has not been subjected to any extreme tests.  
                                        




Perhaps a more fundamental question is how the 2007 Act is a significant 
improvement upon the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, particularly 
following the introduction of the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 with 
unlimited fines and the option of custodial sentences for individuals found guilty 
of an offence.  As discussed previously in this Chapter, the 2007 Act is not health 
and safety legislation but there would be very few circumstances where the 
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 would not apply, at least to some 
extent.  Obviously the health and safety legislation does not include a 
manslaughter offence but perhaps it is not the punishment of organisations for 
manslaughter that was the main cause for concern following the accidents 
discussed previously in this Chapter, but the apparent immunity of the senior 
managers of these organisations not just from the charge of manslaughter, but 
any individual responsibility for their occurrence.  The 2007 Act does not address 
this particular concern, indeed it explicitly excludes individuals from the offence 
of corporate manslaughter and whilst the common law offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter can still be used, senior managers in the largest 
organisations would almost certainly be shielded from the offence by the layers 
of management between them and the accident whereas similar post-holders in 
the smallest organisations would be exposed to the charge.  In this particular 
respect, the 2007 Act cannot be considered an effective remedy. 
The next Chapter will examine the nature of crime and regulation in more detail 
and in particular, the continuing debate over what is ‘true’ crime and what is 
regulatory, and whether or not there is any actual difference between them.  In 
many respects, as a piece of ‘true’ criminal law, the 2007 Act addresses some of 
the perceptions held by some people in the legal field that health and safety is a 
regulatory issue, rather than criminal.  Whether or not it makes any difference 





6.0 Crime and Regulation 
6.1 Introduction 
Towards the end of the twentieth century and start of the twenty-first, there 
was a consensus that the regulatory approach to workplace safety was failing to 
effectively punish large organisations held responsible for causing deaths as a 
consequence of their activities - corporate killing.  This perception was at least 
partly attributable to the regulatory nature of health and safety legislation 
where breaches were not considered to carry the same stigma as ‘true’ criminal 
offences.  Its emphasis on prevention rather than punishment or retribution 
could also be attributed to its regulatory nature.  The use of the common law 
offences of gross negligence manslaughter and culpable homicide proved no 
more successful, at least against larger organisations.  This, perhaps inevitably, 
led to the criminalisation of the offence of corporate killing with the 
introduction of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
which offered a very different approach to the regulatory system previously 
relied upon to improve workplace safety. 
Starting with the impact of the 2007 Act, this Chapter will examine the 
consequences of criminalising what would have been traditionally considered 
regulatory offences in the context of the sense of criminal and regulatory law 
which, of course, change to reflect changing circumstances, perceptions and 
societal attitudes.  In addressing the sense of regulation and criminal law, the 
practical implications for the distinction between each will become more 
apparent.  
The introduction of the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 with its wider 
range of penalties, particularly custodial sentences for many more offences, has 
the potential to change the perception of what is categorised as regulation and 
perhaps go some way towards answering the question of whether or not there is 
actually a real distinction between criminal and regulatory law, or if it is 




6.2 Impact of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007 
The first case prosecuted under the Act was against Cotswold Geotechnical 
Holdings in respect of the death of junior geologist Alexander Wright when a 
trench he was taking soil samples in collapsed.674  The company director, Peter 
Eaton, was also charged with gross negligence manslaughter and there were 
various other health and safety charges laid against the company in respect of 
the accident.  The company was found guilty of corporate manslaughter and 
fined £385 000, payable over ten years.  Because of his ill-health, the charge of 
gross negligence manslaughter was not pursued against the company director.  
The conviction and the size of the fine were subsequently the subject of an 
unsuccessful application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.675  Although 
the leave to appeal was dismissed, it is interesting to note that the appellant’s 
legal team pointed out that the fine was 250% of the company’s turnover and 
whilst the merits or otherwise of the fine are not in question here, it does show 
how small a company it was.  Whilst the offence of corporate manslaughter was 
found proven in the case of Geotechnical Holdings, it was never going to 
properly test the effectiveness of the 2007 Act which was intended “…to try and 
gain traction on large and medium sized companies”, a description that could 
not be applied to this company.676  Since Peter Eaton would almost certainly 
have been identifiable as ‘the controlling mind’ of the company on the basis of 
the identification doctrine, there is little doubt that gross negligence charges 
could have been brought prior to the 2007 Act. 
Since that first case, there have been a further seventeen cases in England and 
Wales brought by the Crown Prosecution Service under the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, making a total of eighteen to 
the end of June 2015.677  Of those eighteen cases, eight are ongoing, eight 
defendants have been found guilty and two defendants have been found not 
guilty.  The maximum fine imposed was £500 000 and the average was just under 
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£260 000, significantly below the starting point of £450 000 proposed by 
Sentencing Council for Category A offences for micro companies discussed in 
chapter five.  The average fine is below the lowest end of the category range of 
between £270 000 and £800 000.  Further information on cases brought in 
England and Wales and Northern Ireland can be found in Appendix A.  In the 
same timeframe, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service for Scotland has 
raised no prosecutions under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007.678 
Following the death of a woman in October 2012 during childbirth, Maidstone 
and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust and two anaesthetists were respectively 
prosecuted for corporate and gross negligence manslaughter.  It is perhaps one 
of the most important cases since the Act was introduced, being the first 
involving a large public sector organisation.679  The victim had given birth by 
caesarean section but subsequently suffered from serious bleeding.  She 
underwent a further operation under general anaesthetic to remove placental 
tissue from her uterus and after that procedure, no further bleeding was 
observed.  What happened then is subject to some uncertainty with the 
anaesthetist and an operating department practitioner stating that they had 
seen some signs of revival but the nurse responsible for the two operating 
theatres in the maternity unit not seeing or hearing any response.680 
If there was a recovery, it did not continue and the victim’s breathing became 
irregular to such an extent that she required ventilation, which the anaesthetist 
carried out using an oxygen bag and face mask.  This continued for around forty 
minutes and a consultant anaesthetist, the first defendant, Dr Cornish, was 
called in and proceeded to do a number of things, including reviewing the 
victim’s oxygen saturation, which gave no cause for concern, and various other 
tests, all of which were standard practice and carried out in an appropriate 
manner.681  The following hours saw various consultants and other individuals 
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visit the victim as her condition did not improve and then started to deteriorate.  
Around three hours after manual ventilation was commenced, she suffered a 
cardiac arrest and died around an hour later. 
Gross negligence manslaughter charges were brought against the anaesthetist, 
Dr Nadeem Azeez and the consultant anaesthetist, Dr Errol Cornish, and a charge 
of corporate manslaughter was brought against Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells 
NHS Trust.  Dr Azeez left the UK before the trial started and did not return for 
it.  After hearing seven days’ worth of evidence, the judge, the Honourable Mr 
Justice Coulson acquitted both remaining defendants on the grounds that they 
had no case to answer.  In a long and detailed ruling, The Honourable Mr Justice 
Coulson considered all aspects of the charges against both Dr Cornish and the 
Trust.  He concluded that the actions of Dr Cornish did not breach the duty of 
care owed to the victim, and even if there was a breach, it could not be 
considered a gross breach.  There was nothing in Dr Cornish’s treatment of the 
victim that could have caused or significantly caused her death there was no 
evidence to suggest that she was at serious or obvious risk of death as a 
consequence of that treatment.  Accordingly, there was no case for Dr Cornish 
to answer.682 
Moving on to the case against the Trust, an interesting aspect of Mr Justice 
Coulson’s ruling was his discussion in respect of senior management, where he 
identified the “senior management” with individual roles, either the CEO, 
medical director or clinical director.  This seems to revert to the previous 
identification doctrine which had been an obstacle in so many corporate 
manslaughter cases prior to the 2007 Act.  Having said that, he rejected the 
submission made by the Trust that the case should be stopped because the 
“…precise tier or precise individuals involved…” had not been identified.683  Part 
of the case against the Trust was a breach of duty in the appointment of both Dr 
Azeez and Dr Cornish.  The Honourable Mr Justice Coulson could find no 
evidence to suggest that there was any case against the Trust on the basis of the 
appointment of either anaesthetist.  Similarly, the case against the Trust was 





not made in respect of appraisal or ongoing professional supervision in respect of 
Dr Azeez. 
Where The Honourable Mr Justice Coulson did find evidence of a breach of duty 
was in respect of the day in question.  He considered that the supervision of Dr 
Azeez on that day was unclear even though there was a supervisor named on the 
rota but he went on to say that there was no evidence to suggest that Dr Azeez 
did not know who his supervisor was, and even if he did not know, there was no 
evidence that this failure had any effect on the victim’s care.  Although there 
may have been a breach of duty of care, The Honourable Mr Justice Coulson held 
that there was no evidence that it was a gross breach of the duty of care, nor 
did it materially contribute to the victim’s death.   
Before concluding that there was no case to answer against either defendant, 
The Honourable Mr Justice Coulson made some interesting comments about the 
Crown’s assertion at the beginning of the case that in order for their case 
against the Trust to “…get off the ground…” they had to establish gross 
negligence manslaughter against one or both of the anaesthetists.  He disagreed 
with the Crown’s argument, stating that each charge was independent of the 
other, it would be possible for both anaesthetists to be found not guilty of gross 
negligence manslaughter but the trust to be found guilty of corporate 
manslaughter, and vice-versa.   
The implications of the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells case will not be fully 
appreciated for some time but it is inevitable that it will influence any future 
corporate manslaughter charges against large public sector organisations but 
importantly, it does illustrate the challenges that any corporate manslaughter 
case will face where the circumstances are not clear-cut.  It could be argued 
that whilst the victim should not have died and the standard of care was 
inadequate, the failures by both the doctors and the Trust could never have 
been considered “gross” and perhaps this was perhaps a set of circumstances 
that might have benefited from a different approach, a view supported by 
Barnard who described the prosecution as “…dangerously speculative…”.684 
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Within a week or two of the dismissal of the charges against Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells and Cornish, a case with some similarities was decided at 
Nottingham Crown Court, but with a very different outcome.  In 2012, an elderly 
resident of Autumn Grange Care Home in Nottingham died as a consequence of 
the very poor care she received.685  The home was operated by Sherwood Rise 
Limited which was charged with corporate manslaughter and the company 
director was charged with gross negligence manslaughter.  Both the company 
and director pleaded guilty to the respective charges, with the former being 
fined £300 000 and the latter imprisoned for three years and two months and 
disqualified from holding a company directorship for eight years.  The care home 
manager was sentenced to one year imprisonment, suspended for two years, 
after being found guilty of breaches of health and safety offences, and 
disqualified from being a company director for five years.   
This case was notable as the first successful prosecution for corporate 
manslaughter in the health care sector.  In that respect, it is similar to the 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells case but the similarities end there.  The scale of 
the organisations was hugely different and the evidence of gross breach of duty 
of care was very much apparent in the Autumn Grange case.  One other obvious 
difference between the two cases was the guilty pleas from both Autumn Grange 
and its Director.   
Even taking these two high profile cases into account, there would still appear 
to be a considerable gap between the number of potential corporate 
manslaughter/corporate homicide cases and the number actually prosecuted. 
The Health and Safety Executive collects data on fatal injuries and from April 
2008 to March 2014, six hundred and fifty-five employees, three hundred self-
employed workers and two-thousand two hundred and seventy members of the 
public were recorded as suffering a fatal injury as a consequence of work 
activities.686  Between January 2010 (when the first prosecution took place) and 
December 2015, there had been a total of eighteen corporate manslaughter 
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prosecutions in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and none in Scotland (see 
Appendix A).  Given the very lengthy periods experienced so far between deaths 
and prosecution, it is possible that there may be a few from that period in the 
pipeline but it must be assumed that here wouldn’t be more than a handful.  It 
should be noted that two-thousand one hundred and ninety-four of the deaths to 
members of the public occurred in the service sector and the Health and Safety 
Executive estimates that around three-quarters of those deaths were railway 
fatalities, including suicides.  From 1st October 2013, the requirement to report 
railway suicides was removed.  However, even if all fatal injuries to members of 
the public and self-employed workers were removed from the statistics, there 
still seems to be a significant disconnect between the numbers of worker 
suffering fatal injuries whilst at work and the number of corporate manslaughter 
cases brought over a significantly longer period of time.  Whilst not all the fatal 
injuries to employees would satisfy the criteria for a corporate manslaughter or 
corporate homicide charge, it must also be assumed that more than eighteen of 
the recorded fatal injuries to self-employed workers and members of the public 
would meet the criteria. 
As discussed previously, the Health and Safety Executive does not prosecute for 
the consequences of a contravention but for its breach, with the consequences 
only being relevant during sentencing (although they would obviously influence 
enforcement action taken by the Executive).  This makes it impossible to 
determine how many prosecutions were taken by the Health and Safety 
Executive where a fatal injury was the outcome of the contravention but the 
total number of prosecutions taken and success rate can be found on its 
website.687  Between 2009/10 and 2013/14, the average number of proceedings 
initiated each year by the Health and Safety Executive was 565, with an average 
of 109 further cases initiated by local authorities for health and safety offences 
over the same period.  The average annual success rate, that is, defendants 
found guilty of at least one contravention, was 94% for the Health and Safety 
Executive and slightly higher at 97% for local authorities.  It can only be 
conjecture and there is no evidence to support it, but the relatively high 
prosecution rate by the Health and Safety Executive and local authorities could 




be one reason why enforcement of the 2007 Act was eventually allocated to the 
police and the Crown Prosecution Service.  It is impossible to know if 
proceedings for corporate manslaughter/corporate homicide would be more 
common if the Health and Safety Executive was responsible for its enforcement 
but it would not be unreasonable to conclude that it probably would be, given 
its track record for prosecution of health and safety offences. 
The discussion so far in this Chapter has focussed on the relationship between 
the 2007 Act and health and safety offences but it must recognised that it 
applies more widely than just deaths arising from what would be considered 
health and safety contraventions.  The 2007 Act applies where death arises from 
“…the way in which its activities are managed or organised…” so could include 
those where the health and safety legislation would not be applicable, for 
example, the provision or sale of harmful food or other substances.  Having said 
that, all eighteen cases brought under the 2007 Act would fall under the general 
description of workplace health and safety and so far, it seems to being used as 
an adjunct to the more general health and safety legislation. 
It is difficult see any particular pattern in respect of the deaths referred to the 
Crown Prosecution Service for proceedings for corporate manslaughter.  To 
illustrate this, the June 2015 edition of the Safety and Health Practitioner 
reports on two health and safety prosecutions, both involving the death of a 
worker. 688  Both accidents are fairly typical of the type reported month after 
month but it is difficult to understand why neither was subject to prosecution 
for corporate manslaughter and one in particular would appear to satisfy all of 
the criteria for such a prosecution where a worker was killed after being struck 
by a fragment from a disc which exploded after being incorrectly fitted to a 
handheld grinder.  The Health and Safety Executive investigation discovered a 
long history of similar incidents caused by the company allowing the use of in 
appropriate combinations of grinders and discs and a lack of training and 
understanding of the correct use of discs by workers.  The hazards associated 
with the incorrect use of discs and grinders are well known and there has been 
extensive guidance published over the years highlighting them and advising on 
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their safe use.  The company was fined £150 000 for breaching S2(1) of the 1974 
Act and ordered to pay £24 000 in costs.  This accident is, by no stretch of the 
imagination, unusual or exceptional but the question must be asked what makes 
it different from R v. Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd discussed previously in this 
Chapter.  There was clearly a duty owed to the victim and in light of the 
company’s history of similar accidents and the failure to put in place effective 
control measures, it must be considered a gross breach of that duty and the 
actions of the senior management were, without doubt, a substantial element of 
the breach.  In many respects, it could be argues that this company was more 
liable for the death of the worker than Geotechnical Holdings, so why was a 
prosecution for corporate manslaughter not initiated? 
In the same edition of Safety and Health Practitioner, a prosecution against 
Pirelli Tyres was reported where it was found guilty and fined £150 000 when a 
worker died after being trapped in an industrial autoclave.  After sentencing, 
the HSE said “…Pirelli had failed to identify the autoclave as a confined space 
posing a serious risk. There were therefore no measures in place, such as 
instructions or signs, to prevent access to the autoclave.  There was also no 
system for checking the autoclave before the door was shut and the operating 
cycle was started.”689  Once again, on the face of it, there would certainly 
appear to be sufficient evidence to support corporate manslaughter proceedings 
and it would have been the largest organisation to be prosecuted since the 
introduction of the 2007 Act. 
It is not clear why so few prosecutions have been taken under the 2007 Act, 
although it could be argued that it is still a relatively new piece of legislation, it 
would be expected that by 2014/15 there would have been a significant 
acceleration in the number of cases, which does not appear to have happened, 
or at least in any meaningful way.  The allocation of investigation to the police 
and enforcement to the Crown Prosecution Service in England Wales must have 
some influence on the approach to corporate manslaughter cases and the 
guidance published by the National Liaison Committee for the Work-related 
deaths protocol will certainly not encourage prosecutions to be initiated.  The 
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guidance has a number of signatories including the Association of Chief Police 
Officers, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Health and Safety Executive and 
is intended “..to assist the police, enforcing authorities and prosecutors in the 
joint investigation and where applicable, the prosecution of cases in relation to 
deaths in the workplace”.690  Section 4 of the guidance discusses the decision 
making process when considering prosecution for corporate manslaughter and 
gross negligence manslaughter.691  Strangely, it seems to conflate both offences 
even though they are very different and some of the advice seems to be rather 
contradictory.  For example, the guidance states “Negligence by a number of 
people cannot be aggregated to mean that all together their conduct fell far 
below the required standard. All those suspected of breaching the law must be 
considered individually.”  Whilst this is indeed the case for gross negligence 
manslaughter, it is not the case for corporate manslaughter and would imply a 
return to the identification doctrine which caused so many cases to fail in the 
past.  It is possible that the quoted passages are intended to apply only to gross 
negligence manslaughter cases and the guidance does go on to discuss specific 
requirements for the corporate manslaughter offence including the involvement 
of the organisation and the role of senior management, but that only comes 
after the emphasis on the need to establish individual responsibility.  On the 
basis of this guidance, which will be used by the police and other enforcing 
agencies that perhaps do not have the appropriate experience, it is hardly 
surprising that so few fatal accidents have been referred to the Crown 
Prosecution Service for corporate manslaughter charges.  It must also be 
assumed that increased concern over terrorism will have had an impact on police 
priorities and it is possible that corporate manslaughter/corporate homicide will 
not have the level of priority originally anticipated. 
The Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 could potentially have a more 
significant impact on organisations than the 2007 Act although it does not cover 
such a wide a range of activities.  Unlike the 2007 Act, it applies only in the 
same circumstances as the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 but as 
discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, the number of potential cases that 
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would fall outside its scope will be very few.  A very short piece of legislation, 
the 2008 Act was introduced with much less fanfare than the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, perhaps due to its ‘regulatory’ 
nature, but it introduced the possibility of custodial sentences for many more 
health and safety offences and in the five year period ending in March 2015, the 
Health and Safety Executive prosecutions database recorded twenty-one 
decisions which resulted in a prison or suspended prison sentence.692  It is too 
soon to draw any meaningful conclusions from the number of health and safety 
prosecutions resulting in a prison sentence, suspended or otherwise, but it does 
suggest that courts are willing to impose custodial sentences for what could be 
considered regulatory offences.  With the 2008 Act extending the range of 
penalties for both organisations and individuals found guilty of a health and 
safety offence, including unlimited fines and imprisonment, the raison d'être for 
the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 must be called 
into question.  That question will be addressed in the final Chapter but before 
then, some of the concerns in respect of the 2007 Act will be examined in more 
detail. 
As discussed earlier in this Section, there would appear to be no discernible 
pattern for the corporate manslaughter cases initiated by the Crown Prosecution 
Service other than all of the companies prosecuted have been small or medium-
sized, with the exception of Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells, as discussed 
previously.  Examples of what would, on the face of it, appear to be clear cases 
of corporate manslaughter have not been pursued by the Crown Prosecution 
Service and as discussed elsewhere in this document, concern has been 
expressed by various commentators about some of the cases that have been 
prosecuted.  In R v. Lion Steel Equipment Limited, the company was charged 
with corporate manslaughter and three directors charged with gross negligence 
manslaughter following the fatal fall of an employee through a fragile roof.693  
The company and directors were also charged with a range of health and safety 
offences, including, in respect of the directors, Section 37 of the Health and 
Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.  The judge determined that it would be unfair for 
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the corporate manslaughter charge to be heard at the same time as the 
individual gross negligence manslaughter charges and ordered it to be severed 
from the indictment.  The gross negligence manslaughter charges against the 
three directors were dismissed by the judge and Lion Steel Equipment Limited 
pleaded guilty to the charge of corporate manslaughter with all other charges 
either dismissed or left on file.  It is interesting to note that the offer of a guilty 
plea for the corporate manslaughter charge on condition that the individual 
gross negligence manslaughter charges against the three directors being 
dismissed was made some months prior to the court hearing but was rejected by 
the Crown Prosecution Service.  Finally, the judge was very critical of the length 
of time between the victim’s death in 2008 and the case being heard, in 
particular the three years it took for the prosecuting authorities to bring 
charges. 
The decision to prosecute Lion Steel for corporate manslaughter and its three 
directors for gross negligence manslaughter follows the pattern set by the very 
first corporate manslaughter case where the company and its director were also 
charged with corporate and gross negligence manslaughter.  A search of the 
Safety and Health Practitioner using the term “gross negligence manslaughter” 
revealed a number of prosecutions against individuals occupying various 
positions in organisations, some were associated with a corporate manslaughter 
charge but others were not although almost all had parallel prosecutions for 
health and safety offences.  It would certainly appear that the introduction of 
the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 has had the effect 
of a significant increase in gross negligence manslaughter proceedings in respect 
of workplace deaths even if the number of corporate manslaughter cases has 
been relatively small.   
The changes in sentencing introduced by the 2008 Act has, according to the 
Health and Safety Executive prosecutions database, resulted in prison sentences 
being imposed in three cases where Section 37 of the Health and Safety at Work 
etc. Act 1974 was breached, and one case involving a breach of Section 7.694  
Whilst this could not be considered particularly significant, and the numbers are 
certainly far too few to draw any particular conclusions, they do indicate a 
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willingness of courts to impose a custodial sentence on company directors and 
others.  There is concern expressed about the use of gross negligence 
manslaughter and Section 37 of the 1974 Act charges being taken against 
company directors and others,695 but in combination with multi-million pound 
fines imposed following breaches of health and safety legislation, it is difficult 
to see how the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
provides any significant advantage over the more traditional health and safety 
legislation in encouraging organisations to carry out their undertakings in a safer 
way, particularly following the introduction of the Health and Safety (Offences) 
Act 2008 other than the possibility of a ‘criminal’ rather than ‘regulatory’ 
conviction.  The remainder of this Chapter will examine the conflict between 
criminal and regulatory offences and its implications for corporate killing. 
 
6.3 Crime 
There has been much discussion in this thesis about regulation and ‘true’ crime, 
and having established the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (and the 
Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008) as regulation and the 2007 Act as 
criminal, it is now necessary to consider what these categorisations actually 
mean for workplace safety,  Before that can be done, the terms must be defined 
but defining criminal law is, as Herring  suggested, “…surprisingly difficult…” and 
over the years there have been many attempts to define, or possibly more 
appropriately, describe what it is.696  Criminal law prohibits “…behaviour that 
represents a serious wrong against an individual or some fundamental social 
value or institution”        .697  Ashworth pointed out that criminal law extends 
beyond “serious wrong” including many examples of what could be considered 
relatively minor offences that have little, or no stigma attached to them.  The 
concept of ‘stigma’ has been used to distinguish between criminal and 
regulatory offences and will be discussed in more detail later in this Chapter. 
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Lamond suggested that crimes are public wrongs the community is responsible 
for punishing, although not necessarily wrongs against the public itself.698  It 
could be argued that this follows on from Williams who stated a “…crime (or 
offence) is a legal wrong that can be followed by criminal proceedings which 
may result in punishment”699 although Herring  pointed out that this is a circular 
argument – what came first, the crime or the criminal procedures?700  Williams 
addressed and dismissed this argument on the basis that a crime is established 
by the fact that the wrong can be followed by criminal proceedings therefore 
criminal proceedings determine the crime.701  Commenting on Williams, Farmer 
agreed that  “Crime is defined by the legal consequences of the act…”supporting 
Devlin, who stated that “…criminal law is not a statement of how people ought 
to behave; it is a statement of what will happen to them if they do not behave”. 
702, 703  This leads on to the question of who determines the consequences of any 
particular course of action or behaviour.  In Proprietary Articles Trade 
Association v. Attorney-General for Canada, it was held that “…the domain of 
criminal jurisprudence can only be ascertained by examining what acts at any 
particular period are declared by the State to be crimes, and the only common 
nature they will be found to possess is that they are prohibited by the State and 
that those who commit them are punished.”        704  This would imply that any 
behaviour will be a crime if so determined by the State. This definition of crime 
was subsequently qualified by Lord Atkin who proposed that there must be 
“…some evil or injurious or undesirable effect upon the public against which the 
law is directed”.705  He went on to suggest areas appropriate for criminal law, 
including “…public peace, order, security, health, morality…” making clear that 
this list is not exclusive but would cover most circumstances.  
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The role of government in determining crime and criminal behaviour is 
supported by Clarkson et al  who suggested that in most cases, the decision to 
criminalise certain behaviour or actions happens as a political response to 
pressure groups or perceived public opinion, in effect politicians decide what is 
criminal behaviour.706  As Slapper succinctly put it, “crime is anything that the 
state has chosen to criminalise”.707  This can lead to the situation where 
“Statutory additions to the criminal law are too often made on the simple 
principle that ‘there ought to be a law against it’”.708  Baldwin supported this 
view when discussing punitive approaches to regulation which “…may be driven 
by recently emergent public appetites for blame as much as by considered 
thoughts on regulatory strategy”.709  This would suggest that whilst politicians 
decide what criminal behaviour is (or will be) this decision is reached with at 
least a consideration of what the public opinion is.  It could certainly be argued 
that the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 falls into this 
category  as will be discussed in more detail later.  There are other examples of 
public opinion driving criminal law including the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 and 
much of the child protection legislation introduced since the Soham murders in 
2002. 
Having considered what criminal law is and where it comes from, before it can 
be considered in the context of regulation it is necessary to consider its purpose, 
which is typically to punish those found guilty of its contravention.710   The 
purpose of punishment can include retribution, or just deserts, as discussed in a 
previous chapter and it may be considered the main justification for criminal law 
although there are other outcomes of criminal prosecution, including 
deterrence, either for the guilty party or for others who may be tempted into 
the same unlawful behaviour. 711  Ashworth proposed that there are two 
dimensions for the justification for criminal law and punishment, a “…deserved 
response to culpable wrongdoing…” and as a deterrence to others.712 Deterrence 
                                        
706 C.M.V. Clarkson, H.M. Keating and S.R. Cunningham, Clarkson and Keating Criminal Law.  
Text and Materials (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 3 
707 Slapper, Blood in the Bank.  Social and legal aspects of death at work. op. cit. n.515, p.10 
708 Devlin, 'Morals and the Criminal Law' op. cit. n.703, p.382 
709 R. Baldwin, 'The New Punitive Regulation' (2004) 67 The Modern Law Review 351 
710 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law op. cit. n.347, p.36; Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 
op. cit. n.697, p.18; Herring, Criminal Law op. cit. n.538, p.4 
711 Herring, Criminal Law op. cit. n.538, p.30 
712 Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law op. cit. n.697, p.17 
212 
 
lets “…one person suffer in order to instil fear into others” and as discussed in 
Chapter Five, it must be considered an important outcome of any action taken 
against corporations in respect of health and safety offences.713,714  Deterrence 
can be personal, intended to dissuade the guilty party from repeating the 
unlawful behaviour or, perhaps more relevant to corporate crime generally, 
where it is intended to dissuade other people or organisations from participating 
in the unlawful behaviour.715 
As discussed previously, retribution and deterrence are not the only 
justifications for criminal law, dangerous criminals may be removed from society 
making it, in theory, a safer place, and rehabilitation of the offender may 
prevent reoffending at a later point in time. 716  Retribution and deterrence are 
perhaps less important when it comes to corporate crime but they are possible 
consequences of any sentence imposed under criminal law.  Before the 
distinction between crime and regulation can be examined in more detail, it is 
necessary to examine the concept of regulation, with particular reference to 
worker protection. 
 
6.4 The Nature of Regulation 
...it is next to an impossibility to alter a general bad custom in any 
nation, without a general regulation, because of inveterate bad 
dispositions and discouragements, with which the first beginnings of 
reformations are always attended.717      
Much of the previous discussion in this thesis has focussed on the distinction 
between regulatory and criminal law with the more traditional health and safety 
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legislation falling firmly in the former category and the 2007 Act in the latter.  
Why this matters, if it does, will be discussed in this section which will explain 
the role regulation has played in the past and will inevitably play in the future to 
protect the health and safety of people affected by work activities but before 
that can be considered, it is necessary to define what it is and how it differs 
from other forms of control.  The Oxford English Dictionary has a number of 
definitions for “regulation” including:- 
1. The action or fact of regulating (in various senses of REGULATE v.); an 
instance of this. Also: the state of being regulated. 
2. A rule or principle governing behaviour or practice; esp. such a directive 
established and maintained by an authority.718     
Regulate is defined as:- 
1. To control, govern, or direct, esp. by means of regulations or 
restrictions.  
2. To bring under control; to reduce to order. 
3. To correct through regulation.  
4. To control, modify, or adjust with reference to some principle, standard, 
or norm; to alter in response to a situation, set of circumstances, etc.719 
  
From these definitions, it can be seen that the term ‘regulation’ is very wide in 
its application and will cover almost every form of control, governance or 
direction.  Most people will have an opinion on what ‘regulation’ is but there are 
almost as many interpretations of the term as there are researchers in the field 
as illustrated in the following paragraphs.720 
Morgan and Yeung  suggested that ‘regulation’ is “...notoriously difficult to 
define with clarity and precision,...”, a view supported by Moran  who stated 
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that it is a “notoriously inexact word”.721  Perhaps the simplest definition is that 
given by Hood et al, “…governmental interference with market or social 
processes to control potential adverse consequences to health”.722  Collins  
adopted a broad approach to ‘regulation’ and he used the term to “...describe 
any system of rules intended to govern the behaviour of its subjects”  suggesting 
that law is only one of many types of social regulation including “...custom, 
convention and organised bureaucracies.”723  He did recognise that the term can 
be used in a narrower sense, particularly when applied to the control of markets 
where ‘regulators’ will endeavour to prevent distortion and its undesirable 
effects, but also protect the participants.   
In common with other commentators, Braithwaite adopted the analogy of rowing 
and steering to describe the three distinct stages of the regulatory state.724  
Prior to the nineteenth century civil society was mainly responsible for both 
rowing and steering with the state’s involvement being restricted to providing 
protection to the populace against major crime and maintaining the laws of 
contract.  From the nineteenth century to the mid-late twentieth century, the 
state became almost entirely responsible for rowing and steering (although he 
suggested that the state was much weaker in steering than rowing) but towards 
the end of the twentieth century, the state becomes responsible for steering 
while civil society takes on the responsibility for rowing.725 
Black  took a different view to Moran and proposes that regulation “...is that 
aspect of governance which is concerned with changing (or maintaining) the 
behaviour of others in order to attain an identified goal,...”. 726 This would imply 
a much more active involvement than suggested by Moran.  It also fitted more 
comfortably with the regulatory approach taken by the Health and Safety 
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Executive. Black went on to discuss the structure of agencies formed in the 
nineteen-seventies, including the Health and Safety Commission, describing 
them as having the “stamp of corporatism” by including “...representatives of 
labour, capital and the state...” in their governance bodies.727  She compared 
them to more modern regulators where the emphasis is on consumer panels 
although it must be noted that many of the modern regulators were established 
to protect consumer interest which is different from protecting worker safety. 
Scott suggested that regulation can be thought of as “...any process or set of 
processes by which norms are established, the behaviour of those subject to the 
norms monitored or fed back into the regime, and for which there are 
mechanisms for holding the behaviour of regulated actors within the acceptable 
limits of the regime (whether by enforcement action or some other 
mechanism)”.728  Again, this would seem to be more in line with Black than 
Moran, implying a more active approach than the latter.   
Baldwin et al identified three different forms of regulation, a set of 
authoritative rules, usually with some mechanism to ensure compliance, steering 
of the economy by the efforts of state agencies and finally, all mechanisms of 
social control. 729  There is overlap between these different forms but workplace 
safety would normally fall under the first category although Baldwin et al 
pointed out that it would also fall under the second category and, of course, it 
could also fall under the final category.  Importantly, the third category will 
encompass the influence that organisations have in the policy making process 
and its implementation.730 
Ogus described regulation as “…fundamentally a politico-economic concept…” 
which perhaps more explained its origins rather than what it is and how it 
works.731  He went on to distinguish between ‘social’ and ‘economic’ regulation, 
with the former including health and safety, environmental and consumer 
protection and the latter dealing with ‘industries with monopolistic 
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tendencies’.732  He suggested social regulation arose from two types of market 
failure; in an unregulated market where individuals may not have sufficient 
information about the quality of goods or services offered by suppliers resulting 
in their preferences not being met, and market transactions having an adverse 
effect on individuals not directly involved in them.  The focus of this Chapter is 
on social rather than economic regulation although there will inevitably be 
overlap between the two types, at least so far as public interest is concerned.  
Ogus described different regulatory forms based on of the extent of state 
intervention as shown in figure 6.1733 





‘command and control’ 
 
Prior Approval 
Figure 6.1 – Regulatory Forms 
Health and safety regulation has mainly taken the form of standards, with a 
range of criminal sanctions available for non-compliance, although there are 
areas where high intervention is the norm, for example licensing in the case of 
working with asbestos or manufacturing and storing explosives.  Within the 
context of the forms of regulation identified by Baldwin, Morgan and Yeung 
further identified three main theories of regulation; public interest, private 
interest and institutionalist.734 
There are two aspects to the public interest theory of regulation.  Perhaps the 
most relevant to worker safety and the one that could be considered to 
encompass the traditional view is regulation for the benefit and security of the 
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general public.735  Selznick stated that regulation is the “…sustained and focused 
control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a 
community” which perhaps illustrates at least part of the distinction between it 
and the ‘criminal’ law.736  Although Selznick took a narrow view of what 
regulation is, his views conformed to the public interest theory and its intended 
outcome.  The alternative approach is economic welfare where regulation 
follows on from market failure.737  This concept of public interest regulation 
following market failure has been touched upon previously in this Chapter.  In a 
perfect capitalist society, markets should govern themselves but in the event of 
a market failure, private law should be able to provide an appropriate remedy.  
In reality, private law has not always provided a satisfactory remedy to market 
failures resulting in the need for regulation in the public interest.         738  Much of 
the research carried out in the nineteen-eighties and nineteen-nineties focussed 
on regulation of the (then) newly privatised industries, the City and the 
professions.  Majone  argued that the single justification for regulation was 
“...improving the efficiency of the economy by correcting specific forms of 
market failure such as monopoly, imperfect information, and negative 
externalities”. 739 In this respect, regulation fulfils a function beyond that 
normally associated with criminal law although failure to comply with regulation 
can have the same or similar consequences to committing more traditional 
crimes.  Hantke-Domas identified two aspects of public interest, that is, 
perception and concept.740  He suggested that the perception of public interest 
is associated with the “…realisation of political and moral values” while the 
concept provides the basis for deciding disputes “…within the realm of the 
community’s interest”. 
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What is now referred to as the public interest theory was generally accepted as 
the only explanation of regulation until the early nineteen-seventies when 
Stigler first argued that regulation was not primarily for the public benefit but 
mainly served the narrow self-interests of industry and commerce.741  The 
private interest theory (also called the Chicago or positivist theory) provided an 
explanation why so many supposedly competitive industries, in particular 
transport, banking, finance and telecommunications, had, at that time, price 
and entry regulation amongst other anticompetitive controls.742  The private 
theory of regulation gained popularity amongst supporters of privatisation and 
deregulation in the late nineteen-seventies and nineteen-eighties.743  Increased 
competition by means of privatisation of public sector monopolies and 
deregulation of private monopolies (for example, airlines, freight haulage, 
telecommunications, etc.) was partly justified on the basis of the private theory 
of regulation.  Braithwaite stated that the domination of the private interest 
theory of regulation as proposed by the Chicago School had come to an end by 
the nineteen-nineties and that it had not produced privatisation and 
deregulation but privatisation and regulatory growth, as discussed previously in 
this Chapter.744  The end of the ascendency of private interest as the dominant 
theory of regulation was supported by Majone who also found that most of the 
growth of regulation in Europe from the early nineteen-nineties could best be 
described in public interest terms and even where the private interest theory 
better explained any specific regulation, it was also justified by the merits of 
the case.745 
The private theory of regulation goes some way to explaining regulatory capture, 
which occurs when it is in the interests of the regulated to be regulated, at least 
under that particular regime.  McLean suggested that regulatory capture could 
arise through two routes, the regulations come into force for the benefit of the 
regulated or they are subsequently captured by the regulated at some point in 
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time after they have been introduced.746 Regulatory capture includes 
circumstances where the regulatory administration or enforcing authority is 
captured by the regulated industry.747  Stone cast doubt over the extent of 
regulatory agency capture arguing that interests are too diverse to allow it to 
take place either frequently or for any length of time.748  Maikkai and 
Braithwaite found little evidence of systematic regulatory capture in their study 
on nursing home regulation agencies.749  Whilst there is little evidence of 
systematic regulatory capture, one of the consequences of the Clapham Train 
Crash was the transfer of health and safety for railways in the UK from the 
Railway Inspectorate to the Health and Safety Executive.  This would imply at 
least some concern over regulatory capture and a similar situation arose 
following Piper Alpha when offshore safety was transferred from the Department 
of Energy to the Health and Safety Executive as a consequence of a perceived 
conflict of interest which would almost certainly result in regulatory capture.  
Although somewhat outside the scope of this research, the role of the US 
Minerals Management Service in the Deepwater Horizon disaster illustrates the 
dangers of regulatory agencies working too closely with the regulated industry.  
As a consequence of severe staff shortages and a culture of accommodating the 
interests of the industry, the Minerals and Management Service was an almost 
perfect example of a captive regulator and has been severely criticised as a 
consequence.750   
In addition to concerns over regulatory capture, the independence of regulators 
is also at risk from political interference.  Although Moran suggested the 
establishment of the Health and Safety Commission and Health and Safety 
Executive set them free from the “...outcomes of partisan, majoritarian 
politics”, he was subsequently scathing about their performance in the nineteen-
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eighties.751  He implied that this was at least partly due to regulatory capture 
where the Health and Safety Executive, and the regulated sector found common 
cause in maximising production rather than ensuring safety.752  He suggested 
that this regulatory capture contributed to accidents such as Piper Alpha 
although in that particular case, the enforcing authority was the Department of 
Energy and offshore safety was subsequently transferred to the Health and 
Safety Executive.  Black saw the creation of the Health and Safety Executive and 
Health and Safety Commission as part of a “renewed move to establish 
regulatory bodies” in the 1960’s and nineteen-seventies.753   
The failure of the Health and Safety Executive to adopt non-governmental rules 
and standards was criticised by Black.754  In particular, she referred to the 
Responsible Care initiative which was established by the chemical industry to 
develop a transnational industry-based regime for the management of health, 
safety and environmental issues.  It also included certification and verification 
but the programme was not adopted by the Health and Safety Executive when 
setting its own guidance, or when determining compliance with statutory 
requirements.  Black suggested that this “...illustrates the dangers of assuming 
that legal norms will always trump other operating norms...”.  The failure of the 
Health and Safety Executive to adopt the standards referred to by Black was 
contrary to the approach proposed by Robens, namely the increased use of 
industry guidance and codes of practice, but it does fit with the ‘command and 
control’ regulatory form discussed previously in this Chapter. 755 
 
6.5  ‘Real’ Crime 
An important part of this research is to examine the perception that the 
traditional ‘regulatory’ approach to controlling health and safety in the 
workplace has failed to prevent deaths arising from work and work activities, or 
perhaps more pertinently, failed to properly punish those considered responsible 
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for such deaths.  The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
was introduced to address this apparent failure and as a piece of legislation it is 
very much perceived as ‘criminal’ in nature and is quite distinct from the 
regulatory approach to workplace safety that went before it.  The concepts of 
crime and regulation has been discussed previously but the distinction between a 
‘criminal’ and ‘regulatory’ offence, if there is one, has not been fully explored.  
The remainder of this Chapter will consider the concept of ‘real’ or ‘true’ crime 
as the basis for such a distinction. 
As discussed previously, the difference between criminal and regulatory offences 
has been the subject of much speculation.756  Hildebrandt  suggested that the 
distinction can be traced to the concepts of what she referred to as ’justice’ and 
‘police’ (or administration), in particular their separation as individual domains 
of government power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 757  The 
present day association of criminal offences with ‘justice’ was made by Lacey  
who included it as one of the intrinsic values attached to ‘real crime’ which also 
includes fairness, right and wrong.758  Hildebrandt traced the distinction back to 
medieval times, with crimina resulting in corporal punishment and 
contraventions resulting in fines.  Crimina were “violations of the royal peace”, 
whereas contraventions were “violations of administrative rules”.759  From this, 
Hildebrandt proposed that the difference between criminal and regulatory 
offences was “...a historical artefact rather than an ontological fact”.  It should 
be noted that Hildebrandt’s research focused on continental Europe and her 
findings do not necessarily apply directly to England, Wales and Scotland. 
In her conclusions, Hildebrandt  proposed that regulatory offences have their 
origins in rules implemented by democratic institutions, as opposed to criminal 
offences which have their origin in pre-existing rules which imposed obligations 
on individuals to one another, prior to them being criminalised by the state.760  
Whilst this distinction may have been appropriate in the past, it is not 
sustainable in the twenty-first century where an ever increasing number of 
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criminal offences have their origins in parliament (for example, the dangerous 
dogs’ legislation referred to previously). 
A different approach is taken by Stafford  who drew a distinction between 
prosecutions taken by the police and what he referred to as “private 
prosecutions”.761  He defined “private prosecutions” quite simply as any 
prosecution not taken by the police.  This would include prosecutions taken by 
the Health and Safety Executive, local authorities, Environment Agency, fire 
authorities, education authorities, and so on.  This group would be normally 
considered to be “regulatory” authorities and this distinction has been used to 
differentiate between “criminal” and “regulatory” law, on this basis it is not the 
offence that determines its nature but the body or organisation responsible for 
its prosecution.  This could justify the decision to have the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 investigated and prosecuted by 
the police, rather than the Health and Safety Executive and it also affirms that 
distinction between the “criminal” 2007 Act and the regulatory health and 
safety legislation. 
Mackenzie and Green  blur this particular approach to distinguishing between 
regulatory and criminal when discussing the Dealing in Cultural Objects 
(Offences) Act 2003.762  They clearly saw this Act as an attempt to regulate 
participants in the antiquities trade and referred throughout the paper to the 
“regulated” and “regulator” even though the Act did not establish a regulating 
body (Customs and Excise were able prosecute offences in certain 
circumstances).  If the role of Customs and Excise is put to one side, this Act 
would surely fall under the definition of criminal law discussed in the previous 
paragraph, in so far as the police would appear to prosecute offences.  This is 
just one of many examples of legislation which could fall into either camp, 
crime or regulation, which in itself suggests the distinction is rather artificial. 
When comparing the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
to the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 and other specific health and 
safety legislation, the enforcing authority does indicate a difference, with the 
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former enforced by the police and the latter (mainly) by the Health and Safety 
Executive.  At its simplest, this approach would suggest that the police would 
enforce ‘true’ crime while other organisations (including the Health and Safety 
Executive) would enforce “regulatory” crime, the determining factor being the 
enforcement agency rather than the offence.  Again, this distinction does not 
appear particularly robust since there are “regulators” that will enforce criminal 
law (for example, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) and there are 
circumstances where police will enforce what clearly falls under the category of 
regulation. 
Wells  suggested that, rather than any distinction between what she referred to 
as “public safety” or  “other” criminal law, historical and administrative factors 
would determine whether or not a piece of legislation would fall to any 
particular regulatory agency (or any regulatory agency at all) to enforce.763  
Following this line of argument, it is not possible to establish whether an offence 
is regulatory or criminal on the basis of the agency responsible for prosecuting 
it.   When discussing  the concept of public welfare as a mechanism for 
distinguishing between regulation and criminal law, with the former being 
mainly concerned with public safety, Wells pointed out that crimes such as 
murder, assault, wounding, etc., cannot be separated from the concept of 
public safety and there had been increasing criminalisation of  activities that 
could affect public safety but were previously outside legal control.764    The 
implication is that whether an offence is regulatory or criminal cannot be 
determined on the basis of public welfare or public safety but the 2007 Act 
supports the argument that there has been increasing criminalisation of certain 
types of activities which were either excluded from the law altogether or 
subject to regulation.  The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
2007 could be associated with protecting public safety but unlike health and 
safety legislation, it would not be described as regulation for the reasons stated 
previously.  This confirms Well’s view that it is administrative and/or historical 
factors that will determine whether a piece of legislation falls to a particular 
regulator to enforce, rather than its fundamental nature.   
                                        




Stafford  pointed out that many of the prosecutions taken by regulators involve 
crimes of strict liability, and generally do not require mens rea although there 
are a number of offences where mens rea may be absent but they are still 
prosecuted by the police.765 Stafford provided the example of drunk driving 
where, assuming there are no other offences committed by the driver, the 
offence is one of strict liability.  This would suggest that mens rea in itself is not 
sufficient to establish whether an offence is regulatory or criminal.  In general, 
offences requiring mens rea will be considered true crime (even then, there may 
be exceptions) but not all strict liability offences are regulatory  as 
demonstrated with the offence of drunk driving.766  The concept of strict liability 
is important when considering true and regulatory criminal law and will be 
discussed later in this Chapter. 
The distinction between criminal and regulatory law was discussed by Lacey  
who suggested that criminal lawyers have focussed on “real crime” (her 
quotation marks) while treating regulatory offences as marginal.767  This 
supports the argument that some sections of the legal profession see regulation 
as something lesser than true or real crime.  Lacey associated “real crime” with 
those offences requiring mens rea.  Her approach was similar to that of Stafford 
when defining private prosecution but it has the same problems with some strict 
liability offences which would normally fall under the criminal rather than 
regulatory category.  Lacey  went on to define regulation as “...a practice which 
has the intention or effect of controlling, ordering, or influencing the behaviour” 
although she questioned her own broadening of regulation in terms of “analytic 
integrity and fit with linguistic usage”.768 
Although offences prosecuted by regulators would, in most cases, be strict 
liability in nature, there may be circumstances where consent, connivance or 
negligence of the defendant in allowing the offence to be committed could be 
important in determining guilt, as well as any subsequent penalty.  Section 37 of 
the Health and Safety at Work, etc., Act 1974  states that where an offence has 
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been committed by a body corporate but can be attributed to the consent, 
connivance or negligence of “…any director, manager, secretary or other similar 
officer…”, then that person is also guilty of the offence.  This would suggest that 
mens rea must be demonstrated for the offence to have been committed, at 
least where the fault is one of consent or connivance.  The 1974 Act is generally 
considered regulatory, rather than true criminal law but it still includes this 
element of mens rea, rather than the more typical strict liability approach 
associated with regulation.   
Whether or not a particular offence needs mens rea has been subject to much 
debate and discussion.  There is a general presumption that mens rea is required 
unless the wording of the statute suggests otherwise, in which circumstances 
strict liability will apply.  Lord Scarman  in Gammon Ltd v. Attorney-General of 
Hong Kong  stated the following propositions for determining whether or not 
mens rea is required:- 
1. there is a presumption of law that mens rea is required before a person 
can be held guilty of a criminal offence;  
2. the presumption is particularly strong where the offence is "truly 
criminal" in character;  
3. the presumption applies to statutory offences, and can be displaced only 
if this is clearly or by necessary implication the effect of the statute;  
4. the only situation in which the presumption can be displaced is where the 
statute is concerned with an issue of social concern, and public safety is 
such an issue; 
5. even where a statute is concerned with such an issue, the presumption of 
mens rea stands unless it can also be shown that the creation of strict 
liability will be effective to promote the objects of the statute by 
encouraging greater vigilance to prevent the commission of the 
prohibited act.769 
The debate over strict liability is one of controversy and disagreement best 
illustrated by Reid who suggested that “One’s view of strict liability depends on 
one’s view of the purpose of criminal law and the principles of a criminal justice 
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process”, resulting in as many views as there are commentators.770  Strict 
liability removes the need for intent to be proven; it only requires the act to 
have been carried out, irrespective of the mental state of the perpetrator.771  
Ashworth described strict liability offences as those “…which a person may be 
convicted without proof of intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence”.772  
They are typically associated with environmental and public protection, 
including workplace safety but as mentioned previously, the Health and Safety 
at Work etc. Act 1974 may require the mental state to be established in some 
circumstances so it cannot be assumed that health and safety legislation, per se, 
is always strict liability in nature.773  
Herring  identified four justifications for strict liability in criminal law; 
protection of the public, ease of proof, strict liability offences are not really 
criminal and the Human Rights Act.774 Protection of the public, which Herring 
suggested was the main justification, is also viewed by other commentators as 
important in the creation of strict liability offences.775 The threat to public 
health, safety, morals or order is such that mens rea need not be demonstrated 
by the prosecution.776  This concept of public protection or public welfare has 
been discussed previously in this Chapter and there is clear historical link 
between strict liability and public protection or welfare.  
Schwenk  argued that most regulations (if not all) subject to a penalty are 
‘public welfare offences’, and accordingly do not require mens rea to be 
established.777  The concept of public welfare offences was discussed at length 
by Sayre , from their origin in Great Britain in the nineteenth century through to 
the United States in the 1920’s and ‘30s.778  He proposed that a public welfare 
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offence was one that did not need mens rea to be established for a guilty verdict 
to be reached.  He suggested that the need to establish mens rea for an offence 
would be determined by two factors, its character and the nature of the 
penalty.779  This clear distinction between public welfare offences and true 
crime was challenged by Wells as discussed previously.780  “Strict liability 
offences are easier for the prosecution to prove”, where mens rea can be 
difficult to establish, a prosecution for a strict liability offence can succeed if 
the act can be established irrespective of the intent.781   This is clearly an 
advantage when prosecuting an organisation, where establishing mens rea has 
proved difficult, if not impossible, and one that the 1974 Act, supported by the 
Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 has over the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 when dealing with the unlawful behaviour of 
organisations. 
It could be argued that health and safety legislation has gone even further in 
that an injury arising from a workplace accident is proof that an offence has 
been committed.  It is up to the employer or person having control of premises 
to prove that they had taken all reasonably practicable measures to prevent the 
accident occurring.  Referred to as the reverse burden of proof, it has been the 
subject of some debate over the years.  Making reference to the case of R. v. 
Chargot and others which involved the death of a dump-truck driver, Spencer 
expressed concern about this apparent reverse burden of proof,  “So in other 
words, wherever an industrial accident occurs the employer is guilty unless he 
can talk his way out of it”.782, 783  In this case, the driver’s employer, the main 
contractor for the construction site, and a director of the main contractor were 
prosecuted for various offences in terms of the 1974 Act.  Lord Hope concluded 
“… where a person sustains injury at work, the facts will speak for themselves.  
Prima facia, his employer, or the person by whose undertaking he was liable to 
be affected, has failed to ensure his health and safety.  Otherwise there would 
have been no accident”.   
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The question of whether or not strict liability offences are truly criminal has 
been discussed at length and Herring  suggested a justification for strict liability 
is that such offences are not really criminal.  Although a defendant can be acting 
entirely reasonably, there is no “grave injustice” if he or she is convicted 
(although the introduction of the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 may 
change this view).784  He pointed out that the  distinction between a regulatory 
and truly criminal offence is irrelevant when it comes to trial and punishment, a 
point made previously in this Chapter and supported by Williams who put 
forward the view that  “Magistrates may allow the traffic offender to preserve a 
modicum of his self-respect by standing in front of the dock instead of in it; yet 
he can often be tried on indictment, and he is subject to the same types of 
punishment as common criminals”.785 
The final justification for strict liability offences put forward by Herring was the 
Human Rights Act, although his argument was less a justification than a 
confirmation that strict liability offences are not prohibited by the Human Rights 
Act and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.786  Making 
reference to key judgements, Herring confirmed that strict liability offences do 
not infringe Article 6 of the Convention.  
Wells used the inchoate mode to differentiate between what she terms 
“conventional offences” and “regulatory offences”.787  Although a conventional 
offence can take an inchoate mode, it is normally one of a pair with the partner 
being result-based, for example, attempted murder and murder.  Regulatory 
offences will often stop at the inchoate stage, what follows being irrelevant to 
the offence.  The inchoate nature of health and safety offences is illustrated by 
R. v. Board of Trustees of the Science Museum where it was held that it was 
only necessary to show that risk to health could exist for an offence to be 
committed in terms of Section 3(1) of the Health and Safety at Work etc., Act 
1974.788  It was not necessary to prove that injury was caused, or even that the 
risk to health did exist.  In this case, discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, 
the Board of Trustees of the Science Museum were successfully prosecuted for 
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having a cooling tower contaminated with Legionella Pneumophila, the 
bacterium responsible for Legionnaires Disease.  Although only presenting a risk 
when inhaled, it was held that it was not necessary to prove that any member of 
the public had been exposed to it as a result of the operation of the cooling 
tower, nor even that it had escaped into the atmosphere; the presence of the 
bacterium and the potential for it to escape was enough for risk to be 
established.  This could be important in distinguishing between the 1974 Act and 
the 2007 Act where an offence is only committed when a death has occurred, 
but there could be breach of the former where there is the potential of a 
fatality, even if it has not occurred.  
Using the distinction between safety and harm, Wells argued that regulation 
strives for the former but criminal law punishes the latter.789  Looking at 
regulation and criminal law more broadly than Wells, Baldwin et al reached a 
similar view and suggested that the former is intended to encourage particular 
activities or to change behaviour, whilst the latter is focussed on punishing 
wrongdoing although they accepted that not everyone found it a convincing 
argument.790  This is illustrated by the case of R. v. Board of Trustees of the 
Science Museum where the offence is exposing members of the public to risk, so 
the emphasis is on ensuring safety rather than punishing harm.  Even if deaths 
had occurred and could be directly attributed to the state of the cooling towers, 
the nature of the offence would not change (although any penalty applied may 
take into account its consequences and additional offences may have been 
committed, for example, gross negligence manslaughter).  Once again, this 
distinction illustrates the difference between the 2007 Act and the 1974 Act, 
with the former punishing a particular type of harm and the latter striving for 
safety. 
Clarkson et al argued that offences of the nature discussed in the previous 
paragraphs are not inchoate since they do not require a second offence to give 
them meaning, in effect, an offence cannot be inchoate if there is no 
substantive offence.791  Conspiracy, incitement, and attempt are inchoate 
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offences but in themselves they are incomplete, there must be a subsequent 
crime or offence, for example, murder, fraud, etc. – the substantive offence.792  
This view is also put forward by Ashworth who discussed the need for a 
substantive offence which does not exist in the example of R. v. Board of 
Trustees of the Science Museum.  Health and safety offences will not normally 
fall under any of the categories of inchoate offences described by Clarkson et al 
and Ashworth, that is, conspiracy, incitement or attempt and are, in themselves, 
substantive offences.  This somewhat contradicts Wells, although there are 
similarities between inchoate offences and health and safety offences of the 
type described in the previous paragraphs, the main one being that harm is not 
caused but the offence has still been committed. 
A further category of offence exists, endangerment offences, which share some 
of the characteristics of inchoate offences, most notably that physical harm 
need not have occurred for the offence to be committed.793  The most 
significant difference between endangerment and the various inchoate offences 
is that the former does not need a subsequent offence to exist; it is a crime in 
itself but only where there is a potential for harm.  Alvesalo et al pointed out 
that many health and safety offences do not require actual or even “abstract” 
endangerment to exist, they exist in the absence of any consequences.794  
Clarkson et al puts some health and safety offences in the category of 
endangerment but it is certainly the case that they would not all fit there, 
particularly the administrative offences such as not having a safety policy.795   
 
6.6 Criminal or Regulatory? 
Regulation has also been described as “quasi” rather than “real” crime with the 
term being used to describe offences committed by “…white collar criminals 
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pursuing their business interests and those committing road traffic offences.”796  
Lacey et al did not support this distinction and went on to argue that it is 
difficult to justify any conceptual difference between injuries or loss arising 
from breaches of regulation and injury or loss arising through theft or assault.  
Fitzgerald identified “real” crimes as those that are mala in se, and “quasi” 
crimes as those that are mala prohibita.797  In many respects, this distinction is 
similar, if not identical, to that discussed previously of crimina and 
contravention.798  Like Hildebrandt, Fitzgerald also traced the origins of this 
distinction to mediaeval times, or even earlier. Travers suggested that almost all 
criminal offences prior to the Industrial Revolution were mala in se and it was 
the advent of the Industrial Revolution that created the need for mala prohibita 
offences.799  This would imply that there was no moral blame attached to the 
offence of failing to protect workers and the public from hazardous factory 
conditions.  Interestingly, Fitzgerald suggested that employers have a moral duty 
to protect the health and safety of employees but he went on to point out that, 
with the introduction of factories legislation, offences have “…descended into a 
wealth of detail impossible to deduce from the general moral principle…”.800  
Fitzgerald focused on moral blame when distinguishing between “real” crime 
and “quasi” crime, and suggested that since the latter involves “little if any 
moral blame”, they should only carry minor penalties and trial by jury “…is 
probably inappropriate…”.801  He then went on to identify a further category of 
offence, a form of mala prohibita which “…falls midway between real crime and 
the pure technical offence.”  In effect, there are some offences which, whilst 
not mala in se, are too serious to be subject to “trivial” penalty. 
This approach to crime and whether it is ‘true’ or ‘regulatory’ in nature has 
been questioned by many commentators.  Dennis suggested that classifying 
crime by mala in se or mala prohibita is problematic and not particularly robust 
for two reasons; relying on the” moral quality” of the act is far too ambiguous 
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and it would also be contestable in court.802  Some health and safety or 
environmental offences could be as morally reprehensible as other, more 
traditional crimes and certainly some of the incidents discussed in Chapter Five 
and elsewhere in this document would be described as such.  Almond argued 
that trying to establish the mala in se/mala prohibita distinction on the basis of 
content is “…doomed to failure…” as a consequence of the variety of criminal 
offences, many of which prohibit some form of wrongdoing that impacts on 
public welfare.803  This would suggest that any distinction between true and 
regulatory crime on the basis of mala in se and mala prohibita is increasingly 
difficult to sustain but it is used to support the implication that regulatory crime 
is somehow less serious than true crime. 
The last word on the difference between mala in se and mala prohibita must go 
to Jeremy Bentham who, when commenting on Blackstone’s classifications 
contained in his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1772) declared “…that 
acute distinction between mala in se, and mala prohibita, which being so 
shrewd and sounding so pretty and being in Latin, has no sort of an occasion to 
have any meaning to it; accordingly it has none”.804  The debate on whether or 
not there is any really difference between real and quasi crime, mala in se and 
mala prohibita, certainly predates the industrial revolution and seems to be no 
nearer a resolution.  This would logically lead on to the view that any distinction 
between criminal and regulatory law, irrespective of how each is described, only 
exists in the minds of some of the legal profession, at least in the UK.  The 
exceptions to the rules described previously in this Chapter are too extensive 
and numerous to allow for such a distinction to be made.  Neither the penalties 
available or the enforcing agencies involved in prosecuting an offence are 
reliable tests and, as discussed above, strict liability offences can be criminal or 
regulatory, depending upon the circumstances.  Is it any less moral to cause a 
death through dangerous driving, which would be considered a crime, or through 
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failing to provide a safe place of work, which would normally be considered 
regulatory? 
It is clear that there is no objective test for distinguishing criminal from 
regulatory offences so why is a contravention of the health and safety legislation 
arising from unsafe conditions not considered “real” crime when its 
consequences could be catastrophic?  The Law Commission acknowledged the 
problems of differentiating between regulatory and criminal law concluding that  
“…a rigid distinction between criminal or regulatory law and criminal or 
regulatory procedure may confuse rather more than it illuminates…”.805  It goes 
on to identify three characteristics of a criminal offence; the case must be 
pursued through the Crown Court or magistrates’ courts, it must be proved 
beyond reasonable doubt to have occurred and if proved, the court may impose 
a “detrimental, punitive measure”. Most health and safety offences satisfy each 
of these characteristics and consequently would be described as criminal, even 
though the legislation they derive from is regulatory in nature. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 was the 
Government’s response to the demand for companies to be ‘properly’ punished 
when they cause deaths through their activities and to address the particular 
difficulties associated with their prosecution as a consequence of their nature.  
It effectively criminalised what had previously been the domain of regulation 
with the implication that a regulatory approach to this particular aspect of 
unlawful activity was inadequate, inappropriate or had failed in some way.  It is 
fair to say that the impact of the Act has been relatively insignificant in terms of 
the number of successful prosecutions and this will be discussed in more detail 
in the final chapter. 
This Chapter set out to establish the difference between regulatory and criminal 
law in the context of workplace health and safety.  As discussed, health and 
                                        




safety law is generally considered regulatory rather than criminal but the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 sits uncomfortably 
between these two rather artificial categories seemingly neither one nor the 
other, or perhaps a bit of both.  In practical terms, at least so far as deaths 
arising from work activities is concerned, it is of little consequence.  There are 
similar levels of fines for offences under either the health and safety legislation 
(‘regulatory’) or the corporate manslaughter Act (‘true’ criminal legislation). 
There is, however, a far wider range of offences and penalties available under 
the health and safety legislation, including fines and imprisonment for 
individuals found guilty of an offence.  In any case, they are not mutually 
exclusive and it is likely that many of the corporate manslaughter prosecutions 
will also have parallel health and safety prosecutions. 
The first point to make is that, in general, there is no practical difference 
between criminal and regulatory law, at least so far as the consequences of a 
trial and subsequent punishment of offences is concerned, although attitudes to 
their enforcement may vary. The distinction between criminal and regulatory 
law is somewhat artificial, they are both criminal law in so far as the offences 
are prescribed in statute, although the term “true” or “real” crime is often used 
for the former , implying that, in some way, that there is crime that is not true 
or real.806  This leads on to the question of why some types of offence are 
viewed as a crime, whilst others are considered regulatory which leads to the 
further question of why regulation is viewed with “indifference” by the UK legal 
profession.807   
Although a number of criteria have been discussed as the basis for 
differentiation between criminal and regulatory law, none of them are 
sufficiently robust to properly justify it and the conclusion must be drawn that 
the distinction is only to be found in some sections of the legal profession.  In 
effect, there is no practical difference between what has been described as true 
or real crime, and regulation but it is inevitable that the debate will continue 
long into the future.  It is still fair to say that true crime carries more stigma 
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that regulatory crime although as more and more individuals are subject to 
imprisonment for health and safety offences, that perception may change in the 
future. 
The final Chapter will now examine how this rather strange combination of what 
is perceived as true criminal legislation and the more traditional regulatory 
approach have impacted upon large organisations and corporations following the 
implementation of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 




7.0 General Conclusions 
The history of prosecuting corporate killing in the United Kingdom is 
complicated, made even more so by a rather artificial distinction between 
regulation and true criminal law. This perceived distinction was discussed at 
some length in Chapter Six and whilst there may have been an actual distinction 
in mediaeval times between crimina, violations of royal peace, and 
contraventions, violations of administrative rules, that distinction has become 
increasingly blurred over the centuries to such an extent that, in practice, there 
is no practical difference between regulation and true crime.  The penalties for 
each can include fines and/or imprisonment and they can both result in a 
criminal record.  What remains is the question of stigma which some 
commentators suggest is greater for true crime rather than regulation.  Stigma is 
not easy to measure but it is difficult to see how a prison sentence imposed for a 
contravention of a health and safety requirement results in any less stigma than 
a prison sentence imposed for any other type of criminal offence.   
Having said that, there is no escaping the fact that health and safety legislation 
has evolved through regulation which is reflected in many of its characteristics, 
in particular the nature of some offences including the imposition of strict 
liability upon individuals and companies.  There has been unease expressed by 
some commentators about some of the characteristics of health and safety 
offences but they have been tested in various courts and found to be lawful in 
their application.  It must also be noted that they have proved effective in 
improving workplace health and safety in the United Kingdom and statistics 
would suggest it is generally better than in countries, where health and safety 
legislation does not exist or is poorly enforced.  This would tend to support the 
view that employers will not invest in safety unless they are forced to do so 
through the threat of prosecution, fines and possible imprisonment. 
Whilst the health and safety legislation developed in the UK over the last couple 
of centuries can be generally agreed to have been successful in improving health 
and safety in the workplace, it has been less effective in preventing the 
disasters that resulted in a major loss of life, but that was never the intention.  
There was an upwelling of opinion that the large companies involved in these 
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incidents had somehow escaped proper punishment, in effect they had got away 
with murder.  The large fines imposed in some cases were not considered 
sufficient and there was a demand for “something to be done”.  As discussed in 
Chapter Five, that “something” culminated in the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 which was intended to punish organisations that 
caused the death of persons to whom they owed a duty of care.  Very 
importantly, individual liability for corporate manslaughter was explicitly 
excluded from the Act but the offence of gross negligence manslaughter 
continued to be available where the death was at least partly attributed to the 
actions of an individual.   
The failure to include individual liability for corporate manslaughter is one of 
the main criticisms levelled against the 2007 Act and that in itself is sufficient 
for it to be considered only a half-measure in dealing with corporate killing.  
Although the gross negligence manslaughter offence is available to prosecutors, 
it will only ever be able to be used where an individual senior manager can be 
shown to have day-to-day involvement in the operational activities of the 
organisation.  This means that, inevitably, gross negligence manslaughter 
proceedings will only ever be able to be taken against senior managers in micro, 
small and the smaller medium-sized companies, senior managers of larger 
organisations will effectively be immune from such proceedings as a 
consequence of their separation from the day-to-day operational activities.  This 
is obviously extremely unfair and results in a two tier justice system, but 
perhaps just as importantly, it means there is absolutely no individual 
manslaughter liability for senior managers in larger organisations.  This, in turn, 
means there is little incentive provided by the 2007 Act for them to ensure 
safety at every level of the organisation for both workers and others who may be 
affected by work activities.  
This is one area where the 2008 Act may give the health and safety legislation an 
advantage over the 2007 Act.  As discussed in Chapter Three, Section 37 of the 
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 extends liability for an organisations’ 
offences to senior managers where it can be shown that they have occurred as a 
consequence of their consent, connivance, or negligence.  Following the 
introduction of the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008, Section 37 offences 
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can now attract a prison sentence of up to twelve months and/or a fine of up to 
£20000 when tried summarily, or a prison sentence of up to two years and an 
unlimited fine when tried on indictment.  Prison sentences have been imposed in 
respect of small number of Section 37 cases, but whilst it will never be easy to 
prove an offence, it does provide an alternative route to gross negligence 
manslaughter where senior managers of large organisations are implicated as a 
result of their consent, connivance or negligence in the death of a worker or 
other person.  This in itself could make the ‘traditional’ health and safety 
approach more effective than the 2007 Act in the vast majority of cases. 
Before finally concluding and for the sake of balance, any potential benefits of 
the 2007 Act must be identified and discussed.  At least for a short period of 
time, it did raise and revitalise the safety debate in the UK and many 
organisations did review their approach to health and safety, including the 
requirements of the relevant statutory provisions.  It must be recognised that it 
is quite a different matter for an organisation to be found guilty of corporate 
manslaughter rather than a health and safety offence, even though the 
circumstances and consequences may be identical.  The bad publicity from a 
charge of corporate manslaughter should, for most organisations, be worrying 
enough, but to be found guilty and subject to a publicity order could cause 
serious concern for some.  Unfortunately, the lack of proceedings for corporate 
manslaughter and, in particular, the complete absence of what could be 
considered high profile successful prosecutions since its implementation, has 
gradually reduced the impact of the 2007 Act and apart from that brief flurry of 
interest shortly before and after its introduction, it is now the subject of very 
few scholarly articles and commentary. 
 In conclusion, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 is 
not, in itself, a bad piece of legislation, it is more a question of its relevance.  It 
has not had the impact that many had hoped for, which is partly attributable to 
the failure to include individual liability, but enforcement by the police is 
clearly a significant area of weakness since they have neither the resources nor 
expertise in the vast majority of circumstances that would give rise to corporate 
manslaughter proceedings.  It is unlikely that corporate manslaughter will have a 
high priority in most police forces when many are stretched with anti-terrorism 
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activities and other violent crimes.  It is impossible to know whether or not the 
Health and Safety Executive would have been more active in taking corporate 
manslaughter cases if it had been given the responsibility for enforcement but it 
is fair to make the assumption that they would, given their general track record 
for enforcement action. 
The 2007 Act does not seem to have addressed the concerns of a two-tier 
approach to work-related deaths with the only successful prosecutions taken by 
the end of 2015 being against small or medium-sized companies although that 
has changed with the unsuccessful proceedings taken against Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust.  It is likely that all of the successful prosecutions 
taken by the end of 2015 would have been equally successful as common law 
corporate manslaughter proceedings and this would seem to be supported by the 
number of corresponding gross negligence manslaughter charges brought against 
senior managers at the same time, indicating that the identification doctrine, 
had it still been required, would have been satisfied.  At this point in time and 
taking into account the very small number of proceedings, it would appear that 
large organisations are still much less likely to be subject to prosecution for 
corporate manslaughter than small and medium companies. Similarly, the 
experience so far would indicate that gross negligence manslaughter charge will 
only be of concern for senior managers of the smaller organisations. 
Following the demand for “something to be done” in light of Piper Alpha, Herald 
of Free Enterprise, Paddington, and other disasters, it can only be concluded 
that corporations had the best possible outcome they could have hoped for.  The 
original inclusion of individual responsibility was deleted, the need to 
demonstrate a duty of care (according to the laws of negligence) and to show a 
gross breach of that duty of care caused by a substantial element of senior 
management failures, has resulted in very high barriers to be crossed and the 
larger the organisation, the higher those barriers become.  It could certainly be 
argued that the eventual drafting of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007 was perhaps more sympathetic to the arguments of 
corporations and other organisations than those seeking a more aggressive 
approach to punish them for deaths arising from their work activities.  Until the 
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outcomes of proceedings against large organisations are known, the 
effectiveness of the 2007 Act will remain subject to speculation. 
Without question, the 2007 Act is symbolic in so far as it was introduced as a 
consequence of public pressure to address a very specific form of unlawful 
killing.  Whether or not it is, or will become, more than symbolic will only be 
properly judged when further proceedings, in particular against larger 
organisations, have been initiated but at this point in time it is looking 
increasingly unlikely that it will be anything other than the legislative equivalent 
of the emperor’s new clothes; no-one really believes in it but pretend that they 
do.  The alternative to the 2007 Act would have been to address the 
identification doctrine directly and/or revise the health and safety legislation to 
include a specific offence of causing death through work activities.  The Health 
and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 provided the courts with an appropriate range of 
penalties to deal with most circumstances including imprisonment for individuals 
held responsible, including through their neglect, for the deaths. 
The original intention of this research was to examine the effect of the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 on the behaviour of 
organisations (‘corporations’) in respect of deaths arising from their activities 
but it quickly became apparent that the real issue to address was why the 2007 
Act was considered necessary in the first place.  The completely unrelated 
Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 introduced a new dimension in health and 
safety regulation which must call into question the whole purpose of the 2007 
Act.  The history of health and safety regulation, the nature of corporations and 
corporate killing and, finally, criminalising what had previously been regulatory 
offences all have a part to play in the eventual, and rather confused, approach 
to corporate killing in the United Kingdom. 
The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 was the product 
of a campaign to punish corporations following a number of high profile 
accidents at the end of the twentieth and start of the twenty-first centuries.  
What all of these accidents had in common was a significant number of deaths 
and the failure of the State to successfully prosecute any of the large 
organisations responsible for corporate manslaughter even though that 
possibility had been previously established in law.  It is worth noting that the 
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number of fatal and non-fatal accidents in the workplace had been reducing 
steadily over the decades prior to the 2007 Act with the introduction of the 
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 resulting in a dramatic decrease in the 
fatal accident rate which would indicate that the health and safety legislation 
was effective in its intentions.  Health and safety legislation, and particularly 
the 1974 Act, was never intended to be punitive and nor was it intended to deal 
specifically with workplace deaths.  Although it has proved effective in 
improving workplace safety, it is still perceived as something less than true 
criminal law and even though multi-million pound fines have been imposed for 
health and safety breaches, regulatory offences tend not to have the same 
stigma typically associated with criminal offences.  The Health and Safety 
(Offences) Act 2008 which introduced prison sentences for a much wider range 
of offences may, in time, change some of the attitudes towards regulatory 
offences; a prison sentence will almost certainly carry the same social stigma 
irrespective of the nature of the crime.  
The question, “Why were the high profile corporate manslaughter cases arising 
from work related fatal accidents in the latter half of the twentieth century and 
the early part of the twenty-first century unable to result in a successful 
prosecution?” is much easier to answer and was discussed at length in Chapter 
Five but in essence, the identification doctrine made it almost impossible for a 
successful manslaughter case to be brought against any but the very smallest 
organisations.  This in itself created a two-tier system of justice with large 
organisations being immune from corporate manslaughter charges but small 
organisations being all too vulnerable to them.  Similarly, managing directors of 
large organisations were also protected from gross negligence manslaughter 
charges as a consequence of their separation from the day to day operation of 
their organisations whereas it was much more likely that senior managers of 
small organisations could be directly associated with the circumstances leading 
to fatal accidents.  Unfortunately this state of affairs seems not to have changed 
significantly following the introduction of the 2007 Act with mainly small and 




This leads on to the question “Will the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act address the apparent or perceived shortcomings in the current 
approach to prosecution for corporate manslaughter following work related 
deaths?”,  which is, perhaps, the most difficult to answer definitively.  It has 
been in force for just over seven years and it is fair to say that it has not been 
tested in anger as yet.  Apart from the novelty of the very first corporate 
manslaughter charge brought against R v Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd, 
subsequent cases could not be described as high profile and haven’t put the 
2007 Act under public scrutiny.  The failure to include individual liability in the 
Act will inevitably reduce its deterrent effect for large organisations and other 
than a flurry of interest when it was first introduced, the Act has faded into the 
background and there is not any evidence that organisations have modified their 
behaviour in response to it.  It will almost certainly take a major tragedy similar 
to those generally considered responsible for the introduction of the 2007 Act 
before this question can be fully answered but on the evidence available to 
date, it must be in the negative, there is no indication that it will address those 
apparent or perceived shortcomings.  If this the case, the penultimate question, 
“Is the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act ‘symbolic’ rather 
than ‘instrumental’  and if so, is it an appropriate approach to dealing with 
workplace safety?” can only be answered yes, it is symbolic and no, it is not an 
appropriate approach to dealing with workplace safety.   
With so few corporate manslaughter charges being brought in terms of the Act, 
and most of those against the smallest companies, it is difficult to see it as 
anything other than symbolic.  That in itself might be sufficient for it to have 
the desired effect of modifying organisations’ behaviour to prevent the type of 
accidents seen in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries but there is 
little evidence of that happening.  In many respects, the answer to this question 
is closely associated with the answer to the previous question, it will take an 
accident resulting in a major loss of life before the true nature of the Act is 
revealed.  The importance of symbolism must not be overlooked, however.  No 
matter how ineffective the 2007 Act proves to be, it has clearly established 
corporate manslaughter as a bona fide offence which any organisation held 
responsible for the death of a person could be charged with.  Perhaps that in 
itself justifies the Act’s existence although Chapters Four and Five would 
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indicate that organisations of any size cannot be expected to behave in a socially 
responsible way unless there are punitive consequences for not doing so and high 
chance of being caught, so symbolism might not be enough. 
The answer to the final research question, “With the introduction of the Health 
and Safety (Offences) Act 2008, has the “regulatory” approach finally been given 
the means necessary to properly address its previous perceived shortcomings and 
made the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act irrelevant?” is no.  
If the purpose of the 2007 Act was to specifically address deaths arising from 
work activities, the 2008 Act is not in any way an alternative means to achieve 
that objective.  The 2008 Act does not contain any new offences, its sole 
purpose is to provide for a wider range of penalties, including prison, for existing 
health and safety offences and contraventions.  When combined with Sections 7 
and 37 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, it allows prison sentences 
to be imposed upon individuals found guilty of an offence.  Whilst it could be 
expected that prison sentences would be imposed where the outcome of an 
offence or contravention is death, the consequences of the contravention will 
only be one factor in sentencing although it might be an important one.  In this 
respect it differs from the gross negligence manslaughter offence where the 
penalty is based on the consequences of the action leading to the fatality, the 
consequences are the offence.  The 2008 Act had little impact on the financial 
penalties available for indictable health and safety offences, unlimited fines 
were already available as illustrated by the fine of £15 million imposed upon 
Transco.808 
For all of its shortcomings, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 
Act 2007 is here to stay.  It is impossible to see into the future but given its 
track record over the past years, it is likely that it will continue to be of 
marginal significance with only a few cases being prosecuted each year.  The 
number of prosecutions taken since its implementation is a very small 
percentage of the number of deaths arising from work activities over the same 
period of time and it is difficult to see any rationale for the cases actually taken.  
If the intention was to address the problems associated with punishing 
corporations whose actions resulted in the deaths of worker and others, an 
                                        
808 R. v Transco plc  op. cit. n.339 
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amendment to the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 introducing a 
specific corporate killing offence might have been much more effective, 
particularly when combined with the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008, but 
that assumes a real commitment by the Establishment to punish corporations 
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Appendix A – Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Prosecutions to December 
2015 
Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Ltd –January 2010 
Found guilty of corporate manslaughter and fined £385 000 following the death 
of an employee when the trench he was working in collapsed. This was the first 
successful corporate manslaughter prosecution. 
The owner of the company, Mr Peter Eaton, was charged with gross negligence 
manslaughter but the charge was not pursued as a consequence of his ill-health. 
JMW Farms – May 2012 
Found guilty of corporate manslaughter and fined £187 500 plus costs of £13 000 
(plus VAT of 20%) following the death of an employee when washing a large 
metal bin supported by a fork lift truck.   
The victim jumped on the side of the bin which toppled, causing him to fall and 
it to land on top of him, causing his death.  The lift truck was a replacement for 
the usual equipment which had been removed for servicing.  The forks on the 
replacement lift truck were in a different position from the usual equipment and 
did not correspond to the sleeves on the bin, causing the bin to slip and fall on 
top of the victim. 
The Recorder considered a fine of £250 000 appropriate for what was described 
as a foreseeable accident, but reduced it by 25% on account of a guilty plea. 
Lion Steel Limited – July 2012 
A complicated case, the charge of corporate manslaughter was laid against Lion 
Steel Limited following the death of an employee after falling through a fragile 
roof.  The victim had no training, no risk assessment had been carried out and 
there was no safe system of work in place.  In addition to the charge of 
corporate manslaughter, charges of gross negligence manslaughter were laid 
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against three of the four company directors and various health and safety 
charges were also laid, including breaches of Section 37 of the Health and Safety 
at Work etc. Act 1974 against each of the company directors. 
The defendants successfully applied for the corporate manslaughter charges to 
be held separately from the individual charges against the company directors.  
The first trial was in respect of the individual charges but after a number of the 
charges were dismissed, an agreement was reached where the company pleaded 
guilty of corporate manslaughter in return for all charges against individuals 
being dismissed.  The company was fined £480 000 with costs of £84 000. 
J Murray and Sons Limited – October 2013 
The charge of corporate manslaughter was brought against J Murray and Sons 
Limited following the death of an employee when operating a meal mixing 
machine.  Although there were no witnesses to the accident, it is assumed he 
fell into the machinery when using it for its intended purpose.  Safety panels had 
been removed to make it easier to add materials and were missing at the time of 
the accident. 
The company pleaded guilty to the offence and was fined £100 000 plus £10 450 
costs. 
Princes Sporting Club Limited – November 2013 
The Princes Sporting Club Limited pleaded guilty to corporate manslaughter 
following the death of an eleven year-old girl who died following a fall from a 
banana boat operated by the company.  The company ceased trading shortly 
after the accident and was subsequently fined £34 579.69, the sum of the total 
assets of the company, plus £100 000 costs.  A publicity order was also made, 
the first one ever, even though the company had ceased trading.   
A charge in terms of Section 37 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 




Mobile Sweepers (Reading) Limited – December 2013 
Mobile Sweepers (Reading) Limited was fined £8 000 following the death of an 
employee who was crushed to death when the hopper of a road sweeper he was 
working on fell on him.  The company ceased trading shortly after the accident 
and had only £12 000 left in the bank at the time of the trial.  The Judge also 
imposed a publicity order on the company. 
In addition to the corporate manslaughter charge, the company director was 
charged with gross negligence manslaughter and in terms of Section 37 of the 
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.  The gross negligence manslaughter 
was not pursued but the company director was found guilty in terms of Section 
37 of the 1974 Act, fined £183 000 plus £8 000 costs and disqualified from 
holding the position of director for five years. 
Cavendish Masonry Limited – May 2014 
Following the death of a stonemason’s mate, crushed under a two-tonne stone 
lintel, Cavendish Masonry Limited was found guilty of corporate manslaughter 
and fined £87 117.69 with costs of £150 000.  The company had pled not guilty 
to the corporate manslaughter charge having previously pled guilty to health and 
safety charges brought for the same accident. 
PS & JE Ward Limited – June 2014 
PS & JE Ward Limited was the first company to successfully defend itself against 
corporate manslaughter charges which were brought in respect of the death of a 
tractor driver who was fatally electrocuted when the trailer he was towing came 
into contact with overhead power lines.   
Although found not guilty of corporate manslaughter, the company was found 
guilty of health and safety offences and fined £50 000 with £48 000 costs.   
MNS Mining Limited – June 2014 
Following the deaths of four miners when the mine they were working in flooded 
with 500 000 gallons of water, MNS Mining Limited was charged with four 
accounts of corporate manslaughter and the mine manager was charged with 
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four accounts of gross negligence manslaughter.  Both the company and mine 
manager were found not guilty of the offences for which they were charged. 
Sterecycle (Rotherham) Limited – November 2014 
One worker was killed and another seriously injured when an autoclave used by 
Sterecyle (Rotherham) Limited to treat domestic waste exploded.  The company, 
which went into liquidation shortly after the accident, was fined £500 000 after 
being found guilty of corporate manslaughter.  At the time, that was the largest 
fine imposed for the offence and the first to be in line with that set by the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council. 
Three employees were charged with offences in terms of Section 7 of the Health 
and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, which were withdrawn, and one was also 
charged with perverting the course of justice but found not guilty. 
A Diamond and Son (Timber) Ltd – December 2014 
A family run timber merchants in Northern Ireland, A Diamond and Son were 
fined £75 000 with costs of £15 832 following the death of an employee who was 
crushed when carrying out maintenance on a large machine.  Even though guards 
on the machine had been disabled and no training had been provided on 
repairing the machine in maintenance mode, the judge considered that the 
offence had arisen through human error rather than pursuit of profit.  Other 
factors taken into account when setting the rather low fine was the debt of £1.4 
million carried by the company at that time. 
Peter Mawson Limited – December 2014 
Following the death of an employee after falling through a fragile roof, the 
company pleaded guilty to corporate manslaughter and was fined £200 000 with 
costs of £31 500 and a publicity order was made.  Both the company and the 
managing director, Peter Mawson, were also found guilty of health and safety 
offences with the former fined a further £20 000 and Mawson was sentenced to a 
prison sentence of eight months, suspended for two years and given a 




Pyranha Mouldings Limited – January 2015 
Pyranha Mouldings Limited was charged with corporate manslaughter and various 
breaches of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 following the death of a 
worker who was carrying out maintenance inside an oven used to create kayak 
moulds when it was turned on.  The oven doors locked when it was switched on 
and there was no means of escape or alarm provided within it.  The Company 
was convicted of the various offences and fined £200 000 with a share of the 
costs of £90 000. 
The Company’s Technical Director was charged and found guilty of health and 
safety offences, sentenced to nine months imprisonment suspended for two 
years, fined £25 000 with a share of the costs referred to in the previous 
paragraph. 
Kings Scaffolding Limited – April 2015 
After pleading guilty, Kings Scaffolding Limited was fined £300 000 following the 
death of an employee who fell through a fragile skylight whilst carrying out roof 
repairs. 
Huntley Mount Engineering Limited – July 2015 
Four parties were found guilty of various offences arising from the death of a 
sixteen year-old apprentice when he was instructed to clean a moving part of 
machinery.  The Company was fined £150 000 after pleading guilty to corporate 
manslaughter charges and the organisation that placed the victim with the 
Company, Lime People Training Solutions Limited, was found guilty of health and 
safety offences and fined £75 000 with £25 000 costs. 
The Company owner and his son were also found guilty of health and safety 
offences, with the owner sentenced to eight months imprisonment and 
disqualified from being a company director for ten years and the son sentenced 
a prison sentence of four months, suspended for twelve months, 200 hours 
unpaid community service and a £3000 fine.  Both father and son were subject 
to court costs of £15 000 each. 
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CAV Aerospace Limited – July 2015 
CAC Aerospace Limited was fined a total of £1 000 000 with costs of £125 000 
after being found guilty of corporate manslaughter and various health and safety 
offences following the death of an employee, crushed under a stack of sheet 
metal.  The Company was fined £600 000 for the corporate manslaughter offence 
and £400 000 for the health and safety offences. 
This case attracted additional attention because the fatality occurred in a 
subsidiary of the parent company but it was the latter that was charged and 
found guilty.   
Linley Development Limited – September 2015 
Following the death of a worker when a wall collapsed, Linley Development 
Limited was fined £200 000 plus £25 000 costs after pleading guilty to a charge 
of corporate manslaughter.  A publicity order was made against the company. 
The company director was found guilty of health and safety offences, given a six 
month prison sentence, suspended for twenty-four months, and fined £25 000 
with £7 500 costs.  The project manager was also found guilty of health and 
safety offences, given a six month prison sentence, suspended for twenty-four 
months, and ordered to pay costs of £5 000.  Charges of gross negligence 
manslaughter against both the company director and project manager were 
withdrawn. 
Baldwin Crane Hire Limited – December 2015 
Baldwin Crane Hire Limited was found guilty of corporate manslaughter and 
various health and safety offences following the death of an employee when the 
mobile crane he was driving crashed after the braking system failed.  Further 
investigation of the Company’s fleet found serious faults in the braking systems 
of a number of vehicles. 
The Company was fined £700 000 plus £200 000 costs and required to post 
details of the offence on its website for a period of six months and place a 
similar notice in the trade publication. 
